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Preface
Thailand in Transition goes beyond the conventional approach
to Thai politics present in most of the literature, which concen-
trates on the traditional institutions in Thailand—the monarchy,
the military, and the bureaucracy. The objective here has been
rather to examine the more contemporary emergent opposi-
tional forces struggling to play a permanent and significant role
in the broader context of Thai politics.
Oppositional forces in Thailand are many and varied,
ranging from the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT),
which seeks to overthrow the Thai government, to the Thai Par-
liament, which is usually legitimized as part of the government
for brief periods between military coups. This book focuses on
the CPT, workers, students, and Parliament by presenting in his-
torical perspective the origins, nature, and influence of each
as an oppositional force in Thai politics. Special attention is
given to the transitional role of these oppositional forces during
and after the dramatic shifts in Thai politics precipitated by
the student revolution of 1973, the military coup of 1976, the
increased hostilities between the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and Vietnam in 1979, and the abortive coup by the Thai
“Young Turk” military faction in 1981.
A separate chapter is devoted to each of the oppositional
forces, which have unique historical backgrounds. The histories
of these oppositional forces often transcend domestic Thai pol-
itics and involve ideological and other significant influences
from the PRC, Vietnam, and the United States. Moreover, these
oppositional forces have influenced significant periods of up-
heaval in contemporary Thai politics and have also affected Thai
foreign policy toward the United States, PRC, Vietnam, and to a
lesser extent Japan.
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It is my contention that the net effect of these upheavals,
beginning with the student revolution of 1973, has been the
gradual reform of traditional Thai institutions and the devel-
opment of a fragile but more permanent framework for demo-
cratic institutions. Most noteworthy among these democratic
institutions are free and regular elections, a viable Parliament,
and broad-based political parties.
This struggle and potential for democracy should be of par-
ticular interest to even the most casual follower of political
events. In the wave of authoritarian regimes of the extreme left
and right that has risen and engulfed most of the Southeast
Asian countries since 1975, the Philippines included, Thailand
remains at a critical political vantage point.
Without the development of permanent democratic institu-
tions Thailand may eventually face a fate similar to that of Laos
or Kampuchea. Even with the existence of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Thai government’s
various bilateral protection agreements with the United States,
PRC, and other countries, the Thais still face the threat of
Vietnamese military forces poised along the borders between
Thailand and Kampuchea and Laos. In the last analysis, the
Thais cannot take much comfort from recent statements of
government officials from Singapore and Malaysia who were
quoted in various newspapers as saying that Malaysia and Sin-
gapore “stand ready to fight the Vietnamese communist forces
to the last Thai.”
ROSS PRIZZIA
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Introduction
Transition, as it is implied here, encompasses the important
liberalizing changes of the new political environment which
emerged in the aftermath of the student revolution of October
1973. Hence transition means more than the relatively liberal
provisions and other changes of the new Thai constitution. Con-
stitutional change is not new to Thailand, but the prevailing
civilian awareness and attitude toward socialism, as well as
the increasing demands by well-organized groups of students,
teachers, workers, and farmers, do represent a significant de-
parture from all previous attempts to achieve democracy in
Thailand. Successful strikes by workers in Bangkok and grass-
roots movements in the provinces have characterized the new
emerging forces in Thai politics since the October student revolt
of 1973. These political events occurred at a rate never before
experienced by the Thais. Moreover, unlike previous protests,
these movements gained broad-based support from diverse
sectors of Thai society. Thailand’s experiment with democracy
after 1973 became not only the promotion of democratic in-
stitutions but a new determination on the part of previously
neglected and suppressed sectors of Thai society to achieve
permanent enfranchisement. Transition, in the context of po-
litical developments since 1973, is related to three main areas
of concern: bureaucratic reform, emerging social forces, and
changes in domestic and foreign policy.
CHANGE ON SEVERAL FRONTS
After the 1973 student-led overthrow of the Thanom military
regime, Thailand’s domestic policies became more involved
with socialistic programs representing a new policy approach.
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Related to this new approach in domestic affairs was the bu-
reaucratic reform which had taken place at various levels of the
Thai bureaucracy.
The traditional Thai bureaucracy has persisted in a con-
ventional mold with few exceptions since Prince Damrong in-
stituted the reforms of King Chulalongkorn the Great. This
bureaucracy has been described by many scholars of Thai pol-
itics (among them F. W. Riggs, W. F. Vella, J. L. Sutton, and W.
Siffen) as being one of the most adaptable and, at the same
time, the most durable systems of civil service in Southeast
Asia. Formed on Confucian principles of civil service and hier-
archy of authority that owed its origins and legitimacy to the
monarchy, this system has continued almost unchanged since
the 1932 coup which legally shifted the bureaucracy from the
monarchy to civilian and military control. In the aftermath of
the bloodless coup of 1932, power shifted to a slightly broader
based decision-making apparatus, but rule by various dominant
cliques at the highest level of this new power base still per-
sisted.
In comparison, reforms after October 1973 differed from
previous reforms in that the new changes were instigated from
below and addressed the process of selection in various sectors
of the Thai bureaucracy. Several stabilized positions in the bu-
reaucratic hierarchy of some of the ministries, which were nor-
mally based on upward advancement via seniority, became in-
creasingly rotative due to reform-minded Thai intellectuals and
the liberal atmosphere in the aftermath of the October revolt.
In some cases, a new democratic elective process replaced the
traditional appointments. These innovations were tried, began
to be accepted at various levels of the government bureaucracy,
and became particularly evident in the educational institutions.
Although the universities witnessed the most change, the
process was attempted by many other institutions including the
Ministry of Interior, various council positions, and even upper-
level positions of investigative teams involved in cases of gov-
ernment corruption. A variety of techniques were employed to
make recruitment and membership in these organizations and
government bodies more representative.
Another significant aspect of the transition was the emer-
gence of new social forces. The pressure brought to bear on
the provincial administrations in the urban centers outside the
capital city of Bangkok became increasingly intense, although
organized protests by the proliferation of oppositional groups
which emerged after the October 1973 revolt were most intense
Introduction
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in Bangkok. The techniques of the new social forces in pressing
demands on the various ministries and agencies of the govern-
ment became as diversified as the demands themselves. In one
case a schoolteacher, speaking to a rally of striking teachers in
front of the Ministry of Education, cut his wrist to emphasize his
determination to remain until the government capitulated to the
teachers’ demands.
The largest and most visible oppositional force immediately
after the 1973 October revolution was the students of the Na-
tional Student Center of Thailand (NSCT). Other student orga-
nizations, such as the Federation of Independent Students of
Thailand (FIST), which were breakaway groups from the NSCT,
also became prominent in pressing various demands for reform
on the new civilian government. In the eight to ten months after
the October uprising, however, many other groups assumed an
influential role. Fishermen’s organizations began to mobilize
national support more effectively and press their demands for
fishing rights and wage and price guarantees, while farmers’ as-
sociations conducted marches and also began to organize and
play an effective role in trying to achieve land reform and price
controls in rice production and distribution. Moreover, other
concerned critizens’ groups organized strikes and used various
techniques to press their demands on the government. At the
same time, workers and others became more effective in ex-
erting pressure on the government. Many of their demands
were for labor reform and other domestic policies calling for
greater control over foreign investments and more equitable
distribution of goods and services.
Another characteristic of the transition involved changes in
Thailand’s foreign policy. This aspect of the transition has most
to do with Thailand’s ultimate survival in the strategy for peace
in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, Thai foreign policy began to shift
toward neutralism and nonalignment in its mildest form and
toward anti-neocolonialism in its harshest form. The change in
Thai foreign policy was also characterized by a general trend
toward normalization of relations with the People’s Republic
of China and accommodation with the new communist govern-
ments of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Another significant
aspect of the foreign policy change was the withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Thailand and the general proposals of Thailand’s
first coalition government. Kukrit Pramoj, who led the coalition
government in 1973, devised a policy to phase out most
American-backed programs for counterinsurgency and defense
support. The overall proposal was designed so that no country
Thailand in Transition
3
in the future would use Thailand as a base for aggression on
other countries in Asia. These new policy proposals pertained
particularly to the U.S. air force bases which had carried out
bombing missions over Laos, Kampuchea, and North Vietnam.
This general policy shift included the prohibition of U.S. recon-
naisance flights from Thailand over the Indian Ocean. These
new far-reaching policies, domestic and international in scope,
began to form a pattern of policy objectives which fostered
a political climate favorable to the broadening of the base of
democracy in Thailand.
The new political climate also helped to foster specific pro-
grams designed to maintain democratic institutions. One such
program was the Teaching Democracy Program which sent five
thousand students to villages in order to work with the people.
This program included a public relations component which was
aired daily at prime time on national television. It also included
a series of colorful posters designed to prepare the phuu noi
(common people) for democracy. Various posters depicting the
necessity of equal treatment for all classes of people generally
sought to promote the right of all Thai citizens to participate
in the politics and future of their own country. Moreover, the
public relations aspect of this program was designed to break
down the psychological barriers which had helped keep the
rural Thais submissive to authoritarian rule by previous military
regimes.
Another element of the transition, though one not likely to
play a dominant role in the near future, was the philosophical
movement which grew extensively on the left of the Thai po-
litical spectrum. Thai leftist intellectuals, representing Marxist
and Russian progressivist philosophies, promoted socialistic
adaptations to the Thai situation. Moreover, a Maoist movement
caught hold among university students who wanted to prop-
agate radical changes in the provinces. Representatives of the
Russian philosophical movement proposed programs which
would gradually increase the pressure for change on traditional
Thai institutions; the Maoist-oriented movement was more in-
terested in inculcating new values in the common people to
replace those deemed most resistant to the proposed radical re-
forms of the Thai political system.
The political environment, particularly after 1973, also
created a unity of purpose among many oppositional groups.
Students and leftist groups jointly supported the protests
against police incursions involving mistreatment of members of
separatist movements in southern Thailand. Leaders of regional
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guerrilla movements in the north and northeast had begun to
collaborate in an attempt to create a unified front of insurgency.
Moreover, the general publication and leadership of “new left”
and traditional communist literature increased a hundredfold
during this period. At the universities, Thai intellectuals, in-
structors, and students began organizing panels, seminars, and
study groups to debate various political issues including the rel-
ative merits of the Marxist, Maoist, and Russian progressivist
approaches to political and economic development.
DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITION
It should be made clear, however, that it was not communist-
supported movements for a “people’s democracy” or a “new
democracy” that characterized political change in Thailand
either during the liberal period from 1973 to 1976 or during the
right-wing regime of Thanin from 1976 to 1979. Neither is the
term “democracy” when used in the context of transition meant
to imply only a reemergence of elections and parliamentary gov-
ernment.
Democracy in this context goes beyond the growth of de-
mocratic and parliamentary forms and addresses itself liberally
to a “broadening of the base”—the enfranchisement of new
groups. It is the expansion of popular participation in a largely
autocratic decision-making structure. While such a process may
admittedly occur within an authoritarian or totalitarian system,
what makes Thailand’s democracy unique is that the Thais have
chosen to broaden their political base through the mechanism
of parliamentarianism. By retaining accepted Thai values
whenever possible—despite their denunciation by some ele-
ments—in conjunction with Western vehicles for popular rep-
resentation, the Thais have blended Eastern methods with
Western forms.
Hence students could overthrow an unpopular regime and
call for a government of the masses, all the while prominently
displaying portraits of the monarchy’s incumbents, the king and
queen. Volunteers could take to the countryside in an attempt
to foster a Maoist cultural revolution of sorts, but parliamentary
democracy was the intended beneficiary. And workers could use
Soviet methods designed to achieve power for the workers—not
in order to seize the means of production but rather for the cap-
italist end of higher wages.
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After 1973 a new system emerged with the embryo of a new
popular consensus buttressing the legitimacy of parliamentary
forms. Between October 1973 and October 1976 hundreds of
incidents occurred throughout the kingdom, any one of which
would in the era of military domination have served as justifi-
cation for a coup. Emergent opposition forces forestalled such
a happening, and it is with the roots and growth of this kind of
democracy and participation that this book is concerned.
THE OPPOSITION
In Thailand oppositional forces are viewed as groups of people
mobilized to oppose or change the Thai government as rep-
resented by the monarch, the bureaucratic elite, and the mil-
itary. Opposition can take the form of parliamentary opposition,
which has been legitimized for brief periods between military
coups, or it may take a more violent form such as that of
the Communist Party of Thailand. Between these two extremes
various groups have emerged to oppose the Thai government
on specific issues and for particular periods of time. It is not my
intention to identify and explain the nature of all these groups;
instead I shall focus on two of the broad-based “progressive
forces” which gained significant momentum during and after
the student revolution of 1973: workers and students.
Other significant oppositional groups, such as the separatist
movement of the Malay Thais in the south and the Meo tribes
in the north, have been reasonably successful in sustaining
their movements for relatively long periods of time. These op-
positional groups are regional and ethnic in origin and nature,
however, and are seen as oppositional forces only within the
broad context of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).
This book deals only with those Thai oppositional forces rep-
resented by the CPT, workers, students, and Parliament. In the
following pages I shall explain the origin, nature, and influence
of each in Thai politics.
Introduction
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The Communist Party of
Thailand
The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) can be traced as far
back as 1925, when a Chinese communist agent was sent to or-
ganize overseas Chinese in Thailand. The Nationalist Chinese
Party, the Kuomintang, had already set up many similar orga-
nizations among the Chinese workers in Bangkok. After the
split between the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang
in China in 1927, similar ideological disagreements developed
among the overseas Chinese in Thailand. Chinese communists
in Thailand began to break away from the various overseas
Chinese organizations formed by the Kuomintang. At about the
same time, many university students had been introduced to the
ideas of Marx by European instructors at Chinese universities.
When serious differences arose between the Kuomintang
and the Communist Party in China, many of these Marxist-ori-
ented university students were arrested by order of Kuomintang
officials. To escape arrest, many students fled to Thailand where
they helped to organize the communist movement. Under their
leadership, various new organizations were initiated. The most
important of these new communist groups was the Association
of Communist Youth of Siam, which sought to spread the ideas
of Marx and Lenin, increase party membership, and raise funds
to support the communists’ struggle against the Kuomintang in
China.
THE INFLUENCE OF HO CHI MINH
From 1928 to 1931, according to some sources, the communist
movement in Thailand gained momentum from the Vietnamese
Communist Party under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Ac-
cording to a biography of Ho Chi Minh written by Jean Lacoutre,
Ho worked with the Vietnamese community in Thailand to
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strengthen the struggle for independence from France.1 La-
coutre maintains that Ho Chi Minh had considerable influence
in the eventual development of communism in northeastern
Thailand and in the resistance of Buddhist monks to the Saigon
government:
The following autumn Ho sailed from Siam with a triple objective:
to set up cells among the substantial Vietnamese colony there;
to foment trouble at the expense of the administration in nearby
Indochina; and to reorganize the Comintern’s networks in
Southeast Asia. In November 1928, there began to be talk of a
certain “Old Chin” in the northeastern provinces of Siam. He was
rumored to have come from China. But the Vietnamese in Siam
saw quickly that he was one of their own people. In Udong, and
subsequently in Sakon Nakhon, he founded a newspaper called
Thanh-Ai (Friendship), opened a school where Vietnamese and
Thai were taught side by side, and set up a forest cooperative.
The villagers worshipped “The Lord High Genie Tran”—the de-
parted spirit of Tran Hung Dao, the legendary sovereign who had
defeated the Mongols; so “Old Chin” composed a song of praise
to the “guardian spirit of the mountains and waters of Vietnam”:
requirements of the “nationalist phase” were leading him onto
strange ground. But in the eyes of Nguyen Ai Quoc, or Vuong, or
Chin [the various names of Ho Chi Minh], anything that extolled
the country’s merits was paving the way for revolution.
Clad in the robes of a Buddhist monk, he afterwards lived for
a while in Bangkok, studying and preaching and at the same time
setting up cells within the pagodas, training the young monks in
a comprehensive social philosophy which embraced everything
except the foreign invader and his hirelings. Traces of the net-
works which he then established, and of the watchwords which
he imparted, came to light years afterwards in south and south-
eastern Cochin China (1945), and perhaps even in 1963–1966,
when the Buddhists rose against the authorities in Saigon. After
all, Buddhism is rooted in attachment to the land of one’s fathers.
It attaches importance to the real, the immediate, the given, the
experienced. It is a happy hunting-ground for a skilled Marxist
like Ho.2
By 1931, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) had moved
its headquarters from Vietnam to northeastern Thailand to seek
the cooperation of the Vietnamese living there. The VCP
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workers were particularly effective in finding sympathizers
among the Thai Vietnamese, overseas Chinese, and Thai stu-
dents.
After the 1932 revolution, in which the absolute monarchy
was overthrown in a bloodless coup organized by the military
and Pridi Panomyong, the Thai communists increased their pro-
paganda under the name Siam Communist Committee. This
group claimed some credit for the change in government and re-
moval of the absolute powers of the monarchy. About this time,
three newspapers emerged which supported the claims of the
Siam Communist Committee. Their names carried symbolic rev-
olutionary titles: Satjang (Truth), 24 Mithuna (24 June—the date
of the revolution), and Muanchom Risapda (Masses Weekly), all
of which gave Marxist interpretations of international events.
The liberal political atmosphere which was so prevalent
in 1932 soon disappeared, and in 1933 the Thai government
passed the first anticommunist law. The law did not deter
several young advocates of socialism, however, for the very next
year leaflets urging the establishment of a Russian-style gov-
ernment in Thailand were distributed in the northeast by uni-
versity students under the name of Khananum Thai (Thai Youth
Group). In 1935, the Thai government strengthened its anticom-
munist stand and further amended the anticommunist statute of
1933 to deal with the emergence of communist groups under
noncommunist names.
The invasion of China by Japan caused many anticommunist
leaders in China and Southeast Asia to seek the aid of in-
digenous communists. From 1935 to 1941, there began a
general trend of anti-Japanese alliances in Southeast Asia
among nationalists and communists alike. After 1941, many
communists entered Thailand to fight the common enemy
Japan.
It was at this time that the Thai Communist Party (TCP) was
officially established and in the name of “Thai patriotism” an-
nounced its support of the Free Thai Movement. The Free Thai
Movement was a group of Thai patriots who continued to resist
Japanese occupation after the Thai government, under Prime
Minister Phibun, had declared war against the United States in
collaboration with the Japanese and their goals for Southeast
Asia. The Free Thai Movement was not a fighting force as
was the French Resistance in Europe; its primary purpose was
to supply information on Japanese plans and installations in
Thailand to the allies. It was originally organized by Pridi
Panomyong in collaboration with the allied intelligence unit, the
Thailand in Transition
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Office of Strategic Services (OSS).3 The Thai government and
the Japanese administrators were aware of the existence of the
Free Thai Movement but tolerated its activities for the sake of
the war effort. A case in point is Dr. Puay Ungphakorn, who was
parachuted by the OSS into northern Thailand to support the
Free Thai Movement. Although captured and imprisoned for his
activities, Puay was released from jail every night in order to
continue his work.
During this period (1941–1945), the Thai Communist Party
became an effective part of the anti-Japanese alliance. The TCP
expanded its activities and divided the party organization into
two independent branches: a Chinese Executive Committee, pri-
marily comprised of Thai Chinese, and a Thai Executive Com-
mittee made up of indigenous Thais.
The favorable political climate for the TCP’s activities was
sustained even after the war. Some political observers at-
tributed this situation to the need of the Thai government to
court the USSR in order to obtain approval for membership in
the United Nations. Thus, in 1946, when the Thai government
abolished all anticommunist acts, the Chinese branch of the
TCP severed itself completely from the parent organization
under the name Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT)
and began recruiting left-leaning Chinese from the overseas
Chinese communities in Bangkok and Thonburi. The main
concern of the CCPT was still to support the Chinese Com-
munist Party’s struggle in mainland China. Under the new or-
ganizational name and a more effective party apparatus, the
CCPT gained considerable influence over the Thai Chinese com-
munity. The weekly publication of Mahachon (The Great Mass)
greatly assisted the CCPT in its efforts to increase membership
among students and laborers in the rural areas. By 1947,
however, the Thai government, having obtained membership in
the United Nations with considerable support from the United
States, began once again to suppress the communist movement,
and overseas Chinese became the target of government ha-
rassment in the form of deportation, school closure, and press
censorship. After the successful coup d’etat by Phibun
Songkham, the communists were forced to move underground.
In 1949, after the victory by the communists in China, the
Chinese Communist Party of Thailand ceased most of its activ-
ities. Most of the members of the CCPT went to China while
others joined the Thai Communist Party. In the meantime,
United States programs for aid and defense support began to
move in and consolidate the U.S. position with the Thai mil-
The Communist Party of Thailand
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itary leaders. In 1950, the Thai communists attempted to coop-
erate with various civilian leaders and politicians in hopes of
mounting a successful countercoup. The attempt failed, and it
was the last time the Thai Communist Party tried to achieve its
aims through parliamentary means. Thereafter the TCP lead-
ership advocated “armed struggle” and a “people’s war.”
A clandestine organization, the Thai Liberation Organi-
zation, was formed and its members were sent to communist-
controlled areas of Vietnam and Laos for training. The next year,
1951, at a meeting of all communist representatives, the party’s
name was officially changed from the Thai Communist Party to
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Generally the party’s
official policy was a carbon copy of the strategy put forth by
Mao Tse-tung. Members of the CPT were called upon to support
revolution by violent means or by protracted warfare via a
strategy which would first liberate the masses in the rural areas
and thereby enable them to surround the cities. By December of
1952, this policy began to be put into action by the party’s front
organization, the Thai Liberation Organization (TLO). The TLO
organized what later came to be called a “Peace Revolt.” This
initial attempt at open confrontation with the government was
a complete failure and most of the TLO leaders were arrested.
Thereafter the Thai government revitalized its efforts against
the communist movement and enacted an anticommunist law
calling for more severe punishment for members of communist
organizations. The CPT was forced to disband the TLO and cur-
tail all plans for expansion as the government began arresting
CPT members and sympathizers in considerable numbers. It
was during this time that the socialist author Kularb Saipradit
was arrested.
Rather than attempt further expansion in Thailand, the CPT
then began sending most of its remaining members to China for
training. In 1953, the CPT set up three organizations for general
assistance, infiltration, and recruitment. Although these orga-
nizations had names designated by the CPT, they came to be
known by the names given them by the Thai government’s Com-
munist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC): the Gray Or-
ganization, the Yellow Organization, and the Red Organization.
The Gray Organization was a front organization of semi-legal
status that included groups for helping laborers, the Temple
Committee, the Household Medicine Committee (first aid),
various musical bands, sports teams, and student tutorial units.
The Yellow Organization was designed for infiltration into
various government-sponsored groups for working with all
Thailand in Transition
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persons opposed to the government, such as the Thai Labor As-
sociation. The Red Organization was the unit for politicization
and party recruitment; in turn it formed such groups as the
United Professional Workers’ Union, the Thai Liberation Orga-
nization, the Farmers’ Liberation Organization, and the Thai
Youth Organization.
These organizations continued their clandestine activities
until the general election of 1957, when the CPT was able to
initiate contact with progressive Thai politicians who had won
seats in the new Parliament. Since many of these politicians
were in agreement with policies of socialism and anti-imperi-
alism, the CPT grasped the opportunity to use these contacts
to transfer a considerable number of their operatives from the
countryside to the cities. The CPT’s strategy was based on the
hope that vital political contacts in Bangkok would assist their
overall efforts in increasing financial and political support for
their bases in the rural areas.
These plans were aborted in 1958, when the fervent anti-
communist Sarit Thanarat led a successful coup and assumed
control over the newly formed government. With the help of
various U.S.-supported agencies, Sarit initiated a series of coun-
terinsurgency operations.4 Faced with this new anticommunist
push, many of the socialist-oriented politicians in Bangkok dis-
associated themselves from the CPT while others found refuge
as professors at universities in the provinces. The University
of Chiang Mai became a popular haven for the students of
Pridi and supporters of socialist reform. There were a few in-
tellectuals who remained quietly at their posts in the faculty of
economics at Thammasat University; several other professors
sought refuge abroad. It was during this time that Kularb
Saipradit, after spending more than five years in confinement as
a political prisoner, requested and was granted political asylum
in Peking.
In view of the sudden change in the political situation, the
CPT was forced to revert to its initial objectives of working pri-
marily in the provinces. With Sarit in power and U.S. military
assistance increasing at an unprecedented rate, the CPT appar-
ently realized that the situation was still unsuitable for a real
“people’s war.” The CPT subsequently discarded many of the
strategies employed before the Sarit coup and concentrated in-
stead on building an infrastructure of highly qualified cadres in
the provincial and village administrations. Many problems arose
in the early stages of implementing the new strategy, however,
The Communist Party of Thailand
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because many of the provincial party members were not well
versed in the CPT’s principles and consequently their effec-
tiveness was negligible.
By 1961, the CPT had altered its strategy to accommodate
the use of armed resistance once again. To this end, a new front
organization was established—the Democratic Patriotic Front.
This new organization sought territorial acquisition through
protracted warfare in suitable areas of provincial Thailand.
From 1961 to 1964, the Democratic Patriotic Front concen-
trated its efforts in northeastern Thailand and was eventually
successful in seizing remote parts of Nakhon Phanom and
Sakhon Nakhon provinces, which were utilized as support
bases. These bases supported the overall strategy of the CPT,
which was to avoid direct confrontation with government troops
and provincial officers while concentrating its resources ex-
clusively upon the formation and training of effective fighting
units.
In 1964, the CPT formed a new organization, the Volunteer
Liberation Organization (VLO), to recruit and train members
and about the same time established the Movement for the In-
dependence of Thailand (MIT). After the establishment of the
MIT, its leaders announced a return to a previous strategy—that
of using the cities as a means of supporting CPT activities in the
rural areas. Having been able to establish several fighting units
in northeastern Thailand, the CPT also adjusted its strategy re-
garding confrontation with the government forces and began to
encourage expansion through armed struggle in the provinces.
Thereafter localized and limited warfare frequently occurred
between various communist fighting units and government
forces in the remote villages of the provinces throughout the
countryside. In August of 1965, the Thai Patriotic Front en-
gaged the government forces in a fierce battle at Baan Na Bua
village in the province of Nakhon Phanom. Though the commu-
nists suffered serious losses in this battle, further clashes con-
tinued at Phuksed Mountain in Ubon Ratchathani province and
various villages in the northern provinces of Nan, Pitsanulok,
Phetchabun, Uttaradit, Tak, and Chiengrai. The armed struggle
spread as fighting broke out in the southern provinces of Surat
Thani, Nakhon si Thammarat, and Phattalung and eventually
penetrated areas just south of Bangkok in the provinces of
Ratchaburi, Phetburi, and Prachuap Khiri Khan. It was also
during this period beginning in 1964 that the People’s Republic
of China’s official statements began lending support to the CPT.
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CHINA AND THE CPT
Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) played a role in
the training of cadres for the CPT and provided a haven for an
ideological assortment of Thai exiles, the Chinese Community
Party (CCP) was relatively silent in giving official recognition
to the CPT. The PRC’s official position changed somewhat in
1964, however, when the CCP issued a National Day congratu-
latory message to the CPT. Without mentioning the Soviet Union
by name, the message implied an allegiance to revolution in
the CCP image, and not by the means of “revisionist forces”
who had “betrayed the meaning of revolution.”5 Moreover, the
message promised that “the relationships between the peoples
of the two countries will grow closer and closer.”6 The message
also attacked the Royal Thai Government’s “hostile policy
toward China” and maintained that the Thanom government
was nothing more than a “slavish tool” of the U.S. imperialists.7
It became apparent that the CPT had chosen alliance with
the CCP and had adopted a Maoist approach to revolution. This
was not really surprising, of course, since the so-called philoso-
phers of Thai socialism were exiled in China during this time. It
should be noted, however, that the writings of Pridi and Kularb
Saipradit, two of the most prominent Thai socialist philoso-
phers exiled in China, reflected aspects of Russian progressivist
philosophy which allowed for cultural adaptations and gradual
change of the system. Pridi wrote The Impermanence of Society
while in China. Published in Thai (Kwam Pen Annicang Khong
Sang khom) in 1957, it generally reflects Pridi’s attempts to
synthesize Buddhist theological precepts and Marxist dialectics.
Kularb Saipradit’s Till We Meet Again (Chon Ca Phoop Kan
Mai) is considered vulgar by some Thai scholars because of
Kularb’s common use of idiomatic expressions from the Thai
marketplace. Other Thai intellects, however, regard Kularb’s
adaptations to the language of the phuu noi humanistic and ap-
propriate. Because of his writings and firm commitment to the
socialist cause, Kularb is generally more highly regarded than
Pridi by many Thai intellectuals.
The CPT’s 1964 message was uncompromising and called
for a united front to be formed from below to overthrow the
Thai government. There were other, and perhaps more basic,
reasons why the grass-roots approach to revolution, the Maoist
approach, seemed appropriate for Thailand. First of all, political
parties were outlawed during this period (1959–1967), and
forms of overt political participation were precluded for most
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Thai. Moreover, the leadership and cadre levels of the CPT
were still primarily comprised of Thai-Chinese and northeastern
Thai of Laotian and Vietnamese origin. Pridi, though respected,
was basically an ethnic Thai, and it is generally believed that
while Pridi was in Peking he interacted very little with the
Thai-Chinese CPT representatives. Although Pridi reportedly
authored several articles for the CCP newspaper Jen-min-jih-
Pao in the 1950s, other Thai exiles such as Monkon Nonakon,
who was imprisoned for subversion, emerged to lead the MIT.
Pridi apparently played only a ceremonial, if sometimes ob-
scure, leadership role. Even Kularb Saipradit, though quite old,
was more active than Pridi in the CPT while in China. Kularb
was often mentioned as a Thai delegate to various CCP-spon-
sored international front conferences and was generally more
involved in CPT international activities than was Pridi. Another
exile, Phayom Chulanond, also emerged in a role of leadership
to the MIT and the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF), but he is often
described by Thai as being more “opportunist than communist.”
Phayom was an M.P. from Phet Buri to the Thai Parliament
from 1948 to 1950. He failed at reelection in 1950, so he reen-
tered the Thai army where he achieved the rank of lieutenant
colonel until it was stripped from him by the Thai government in
1964.8 Regardless of the image of Phayom as a “frustrated op-
portunist” projected by several Thai officials (Thanat Khoman,
for example), as of 1971 he was believed to have remained a
member of the TPF’s central committee and this organization’s
official “overseas representative.”9
In 1965, several Thai delegations representing these newly
formed front organizations (among them the Thai Patriotic
Front) began to surface at various conferences in Peking. These
included a Thailand Federation of Patriotic Workers, a Thai
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and a Thailand Federation of
Trade Unions.10
According to some sources, the training of Thai leftists for
political indoctrination at the Marxist-Leninist Institute in
Peking began to increase during this period (1964–1965).
However, it is generally believed that even with the increased
activities in Peking and at the cadre training school in K’un-
ming (Yunnan province), the total number of Thai trainees in
China was small compared to the number trained in North
Vietnam.11
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NORTH VIETNAM AND THE CPT
While China was training relatively few senior Thai cadres
(approximately seven hundred between 1952 and 1969), North
Vietnam, beginning around 1962, began “graduating” more
than a hundred Thai and Thai-Lao each year from the Hoa
Binh School near Hanoi.12 Apparently China and North Vietnam
had established a division of labor for training programs: The
Chinese provided indoctrination and training to prepare the
higher-ranking members of the CPT; the North Vietnamese pro-
vided training and equipment in preparing ordinary soldiers
and low-level cadres for the revolution. Since most of the Thai
trainees in North Vietnam were either Thai-Lao or Thai-Viet-
namese, there is considerable speculation that many of these
graduates were sent to Laos to assist the communist Pathet Lao
rather than back to Thailand to join the CPT.13 This division
of labor in which the Chinese trained the leadership while
the North Vietnamese trained low-level cadres and ordinary
soldiers persisted until 1976 when major differences between
China and North Vietnam caused serious problems of unity for
the CPT.
The year 1965 was an ideological milestone for the CPT as
the objectives for a people’s revolution became more apparent.
The shift in CPT policy in directing all fighting units to engage in
armed struggle was combined with a well-defined twelve-point
program drawn up by the CPT’s Revolutionary People’s Council.
The various points were enumerated as follows:
1. To destroy the Thai government and throw out the U.S.
imperialists
2. To change the country’s policy of reliance upon the
United States and to withdraw from SEATO (Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization)
3. To set up a new Parliament with representatives drawn
from diverse patriotic groups and to formulate a new
constitution
4. To guarantee its people basic freedoms of speech,
writing, communications, religious belief, meeting and
assembly, association, and political parties
5. To ensure that every nationality and race has equal
rights
6. To ensure that men and women have equality in political,
legal, economic, and social terms
7. To improve the living conditions of the laboring classes
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8. To initiate a land reform and improve farmers’ living con-
ditions
9. To improve the situation of low-ranking government offi-
cials
10. To suppress all forms of corruption and abolish every fi-
nancial pressure group
11. To abolish the system of monopolistic practices and ac-
celerate the nation’s economic development
12. To protect and promote education and native customs
The program carried with it a propaganda offensive de-
signed to destroy all forms of exploitation by imperialists, land-
lords, and capitalists. The CPT maintained in its message to
the Thai people that Thailand had remained under a system of
feudalism for the last hundred years. Spokesmen for the CPT
argued that:
Those who have power have always controlled the land while
those who produce—the farmers—are exploited by the landlords.
Since farmers have little political knowledge or education, at-
tempts at rebellion or demonstration have so far failed, for they
did not have the Communist Party and the proletariat as their
leaders. When Western capitalist influence penetrated Thailand,
the country became a semifeudal quasi-colony. Following the
Second World War, all the big powers tried to destroy the
emerging national economy through imperialism; the capitalists
with their financial powers exploit the people whose only power
lies in their own labor. The USA, particularly, tried very hard
to promote this form of bondage; the Americans sent USOM
to advise and manage all matters of development and technical
advance; they sent JUSMAG to control Thailand’s military; and
they sent USIS and the Peace Corps to supervise and control
Thailand’s educational and cultural development. The Thai gov-
ernment thus became a puppet of the USA and the Thai people
slaves. As Thais we have no freedoms. The Thai government has
no stable economic policy for crises in the national economy
which will continue to constantly recur, causing a great deal of
suffering and injustice to the common, ordinary people.14
The CPT’s solution to this scenario is a revolution to elim-
inate all class distinctions in Thai society. According to the CPT,
Thai society can be divided into four classes: laborers, farmers,
small capitalists, and national capitalists. The CPT defined each
group as follows:
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1. Although the labor class is still a small group, the la-
borers are the most exploited and have nothing to lose in
supporting revolutionary change. Labor is the most pro-
gressive and important group in the revolution.
2. Farmers can be divided into three groups. Poor farmers
are those who have to rent all their land. They can be
treated in the same manner as the labor class. They are
exploited in every way and can be relied upon as much
as laborers in promoting the revolution. Middle farmers
have slightly better economic conditions than the poor
farmers but they too are exploited by the landlords, cap-
italists, feudalists, and aristocracy. Although their ideas
and potential are not necessarily as progressive as those
of the poor farmers, they can be considered good friends
and allies. Rich farmers are capitalists in the rural
sector, often building up their fortunes by exploiting
middle and poor farmers; yet they, in turn, are under the
power and control of the feudalists, capitalists, and aris-
tocracy. This group also wants independence from its op-
pressors and may give some support to the revolution.
3. The small capitalists or petite bourgeoisie are teachers,
instructors, university professors, university students,
and scholars. They too are being exploited and op-
pressed and are also potential revolutionaries, but they
lack the ability to conduct and lead the revolution. Al-
though well connected to the present economic
structure, they can nevertheless become allies under the
leadership of the proletariat.
4. National capitalists, no matter how rich, are still being
exploited by taxation and corruption from the U.S. impe-
rialists. All these groups can be used only when the rev-
olution has progressed to some extent.
To operationalize the CPT policy as it pertained to class dis-
tinctions, the party proposed organization of different groups to
oppose imperialism, feudalism, landlords, and capitalists. The
CPT maintained that these oppositional groups would hasten
the growth of socialism and eventually communism.
The CPT firmly established the principle that force must be
used to achieve the ultimate victory for the revolution, because
“no ruling class in the world will give up its powers willingly and
voluntarily.”15 Moreover, the CPT in 1965 reemphasized that
parliamentary government will never be able to create equality
or promote the interests of the working class, because “Par-
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liament is itself but a reflection of the interests of the ruling
class.” Therefore the CPT maintained in its 1965 manifesto that
“the struggle must involve the use of armed fighting units and
political campaigns simultaneously…. The fight must be waged
both in towns and in the countryside…. The cities can be sur-
rounded.” Moreover, the CPT proposed that the cities should
no longer be ignored by the cadres because “much work must
be done within the cities to mobilize the laboring classes and
organizations need to be created to provide training and po-
litical education.” Even the various front organizations of the
CPT (the Democratic Patriotic Front, for example) established
in the early 1960s were in need of training and were largely in-
effective prior to 1965. In an attempt to remedy the rather weak
condition of the front organization, the Thai Patriotic Front an-
nounced a six-point program on 23 January 1965. The program
urged all true Thai patriots to:
1. Fight for the independence of the nation and terminate
the U.S. connection.
2. Fight for political freedoms and the announcement of a
new constitution.
3. Initiate a policy of peace and independence and
withdraw from SEATO.
4. Promote economic development, especially of farmers.
5. Improve the methods of punishing corrupt officials and
initiate land reform.
6. Improve health and education services and put a stop to
the debilitating culture of imperialism.16
Also in 1965, a CPT front organization, the Farmers’ Liber-
ation Association, put forth its objectives in a six-point program:
1. To gather the collective powers of the farmers
2. To wipe out all traces of U.S. imperialism and that of
other Western countries
3. To set up a government with members drawn from
among the farmers
4. To protect the rights and benefits of all the people
5. To improve the techniques used in agriculture
6. To struggle to eradicate all class distinctions from so-
ciety17
To operationalize its manifesto and the propaganda state-
ments of its front organizations, the CPT proposed in 1965 a
specific plan for recruitment. The CPT maintained that to ac-
complish the goals of the revolution cadres must become the
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true friends of the people. To this end, a program of assistance
was established which called upon cadres to assist villagers in
building their houses, harvesting their crops, and plowing the
land. According to the CPT, this rural people-oriented approach
would aid the overall program of recruitment.18 The CPT also
reemphasized the three guiding principles on recruitment:
1. Since it takes a long time to mobilize people, the cadres
must use great patience, for the poor have been op-
pressed for so long that they no longer possess self-con-
fidence.
2. Cadres must firmly believe that the revolution is for and
of the people; it is their revolution. This revolution must
occur from contradictions within each village, not from
outside means.
3. Propaganda efforts must be adapted to suit the par-
ticular localities. The revolution and struggle will occur
only if there is some special problem.
It was during the period of 1965–1968, that all organizations
were unified under the Thai Patriotic Front and a clandestine
“people’s network” was established and directed against Amer-
icans in Thailand.
The CPT sought to consolidate the Farmers’ Liberation Asso-
ciation and all other front organizations throughout the country
under the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) and on 4 January 1969
officially established the People’s Liberation Army of Thailand
(PLAT). While clandestine radio stations monitored from
southern China and communist-controlled areas of Laos con-
tinued to denounce the Thai government as “lackeys and
running dogs of American imperialism” during this period
(1968–1972), the CPT placed less emphasis on propaganda and
a greater concentration on acts of violence against the Thai gov-
ernment. Table 1 indicates the extent of the increase in com-
munist activities during the period 1966–1972.19
As the insurgents’ success in the armed struggle for remote
areas of northern Thailand increased at an unprecedented rate,
the statistics of death began to favor the communist fighting
units throughout the country. Moreover, the ratio of government
officials killed to insurgents killed dropped from 1:2.8 in 1967
to 1:0.7 in 1972.20 The sharp increase in the incidence of insur-
gency was combined with a CPT effort to intensify the armed
struggle in support of the expansion of local fighting units
throughout the country.
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Table 1
Incidence of Insurgency: 1966–1972
Nature of Incident 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Fighting 155 232 362 290 258 365 680
Attacks 0 5 5 5 37 36 57
Ambushes 10 21 48 57 53 106 111
Provocations 47 109 226 322 214 217 487
Psychological warfare and
propaganda
112 133 73 47 50 88 47
Intimidation 170 154 213 201 332 420 411
Sabotage 11 7 12 7 11 12 57
Shooting 3 5 33 39 30 60 108
Forced logistic support 39 112 102 59 32 46 68
Communists killed 93 182 141 109 96 190 362
Communists arrested 1,440 1,260 613 226 326 713 1,132
Communists surrendered 1,458 693 554 384 191 834 899
AFTER THE STUDENT REVOLT
Incidents of insurgency—and the CPT’s overall
strength—increased at a dramatic rate in the aftermath of the
student revolt of 1973. Communist insurgents under arms in-
creased from an estimated 3,500 in 1973 to 5,000 in 1974 and
to 8,000 in 1975. The CPT was particularly successful in in-
creasing its strength in northern and northeastern Thailand, but
significant increases were also recorded in the central plain and
in the southern provinces bordering Burma and Malaysia.
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Moreover, the dramatic increase in number of insurgents
was apparently combined with a new sophistication of weapons.
By mid-1975, almost all insurgents were armed with the latest
model of the AK-47 or M-16 rifles, while some units possessed
mortars and B-40 rockets similar to those used by the insur-
gents in Vietnam. The “fighting units” of the insurgent forces
also increased in size, and assaults which previously lasted
for only a few minutes began to last hours or even longer.
Government casualties continued to be more than 50 percent
higher than insurgent losses in most of these battles. Similar at-
tacks continued until 1976, when dramatic changes in the lead-
ership and tactics of the Thai government caused the CPT to
change its strategy.
The period 1973–1976 marked an unprecedented prolifer-
ation of protest groups. Farmers, workers, and students had
for the first time an organizational base and a political envi-
ronment of mobilization and protest which lasted longer than
any such period in Thai history. This extended period of liberal-
ization came to an abrupt halt in October 1976 when a bloody
battle involving radical students at Thammasat University gave
rise to the extreme right-wing government of Thanin Kraivixien.
Thanin’s subsequent suppression of all outspoken members of
the new “progressive” forces caused many to flee to the jungle
seeking refuge. The CPT seized this opportunity to woo many
of the outcast and disillusioned leaders of the various opposi-
tional forces to join in the creation of a new front organization
called the Committee for Coordinating Patriotic and Democratic
Forces (CCPDF). The CPT was particularly successful in re-
cruiting well-known activists among the farmers, workers, stu-
dents, and the outlawed Socialist Party of Thailand to join the
CCPDF.
Labor leader Therdphun Chaidee, student activist leaders
Thirayuth Bonmee and Seksan Prasertjul, and a former M.P.
from the northeast, Thongpak Priangvat, gave the CCPDF the
credibility of being more broad-based than any other front or-
ganization created by the CPT in the past. These leaders were
not obscure Thais in exile but rather people who were played
up in the media as heroes during the 1973–1976 period. In con-
trast to previous CPT drives to establish fronts, the CCPDF in-
cluded the creation of international links with Thais abroad and
sympathetic foreigners. These new groups, formed primarily in
the United States and Europe, demanded a return to democracy
and an end to the repressive regime of Thanin.
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The CPT’s success in these efforts was short-lived because
of dramatic shifts in internal and external events. Internally, the
Thai government shifted to the more moderate regime of Kri-
angsak Chamanand and called for elections which eventually
took place in April 1979. Externally, China invaded Vietnam
over differences regarding Kampuchea. The latter event and
the subsequent hostilities between the Chinese and Vietnamese
communists caused a kind of schizophrenia for the CPT with
regard to origin, loyalties, and strategy.
Already faced with the enormous organizational problem of
the new recruits of the broad-based CCPDF, many of whom
were not communist or even socialist, the CPT was now con-
fronted with a choice between the Chinese versus Vietnamese
connection. This problem was further complicated by factions
within the CPT’s Thai-Lao communist units of the northeast,
many of whom received their training in Hanoi. At first it
seemed as if the Chinese faction would prevail, since the lead-
ership of the CPT central committee was still dominated by
Chinese-trained cadres. However, the CCPDF’s socialist and
communist members were split into Chinese-oriented and
Vietnamese-oriented factions. When Vietnam invaded Kam-
puchea in 1978, the CCPDF initially took a “united Thai” po-
sition against Vietnamese expansionism and even offered,
through the Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT), to coop-
erate with the Thai government in order to resist the Viet-
namese. But when China invaded Vietnam, the pro-Vietnamese
factions among the CCPDF demanded an end to the anti-
Vietnam propaganda. In 1979 the CPT, in a new effort to hold
a neutral posture in the dispute between China and Vietnam,
began to play down the VOPT’s denunciations of Vietnam. The
Chinese communists responded by closing down the VOPT,
which was based in southern China, and ending abruptly the
most effective CPT radio broadcasts.
On the other hand, the pro-Peking faction of the CPT, which
had for ten years used border areas in Laos as a sanctuary
and supply route in its skirmishes with the Thai counterinsur-
gency, was ordered by the Vietnamese-backed Lao government
to return to Thailand and stay out of Laos. The matter became
further complicated for the Chinese faction of the CPT in view
of the increasingly close ties between the PRC and the “im-
perialist” government of the United States. After considerable
soul-searching and debate, the Chinese factions of the CPT and
CCPDF declared that they were not pro-Peking and would act
independently of mainland Chinese directives. The new pro-
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Hanoi factions of the CPT and CCPDF, likewise, claimed that
indigenous Thai interests would take precedence over Viet-
namese interests.
Regardless of the disclaimers offered by both factions, the
old-line pro-Chinese faction has continued to pursue a Maoist-
oriented struggle in the rural regions, while the newer and rel-
atively younger pro-Vietnamese factions drawn primarily from
the outcasts of the 1976 coup have pursued a new strategy
of influence and sabotage in the urban areas of Thailand. The
latter strategy has been followed by the pro-Vietnamese faction
ever since the CPT’s unsuccessful efforts to disrupt the elec-
tions of April 1979. During the 1979 election campaigns, the
government officially recognized communist influence in rural
areas and designated 931 “danger zones.” Candidates insisting
on campaigning in these areas were required to give a 48-hour
advance notice to district officers. Table 2 provides a
breakdown of the number of danger zones by region and
province.21
Even with the split between the pro-Hanoi and pro-Peking
forces within the CPT, militarily the Thai People’s Liberation
Army in 1979 remained around thirteen thousand strong and,
up to 1980, seemed able to enlist new recruits in excess of
losses. Incidence of insurgency increased dramatically from
1973 to 1979 but dropped significantly in 1980–1981. Moreover,
according to Thai government sources the armed guerrillas de-
creased from thirteen thousand in 1979–1980 to ten thousand
in 1980–1981. There is much speculation that this drop in
numbers was due as much to the split in the CPT as it was to
the new counterinsurgency measures of the Thai government.
Perceiving this new split in the CPT as a dual threat, the Thai
government under Prem Tinsulamond responded with an “open
arms” program which by July 1981 was successful in encour-
aging the defection of nearly half the estimated four thousand
dissidents who joined the CPT movement in 1976. Most of these
defectors were radical elements of the labor unions (such as
Therdphun), the farmers and students, and the Socialist Party
of Thailand and included prominent figures in the pro-Hanoi
faction of the CCPDF such as Thirayuth and Seksan.22
The “open arms” program is only one aspect of a broad-
based counterinsurgency effort conceived by General Saiyud
Kerdpol which also includes the CPM (Civil-Police-Military) joint
operations concept, various socioeconomic measures directed
at the poor, and an expansion of the self-defense units in the
villages. While some of these approaches are not entirely new
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Table 2
Danger Zones
Province Region
Number of
Dangerous Areas
Loei NE 162
Nakhon NE 123
Ubon Ratchathani NE 52
Chiyaphum NE 50
Roi Et NE 43
Nakhon si Thammarat S 42
Phattalung S 42
Buri Ram NE 40
Surin NE 36
Khon Kaen NE 33
Surat Thani S 32
Mae Hong Son N 29
Samut Prakan C 27
Phetchabun C 22
Phrayao N 21
Ratchaburi S 20
Nakhon Sawan C 20
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Province Region
Number of
Dangerous Areas
Uttaradit N 19
Nan N 18
Prachin Buri E 16
Nong Khai NE 15
Yaso Thon NE 12
Trang S 9
Prachuap Khiri Khan S 7
Kanchanaburi W 6
Kampaeng Phet C 6
Trat E 6
Krabi S 5
Nakorn Sawan C 5
Ang Thong C 5
Uthai Thani C 5
Phang-nga C 2
Suphan Buri C 1
N: north; NE: northeast; S: south; C: central; E: east; W: west.
to Southeast Asia (in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere), many ob-
servers believed that Prem’s leadership and intolerance of cor-
ruption would ensure greater effectiveness in the continued
implementation of these measures in the rural areas. This
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seemed to be the case throughout 1982, as rural-based CPM
counterinsurgency operations increased with relative success.
In early December, more than three thousand CPT members and
sympathizers from Operational Zone 444 in Tak province sur-
rendered en masse.23 Yet urban unrest, particularly in Bangkok,
reemerged in 1980 and began to spread throughout 1982
among students and workers due to a renewed attempt by old-
line labor leaders to mobilize workers.
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The Workers
Labor associations in Thailand began as early as 1897 with the
establishment of the Association of Tramway Workers and other
organizations of workers in the transport, shipping, and rice
milling industries.1 Although few other union groups were es-
tablished until the 1920s, strong unions were formed among
self-employed workers such as motor tricycle drivers and ped-
dlers rather than among wage earners. Several unions were
also established in larger factories, but outside Bangkok even
factory workers were organized in unions by region rather than
by industry and their membership included varied occupations.
Two communist-oriented organizations, the General Labor
Union and the Young Workers General Labor Union, were estab-
lished in 1924 and grew steadily in strength until 1933, when
the Thai government enacted anticommunist measures which
limited their activities and greatly reduced their membership.
Communist-oriented unions were given a temporary reprieve
during World War II, however, and the trade unions joined in
establishing the Bangkok Federation of Trade Unions in 1944
and in 1945 merged with the communist-dominated Central
Labor Union to resist the Japanese. By May 1947, the Central
Labor Union had fifty-one member unions. The strongest units
were those organized among railroad and streetcar workers,
bus drivers, and workers on the waterfront, in rice mills, and in
sawmills.
After the war, however, the Thai government attempted to
counter the activities of the Central Labor Union. Various min-
istries either sponsored or financed other labor organizations,
such as the Thai National Trade Union Congress, the Free
Workmen’s Association of Thailand, and the United Thai Feder-
ation of Labor.
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The Thai National Trade Union Congress (TNTUC), com-
posed of occupational and regional unions, adopted a consti-
tution in 1951 which supported cooperation between labor and
capital. The strongest unions in the TNTUC were the Union of
Motor Tricycle Drivers, the peddlers’ union, and an organization
of small shopkeepers. The TNTUC’s membership included em-
ployees in government-owned factories and extended to miners,
rubber tappers, and plantation workers in the south and to to-
bacco and teak workers and some farm and plantation laborers
in the north.
The Free Workmen’s Association of Thailand (FWAT), regis-
tered with the government in 1953, was formed in order to draw
Chinese workers away from the communist-dominated Central
Labor Union. The FWAT received considerable financial support
from the director general of the National Police Department
and, like the TNTUC, was linked to the political ambitions of
Prime Minister Phibun Songkram. According to some sources,
Phibun, having observed that all democratic countries had trade
unions, decided to allow trade union movements to develop as
part of a return to a constitution and elections. It was also at
this time that the Phibun government enacted the Labor Law of
1956.
THE LABOR LAW OF 1956
For a society which was principally agrarian, the Labor Law
of 1956 was idealistic in many respects. For an economically
developing nation, however, the three major divisions—labor
protection measures, procedures for establishing a union or fed-
eration, and rules governing industrial relations—were prac-
tical. Protective measures included prohibition of women under
eighteen years of age from engaging in certain types of work, a
minimum age for child labor (age twelve), equal pay for equal
work regardless of sex, time and a half for overtime, and a
maximum 48-hour work week with an 8-hour day (which was in
accordance with International Labor Organization standards in
effect at that time).
The liberal provisions of the law did not, however, reflect
the conservative actions taken by the government. As the trade
unions developed, unions in communist countries quite natu-
rally invited labor leaders to visit their countries. Many of the
leaders responded to the invitation and went to Moscow and
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Peking, only to be thrown in jail upon their return to Thailand.
These actions of the Phibun government only increased union
demands for broader, more general, workers’ rights.
Basically there were two substantial deficiencies in the
Labor Law. First, there was no provision for a minimum wage.
Second, there was no effective method of mediating employer/
employee disagreements. Disputes between employers and em-
ployees continued to be settled through intervention by local
administrators, police, central government ministries, or direct
action by the prime minister. Ironically, even with these defi-
ciencies the Labor Law of 1956 was found to be too liberal
by the military junta in power at the time, and it was subse-
quently abrogated in October 1958 by order of Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat. Sarit led a successful coup against the Phibun
government, banned the trade union movement completely, and
arrested most of its leaders.
Elimination of the Labor Law of 1956 resulted in the ter-
mination of all labor organizations. Authority for formulating
protective labor legislation was transferred to the minister of
interior, who was further charged with the responsibility of set-
tling labor disputes and inspecting labor establishments.2 Since
under Sarit’s rule any striker could be jailed, work stoppages
due to strikes and lockouts were minimal until 1969.3
Although trade unions were effectively banned during
Sarit’s administration, there were in fact some workers’ strikes.
In 1962, there were seven short strikes in which demands were
limited to better wages, facilities, and conditions. During the six
years of Sarit’s rule the longest strike, which lasted two months,
involved workers at the Firestone Tire Company. Many of the
leaders of this strike were jailed for terms ranging from six to
eight years. In the aftermath of the student revolution of 1973,
by contrast, there were more than a hundred strikes, but none
of the leaders were jailed and most of the workers’ demands
were met.
THANOM AND THE LABOR LAW OF 1971
Thanom Kittikachorn, who replaced Sarit as prime minister,
promulgated a new labor law in April 1971, when the country
was once again experimenting with democratic institutions
after the elections of 1969. The Labor Law of 1971 allowed
workers to form employees’ associations. It was surmised at
the time that Thanom wanted to build support from the labor
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movement, once legalized, to meet the eventuality of elections
in the future. Although it was thought that Thanom would win
over workers’ votes through these associations, workers were
rather suspicious at this sudden change of attitude on the ad-
ministration’s part and only three employee associations were
registered at first.
Six months after this labor law was passed, pending labor
disputes were once again temporarily “solved” by direct gov-
ernment action. In November 1971, Thanom decided to put
the country under martial law and rule by executive decree.
It was not surprising, therefore, that the most articulate labor
leaders concluded that periodic government-supported labor
laws were not the solution to the workers’ problems. Instead
of laws without adequate implementation, some labor leaders
argued that in-country training for workers was essential if the
labor movement was to spread.
Snan Vongsuthee, labor leader of the Brotherhood of Asian
Trade Unions (BATU), was instrumental in organizing in-
country training programs, which included more than four
hundred workers from the railroads and the tobacco and textile
industries. These training programs included an important ed-
ucational component to increase the political awareness of the
workers and sustain the momentum of the movement. Also
discussed in these sessions were strategies of collective bar-
gaining, including strikes, walkouts, and the viability of the
student-worker alliance.
Just prior to the October 1973 uprising, various student
leaders (Seksan and others) had been in contact with labor
leaders and some students even assisted in the development of
the political education aspect of the worker training programs.
Also during this time it was the students who helped warn
various worker movements that the police were planning a com-
plete crackdown on their political activities. The special branch
of the police investigation unit, Central Investigation Division
(CID), in Bangkok had already begun monitoring the training
activities. As one labor leader stated in an interview in 1974,
“They [the police] used to follow us to our training sessions and
would be waiting for us outside when we finished.”
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THE STUDENTS’ ROLE IN THE WORKER
MOVEMENT
Students were a great help to the workers’ cause after 1971,
but in a 1974 interview the labor leader Snan recalled the Oc-
tober 1973 revolt: “It wasn’t all students; whatever they may
say, the students didn’t drive the buses at the time of the demon-
strations and confrontations—workers did!”
The successful collaboration between students and workers
became particularly evident about eight months after the Oc-
tober revolt of 1973. During the months of May and June 1974,
Bangkok witnessed a series of student-supported strikes. In
mid-May, Thailand witnessed its first strike by public school
teachers. As noted earlier, one teacher cut his wrist while ad-
dressing a crowd of teachers demanding the resignation of Ed-
ucation Minister Abhai.4 Three days later Abhai resigned and
the teachers’ demands were met. On 23 May, three hundred
Bang Kae Transportation Company bus conductors went on a
five-hour strike demanding a pay raise and a paid holiday. One
bus conductor was clubbed and stabbed to death while trying to
get the conductors to return to work. Thereafter a small group
of conductors staged a brief strike stranding hundreds of pas-
sengers. Within hours the transportation company yielded to
the strikers’ demands.
About one week later (4 June 1974), garbage collectors went
on strike leaving two hundred garbage trucks standing idle.
Workers’ demands included a one-year retroactive wage in-
crease, a shift to a permanent public payroll to replace the day-
to-day basis of payment, and three months of compensation for
the high cost of living.5
These strikes were only a slight indication of what was fast
becoming a formidable student-worker movement. The organi-
zational ability and political strategy of this new force were
particularly evident in the student-supported textile workers’
strike.
THE TEXTILE WORKERS’ STRIKE
During the first week of June 1974, three Thai student
groups—the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), the
People for Democracy Group (PDG), and the Federation of In-
dependent Students of Thailand (FIST)—began assisting textile
workers in their slowdown protest against mill owners. Textile
The Workers
32
manufacturers had requested government assistance in low-
ering the tax for raw materials to compensate for the slowdown.
When the Thai government rejected their proposal, the textile
mill owners laid off 25 percent of the work force. Labor leaders
and student groups rallied to the workers’ cause and organized
three thousand mill workers to force the reinstatement of the
laid-off textile workers. The workers went in busloads to the in-
dustrial Phra Pradaeng area in an attempt to rally the support
of some ten thousand textile workers there. The protesting
workers had six demands which included reinstatement of laid-
off workers, revision of the labor law, and changing temporary
workers to permanent status.
When the workers received no response from the minister
of labor, the protesters seized the Labor Department compound
for an all-night vigil. Student leaders from Ramkamhaeng Uni-
versity proudly stated to the press that “we are fighting not
only for the textile workers but for the benefit and security
of workers throughout the country.”6 By 10 June most of the
workers’ demands were met in principle by the employers.
There was still no agreement, however, on a minimum wage in-
crease, changes in compensation clauses in the labor law, and
retroactive pay for striking workers.
The momentum of the movement increased at a pace rem-
iniscent of the October revolt, as Thailand’s organized labor
force, 400,000 strong, represented by the thirty-four workers’
associations, decided to unite behind the strikers. Student
groups stepped up the pressure as student leaders and other ac-
tivists continued their speeches denouncing the “blood-sucking
foreign capitalists.”7
In the meantime, striking workers were given a boost when
workers from the railway, the plastic factories, and glass fac-
tories joined the protest. An effigy representing a Japanese
capitalist was hung from a wooden pole during the protest
at the Pramain Ground. After six days of labor unrest, the
government offered the striking workers an employment plan
which, among other things, provided for job security and a com-
promise minimum-wage increase.
By all indications it became obvious that the workers, sup-
ported by the students, had won another victory. Unprece-
dented labor organization and tactics had produced unprece-
dented concessions on the part of government and industry.
Government and industry leaders soon experienced the implica-
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tions of this victory for labor in Thailand, as they witnessed a
series of prolabor legislation enacted in the two weeks following
the strike.
The series of strikes and government responses ushered in
a new attitude toward change on the part of the many common
Thai laborers. Although the average Thai worker was still basi-
cally culture-bound in the sense that his lowly position was per-
ceived as his karma (destiny) for this life, many Thai laborers
became aware of the advantages of direct confrontation as a
means of change. Workers apparently were no longer com-
pletely intimidated by a tradition which demanded strict ad-
herence to one’s naa tii (duty) in occupational status and place
in society vis-à-vis the phuu yai (superiors). In a significant de-
parture from previous labor movements in Thailand, workers
now demanded rights and privileges in addition to financial ben-
efits. This attitude, adopted by a significant number of the phuu
noi (common laborers) in Bangkok, contagiously spread to other
laborers in Bangkok and the provinces.
A good illustration of the example set by the textile workers’
strike is the case of the Hotel Workers’ Union, which emerged
as a new and significant force in the Thai labor movement.
Therdphun Chaidee, a former student of Thammasat University,
became a dynamic and charismatic leader of the Hotel Workers’
Union, which by June 1975 claimed more than five thousand
members in Bangkok.
Moreover, labor leaders and many of their followers sought
representation through promotion of their own candidates in
the general elections of 1975 and 1976. Protest marches and
demonstrations, which became a prevailing mode of political
participation during this period (1974–1976), were adopted by
even the most unlikely civil service employees. Several inci-
dents involved rank-and-file policemen and soldiers who used
slowdowns, strikes, and demonstrations. One such demon-
stration by soldiers in 1975 culminated in the looting and van-
dalizing of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj’s private residence.
PROBLEMS OF LABOR UNION DEVELOPMENT
While the textile workers’ strike was a landmark in the Thai
labor movement, and subsequent union activity stimulated
union development, serious problems involving continuity and
organization continued to plague the movement. Although the
prevailing political environment was conducive to labor union
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activity, there seemed to be, as one labor leader remarked,
“more heat than light.” Union gains were often paper promises
since no agency existed to implement the newly enacted laws.
Almost all major labor disputes were settled through govern-
ment intervention at the cabinet level. The legislature, the
courts, and ministries of labor and industry were rarely involved
in the process of mediation and arbitration. The labor unions
were able to obtain a minimum wage law but were not able to le-
gitimize the process of collective bargaining with management.
Their failure was due as much to an inability to organize them-
selves internally as it was due to management’s refusal to rec-
ognize the unions as official representatives of their employees.
Intermediate union officials between the union president and
the employees such as shop stewards, or their equivalent, were
almost nonexistent.
Most unions did not provide their members with the cus-
tomary manual of rules and procedures but instead distributed
occasional leaflets describing a particular issue during a strike.
Through such pamphlets union leaders sought to make em-
ployees aware of their exploitation by management and to ex-
plain that they were in a position to get higher wages if they
went on strike. Union membership was not required nor were
its advantages completely understood by workers. This fact
became evident after the author interviewed more than two
hundred striking workers from Sony and other factories during
the summer of 1975.
Another problem facing the labor movement, generic to
most social movements, was the question of cooperation among
the various unions. The unity of purpose which marked the
success of the textile workers’ strike unfortunately followed the
very same process of disintegration that faced the NSCT several
months after the successful student revolt of October 1973.
Unity now gave way to power struggles for leadership positions
within unions as well as contention between unions. Disputes
between labor leaders ranged from petty personality conflicts to
ideological battles over the role of the labor movement. These
ideological differences usually involved different approaches to
achieve workers’ gains, and the Russian versus the American
experience was often cited as a model for development of the
labor movement.
The gains of the Thai labor movement came to an abrupt
halt in the aftermath of the government’s bloody battle with
students at Thammasat University in October 1976. Worker
training sessions and strikes were outlawed, and all forms of
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union activity became suspect by the new right-wing regime,
which sought to attract new investments by appeasing the
business sector. Previous labor legislation was superseded by
the new regime’s right to rule by “executive decree,” which in-
cluded the extended use of Article 21.8 This article was used to
arrest and detain several thousand student, worker, and farmer
leaders in the aftermath of the bloody coup of 1976. Many
worker leaders went underground; some, such as Therdphun
Chaidee, even joined the new front organizations created by the
CPT.
THE LABOR REFORM BILL OF 1978
In preparation for a return to constitutional rule and elections,
and after a series of strikes in 1978, the government established
the National Labor Development Advisory Committee, which
was fashioned after the U.S. National Labor Relations Board.
The new Thai National Legislative Assembly (NLA), the
members of which were appointed by the government, passed
a 62-article bill that removed labor disputes from the civil and
criminal courts and established a separate labor court to settle
disputes. The new labor court was to have three judges: one
selected by the employer, one by the employee or his repre-
sentative, and one selected by the government. This bill also
provided for the division of the various labor courts into three
geographic jurisdictions: a central court for Bangkok and sur-
rounding provinces, regional courts for the north, south,
northeast, and so forth, and provincial courts to hear cases in
the outlying provinces.
In response to the liberal labor legislation, unions emerged
once again and began grouping together in national labor fed-
erations. The four main groupings of unions were the National
Council of Thai Labor (NCTL), which claimed about sixty
member unions, the Labor Congress of Thailand (LCT) with
around forty-four member unions, the National Federation of
Workers Congress (NFWC) with thirty member unions, and the
Nonaligned Unions (NU), which numbered about fifteen at the
end of 1978.
Previously established unions resurfaced and new unions
emerged, some under leaders who had been arrested or de-
tained by the Thanin government. The Metropolitan Water
Works Authority (MWWA), for example, was now headed by
Arom Pongpa-ngan, a former detainee in the military takeover
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of 6 October 1976. By September 1979, sixty unions including
the MWWA had joined the Labor Congress of Thailand under
the leadership of Paisarn Tawatchainand, a former worker-
leader. Snan, former worker-leader during and after the Oc-
tober 1973 revolt, became secretary-general of the newly
formed NCTL, which had increased its member unions by the
end of 1979.
As part of the new Labor Reform Bill, the government es-
tablished a Labor Relations Committee which included rep-
resentatives of the LCT, NFWC, and NCTL. All members of
the committee, labor and management, were selected by the
minister of interior. The selection process, however, became a
problem for the government. Immediately after the formation
of the committee, Paisarn, president of the LCT, and represen-
tatives of the Nonaligned Unions staged a rally to protest the
formation of the Labor Relations Committee and the process of
selection. The dispute was resolved with Paisarn now included
as a member of the committee.
The National Labor Development Advisory Committee
(NLDAC) was also established during this period to assist in
labor/management disputes and advise on major labor issues.
Since members of this committee were considered leftist-ori-
ented by government officials, however, the role of the NLDAC
was minimal.
Workers in various industries began to reemerge with an
improved organizational base. The militant protests of hotel
workers during the 1973–1976 era, for example, were replaced
by the organization of the first Hotel Labor Federation in
Thailand. This new union organized all the workers at the Narai,
President, Hyatt Rama, and Amarin hotels.
In January 1979, the city’s public transportation was par-
alyzed when most of the twenty-two thousand workers of the
Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) went on strike to
protest the government’s delay in adjusting their wages.
General Serm ordered the workers back to work “or else”9 and
also met with government officials of the BMTA and Labor De-
partment in an attempt to resolve the conflict. In the meantime
Snan, secretary-general of the National Congress of Thai Labor
(NCTL), claimed that the one-day strike by bus drivers was in-
cited by “malicious persons attempting to upset the upcoming
elections.”10 Snan claimed that right-wing elements—not the
NCTL or any other labor organization—were behind the strike
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in an attempt to convince Prime Minister Kriangsak that due
to labor unrest the elections scheduled for April should not be
held.11
In February 1979, when workers of the foreign-owned
Phranakorn Milk Industry staged a prolonged slowdown over a
dispute concerning fringe benefits, management dismissed 101
of the 125 employees. An earlier dispute had gone to the Labor
Relations Committee, which handed down a decision in January
that supported management’s position.
The establishment of the Labor Relations Committee and the
rest of the dispute resolution apparatus set up as a result of the
1978 reforms were far-reaching on paper but not quite imple-
mented as planned. By the end of 1979 the lower levels of the
dispute resolution system, the three levels of labor courts, had
still not been set up to hear cases. Hence newly formed unions
remained in constant conflict with management and commonly
resorted to slowdowns, strikes, and protest marches.
In July 1979, the first major labor rally since the imposition
of martial law drew ten thousand persons including represen-
tatives of more than one hundred unions at Sunam Luang,
a popular protest site in Bangkok. Throughout 1979, union
growth and support in the private and public sectors gained
momentum and wildcat strikes once again became the main
weapon for unions in pressing for concessions. In the fall of
1979, strikes by government workers of the State Railway of
Thailand (SRT), Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT), and
Metropolitan Water Works Authority (MWWA) were eventually
joined by eleven other government employees’ organizations in
demanding higher wages.
In the private sector, more than six thousand longshoremen
walked off their jobs in a wage dispute. The strike paralyzed the
movement of cargo of thirty-two shipping firms for two days at
an estimated cost of 150 million baht. In the end, management
conceded to workers’ demands of a 15 baht per day raise. In
January 1980, a ten-day walkout by the government-owned Thai
Tobacco Monopoly caused Prime Minister Kriangsak to cancel a
visit to West Germany.
Throughout 1980, strikes among government employees
and private-sector workers continued. Slowdowns and work
stoppages in critical industries of transportation and energy
were particularly disruptive. In February 1981, citywide deliv-
eries of cooking gas and oil supplies were halted when the
Summit Oil workers walked off their jobs over a wage dispute.
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By the end of 1981 the labor movement, which had played a
very active role in Thai politics after 1973, once again began to
increase its influence. Now, however, there were two major dif-
ferences: the absence of student participants in strikes and the
union leadership’s focus on worker-related issues rather than
the broad social and ideological issues which motivated labor
activity from 1973 to 1976. This new focus was due in part
to the government’s lifting of the controversial strike ban and
also to the creation of improved methods of dispute resolution
through the Labor Reform Bill of 1978. The ultimate success of
the new collective bargaining arrangements depended on eco-
nomic progress in the private sector and the viability of the Thai
Parliament as a check on the military’s dominance of the Thai
government. The catalytic role of the students, whose protest
demonstrations included support for a viable Parliament and
the workers’ movement, particularly during periods of martial
law, is described in historical perspective in the next chapter.
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Catalysts of the Transition:
The Thai Student Movement
While it is a student’s job to study, there are occasions when his
decision to lay aside his books and take up a political banner can
make a difference in the political future of his country.1
Although university students have become less overtly
active since 1970 in most Western countries (France and the
United States, for example) and even Asian countries (such as
Japan and India), the decade of the seventies witnessed a steady
increase in the number and intensity of student demonstra-
tions in Thailand. Furthermore, while the membership and ef-
fectiveness of student organizations in most Western and Asian
nations decreased considerably from 1970 to 1976, the Thai
students became increasingly organized, expanded their mem-
bership on a national scale, and were more effective in
achieving their demands. Moreover, the effectiveness of Thai
student demonstrations persisted and even gained momentum
after the imposition of martial law in 1971. This development is
remarkable when compared with the fate of student activism in
the Philippines where, following the imposition of martial law,
effective student organizations and activism were almost nonex-
istent.
The unusual effectiveness of university student protests
during the imposition of martial law in Thailand was due largely
to the ability of students to mobilize quickly and sustain their
demonstrations for several days. The organizational capability
of the student movement was greatly facilitated by the for-
mation of the National Student Center of Thailand in 1969. In
fact, its establishment became a turning point in the evolution
of the Thai student movement.
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ACTIVISM
Thailand, unlike India, lacks any real tradition of student ac-
tivism. In the early 1900s while Indian students protested po-
litical issues (such as the partition of Bengal—1905), Thai uni-
versity students, few in number in any case, remained detached
from political matters, which were left entirely to the king and
Royal Council until 1932. The only student activism prior to this
time was by Marxist-oriented Chinese university students who
had fled China in 1927. In fact, Thai university students as such
were nonexistent until 1916, when by royal command the status
of the Civil Servants School was elevated to that of a university
and named Chulalongkorn University in memory of King Chula-
longkorn the Great. It was not until June 1932 that the absolute
monarchy was abolished in a bloodless coup and the reins of
government were transferred to a military and civilian elite.
The liberal ideals of this new ruling clique were reflected in
higher education; in 1933, just one year after the coup, the Uni-
versity of Moral and Political Science was founded. This name
was later changed to the University of Moral Science (that is,
Thammasat University) in 1952, but the curriculum continued
to emphasize the humanities, particularly political science and
law. In 1942, the Faculty of Medicine was separated from Chu-
lalongkorn University and became Mahidol University, named
after the father of Bhumibhol, the present king of Thailand. In
1943, the School of Agriculture and the School of Forestry were
combined to establish the first agricultural institution of higher
learning, Kasetsart University. Silapakorn University, special-
izing primarily in architecture and the fine arts, was founded
in the same year. In 1954, the College of Education was estab-
lished and granted university status; its prime objectives are
to train teachers, school administrators, and educational re-
search workers. Since its conception, various other educational
programs have been added, and the College of Education now
comprises several campuses in Bangkok with other campuses
spread throughout the outer provinces of Thailand.
These five universities, though all institutions of higher
learning, were not all administered by the Ministry of Edu-
cation. Only Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, and Silapakorn univer-
sities were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education;
Kasetsart University was administered by the Ministry of Agri-
culture and Mahidol University by the Ministry of Public Health.
In 1959, however, all five universities were placed under the
Prime Minister’s Office and in 1963, as a result of the Prime
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Table 3
Enrollment, Year of Foundation, and Location of Thai Universities
Name of
University
Enrollment
in 1972
Year of
Foundation Location
Chulalongkorn 12,450 1916 Bangkok
Thammasat 9,148 1933 Bangkok
Mahidol 3,901 1942 Bangkok
Kasetsart 6,007 1943 Bangkok
262 1943 Bangkok
Silapakorn
College of
Education
15,979 1954 Bangkok (three campuses)
and provinces (five
campuses)
Chiang Mai 7,236 1964 Chiang Mai
Khonkaen 1,649 1964 Khonkaen
Songkla
Nakarin
788 1967 Songkla and Pattani
Ramkamhaeng 28,611 1971 Bangkok
Total 86,031
Source: Office of the National Education Council.
Minister’s Office Organization Act, each university gained the
legal status of a ministry department. Soon thereafter the Na-
tional Council of Education was established as a coordinating
committee whose primary concerns are the activities of all uni-
versities.
Of these five universities, only Chulalongkorn maintained
a broad curriculum offering degrees in several areas of study.
Kasetsart University offered courses only in agriculture;
Mahidol provided instruction only in medicine, Thammasat Uni-
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versity in jurisprudence, and Silapakorn in various areas of
art. Since 1965, however, each of these universities has ex-
panded the scope of its curriculum, particularly in the human-
ities. Moreover, several more recently established universities
offer a broad base of academic fields of study and provide ed-
ucational opportunities to the residents of outer provinces. In
1964, Chiang Mai University was established in the northern
capital of Chiang Mai province; in the same year Khonkaen Uni-
versity was created to afford higher educational opportunities
to the residents of the northeastern provinces of Thailand. In
1967, the University of Songkla Nakarin was opened to resi-
dents of southern Thailand; eventually it included a Faculty of
Education at Pattani and also a campus at Haadyai specializing
in engineering and medical sciences.
Before the establishment of these universities in the
provinces, Bangkok was, and to a large extent still remains,
the primary residence of university students; in fact, the uni-
versities in Bangkok still provide more than 90 percent of the
country’s graduates.2 This percentage was somewhat increased
with the establishment of Ramkamhaeng University in 1971. Lo-
cated in Bangkok and named in memory of the famous king of
the Sokuthai era, this university was created through the efforts
of liberal Parliament members only months before martial law
was declared in 1971. Beginning with primarily a liberal arts
curriculum and an open admissions policy, Ramkamhaeng has
had to adjust and expand its programs to the demands of an
ever-increasing rate of enrollment. Enrollment figures, founding
dates, and locations of the Thai universities are shown in Table
3.
LOCATION OF UNIVERSITIES IN BANGKOK
Since university students’ protest marches always take place
in Bangkok, the locations of the universities in Bangkok are of
prime importance if one is to understand student activism in
Thailand. Thammasat University may be used as the starting
point to visualize the geographical implications of student ac-
tivism. Thammasat University is located near the Old Palace
where all kings of Bangkok preceding Rama V have resided.3
Silapakorn University lies between Thammasat and the palace.
In front of these two universities there is a large open field
called Pramain Ground. In ancient times it served as the cre-
mation site for members of the royal family. It is now used for
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Figure 1 Location of universities in Bangkok
the New Year’s Day Festival, the Water Festival, the Ploughing
Ceremony, kite fighting, and an open market where goods from
the provinces are sold each weekend. On one side of Pramain
Ground there begins one of the widest, and most beautiful,
streets of Bangkok: Rajdamnern Avenue. Located on the other
end of this avenue is the Parliament Building with the office of
the prime minister nearby. Along this avenue, about one kilo-
meter from Pramain Ground, lies the Democracy Monument
erected by the 1932 revolutionaries. Protest marches by the stu-
dents almost always start from Pramain Ground and move along
Rajdamnern Avenue to the Parliament Building or the office of
the prime minister. Being both wide and not very long, this
avenue is ideal in accommodating the huge throngs of students
who participate in the protest marches.
Chulalongkorn University is about eight kilometers
southeast of Pramain Ground. The main campus of the College
of Education is about fourteen kilometers east of Pramain
Ground, while Mahidol University is located only about one-half
kilometer from the Parliament Building. Kasetsart University
is somewhat farther from this site, located about twenty kilo-
meters north of the Parliament Building.
The map in Figure 1 depicts the approximate locations of
the various universities and their relative proximity to Pramain
Ground and to each other. As one can imagine, the location
of the universities has significant implications not only for the
strategy of the student protests but also for government at-
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tempts to stop them. The openness of the area of Rajdamnern
Avenue lends itself to tempered responses by government offi-
cials, who hesitate to display force in an arena-like atmosphere.
All the major student demonstrations described below followed
the path to Pramain Ground before pressing demands directly
on the government administrators.
MAJOR STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
Anti-French Demonstration of 1940
The first incidence of student activism occurred in November
1940. The roots of that demonstration can be traced back
almost forty years earlier when Thailand was forced to cede
sections of its eastern territory to France in 1903 and 1910.4
The Thais had always desired to reclaim this territory. When
war broke out in Europe in 1939, the Thai government declared
Thailand to be a neutral state; but when France surrendered
in June 1940, the Thai government seized the opportunity to
regain the lost territory and staged an extensive anti-French
propaganda campaign. In November 1940, there were anti-
French demonstrations by Thais throughout the country.5 Chu-
lalongkorn and Thammasat university students joined these
demonstrations, which were being promoted by various organi-
zations in Bangkok.
Thammasat Students vs. the Army
After World War II, the reins of government were briefly in the
hands of Pridi Panomyong, one of the most powerful and re-
spected civilian leaders. As leader of the Free Thai Movement,
a volunteer underground army which opposed Japanese occu-
pation, Pridi claimed a great following among the civilian pop-
ulation. As one of the 1932 revolutionaries, he was also the
founder of Thammasat University and an instructor there.6 In
November 1947, a military coup forced him to leave the coun-
try and his followers, most of them civilians who had graduated
from Thammasat University, were driven out of politics.7
With a group of his most loyal followers, Pridi attempted
a coup in February 1949. Supported by some navy men and
several civilian leaders, many of whom used to be his students,
he slipped into Thammasat University one night and held a
meeting among his followers in one of the campus buildings.
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Many of the university lecturers and administrators were old
students and admirers of his. After the meeting, Pridi and his
followers went on to seize the Old Palace nearby. Some of his
men took over the government radio station and announced
the news of the coup. Within two days, however, Pridi’s forces
were crushed by the army and Pridi had to flee the country
again.8 Although many university administrators were detained
for questioning, there was little effect on Thammasat University
students at the time. Even after the army took over part of the
main campus and occupied it, students continued to study in
other parts of the campus.
In June 1959, there was another bloody coup led by a group
of navy men. During the fight some of the ground troops oc-
cupied the Thammasat campus to fortify their position in com-
bating the rebellion nearby. A few days after its beginning
the rebellion was crushed by government forces. The army re-
mained at Thammasat University, however, claiming that the
campus was located in a strategic area. Moreover, the gov-
ernment claimed that since the campus had been used by the
army in the coup of 1949, they were justified in their occupation
of the campus. Thammasat University was then closed for about
a month.
In late August 1959, some Thammasat students were di-
rected to attend Chulalongkorn University while others were
told to study at the auditorium of the Ministry of Justice. Tham-
masat students at that time wanted to come back to Tham-
masat, but they were confused as to what course of action, if
any, they should take. About two months later, and after much
debate, the students decided to do something about the situ-
ation. On 11 October about two thousand students attended a
session of Parliament and asked one of the M.P.’s to request the
government to withdraw its troops from Thammasat University.
The government representatives replied that it was necessary
for the army to occupy this “strategic area” in order to maintain
law and order; they refused to specify when the government
would withdraw its troops. At the end of the session the stu-
dents asked to see the prime minister, Field Marshal Phibun
Songkram. It should be pointed out that Phibun Songkram was
once a friend of Pridi Panomyong, the founder of Thammasat
University, but later they became archrivals. The students
avoided ridiculing Phibun for what he had done; instead they
praised him in unison: “Long live Field Marshal Phibun
Songkram”. Then they asked him to withdraw the troops from
the campus.9 Phibun assured the students that the troops would
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move out, but he did not give a specific date. In November
about three thousand Thammasat students traveled to Nakorn-
sawan, a northern town about 250 kilometers from Bangkok,
and returned to Bangkok on 5 November 1951. Then, instead
of going home, they went together in buses to Thammasat Uni-
versity. They marched on the campus and walked in to “in-
spect” the buildings. The soldiers were quite unprepared to
receive the unarmed though apparently angry students. After a
few hours of badgering the soldiers and asking them why they
were occupying the university, the students left peacefully. A
few days later the government withdrew its troops from the
campus, and Thammasat University was reopened to the stu-
dents again.10 It was rumored with some evidence at this time
that the government had specific plans for closing the university
permanently, regarding it as an undesirable stronghold for Pridi
Panomyong and his followers. It was pressure from the students
that finally obliged the government to abandon this plan.
Protesting the “Dirty Election” of 1957
In February 1957, a general election was held throughout the
country. Field Marshal Phibun Songkram and eight members of
his party were candidates for the Bangkok seats. After the re-
sults were in, there was evidence to suggest that Phibun’s fol-
lowers had used unfair tactics to get the candidates of Phibun’s
party elected.11 Public dissatisfaction with the conduct of the
election in February 1957—dissatisfaction which was vigorously
expressed in the press and among students—caused the gov-
ernment to declare a national emergency. This move only
fanned the flames of anger among the civilian population of
Bangkok, however, and they began to gather regularly at
Pramain Ground. They were joined there by increasing numbers
of students from Chulalongkorn and Thammasat universities to
criticize the government publicly for the allegedly fraudulent
election. In the meantime, students on the Chulalongkorn Uni-
versity campus displayed protest signs accusing Phibun of de-
stroying democracy.12
Several days later, the Chulalongkorn students marched
from their campus to join with the people and students of other
universities at Pramain Ground. They then marched to the office
of the prime minister, breaking through police barriers along
the way. Although the police attempted to force the demon-
strators to stop the march without using guns, many eyewitness
reports indicated that when the marchers were asked to stop
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at the bridge near the office of the prime minister, the soldiers
and police were about to open fire. Only at the last moment
did the police officer in charge finally order his men to let the
demonstrators pass without incident. This incident marked the
only time that confrontation with police led to the brink of vi-
olence. This remained the situation throughout all future Thai
demonstrations up until the violent overthrow of the Thanom
government in October 1973.
When the protesters finally got to the government building
housing the office of the prime minister, they broke down the
gate and forced themselves inside demanding to meet with
Phibun. The prime minister eventually came out, spoke to the
protesters, and promised to remedy the situation. The person
most responsible for calming the still hostile student demon-
strators, however, was Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Later, in
September 1957, Sarit, riding the tide of widespread opposition
among the Bangkok populace and with tacit student support,
led a coup against the Phibun government and drove him and
his most powerful allies out of the country.
University students were not the only demonstrators in this
protest, it should be noted. The general population of Bangkok,
including workers, professionals, and politicians, all took part in
the massive protest movement against the Phibun government
for its handling of the election and the subsequent declaration
of a “national emergency.”
Demonstration Against the World Court
In October 1958, Sarit carried out another bloodless coup and
declared himself prime minister. He abrogated the constitution,
proclaimed martial law, and appointed a committee to draft
a new constitution. Martial law remained in effect until 1968
when the new constitution was completed. During this ten-
year period under martial law there was a major demonstration
against the World Court.
In 1959, Kampuchea requested the World Court to rule on
the withdrawal of Thai police forces from the temple grounds
of Khao Praviharn, an ancient temple on the border of Thailand
and Kampuchea, which they had occupied since 1954. The case
remained unresolved with the World Court for four years until
15 June 1962, when the court ruled in favor of Kampuchea.
This decision ignited demonstrations throughout Thailand. Uni-
versity students did not initiate the demonstrations, but after a
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few days of general public protest in Bangkok and other cities
they joined in one of the largest student demonstrations ever to
be staged in Thailand up to that time.
On 21 June 1962, more than fifty thousand students
marched from Pramain Ground to the Parliament Building
shouting slogans and carrying placards denouncing the World
Court’s verdict. The students represented all the major uni-
versities of Bangkok including Chulalongkorn, Thammasat,
Mahidol, Silapakorn, and Kasetsart.13 In front of the Parliament
Building, hundreds of students of the various universities took
turns making speeches denouncing both the World Court’s
verdict and Kampuchea’s leaders. Since the government’s po-
sition on this issue was similar to their own, the students met
with little official opposition. In fact, some of the public demon-
strations were not only supported by the government but also
promoted by government-backed politicians.
Demonstrations Against Martial Law and Higher Bus
Fares
The drafting of the new constitution, which began in 1958,
was completed in 1968. During this ten-year span Thailand re-
mained under martial law as it was declared and set forth
by Sarit in 1958. Although the constitution provided for such
civil liberties as freedom of speech and assembly, the Thai gov-
ernment still retained martial law in Bangkok and other parts of
the country claiming that it was necessary in order to “protect
the national security.” The constitution provided for an election
to be held within 240 days of the date the constitution went into
effect. Thammasat students together with the public and some
politicians began requesting that the government lift martial
law to ensure a fair election and to show good faith in sup-
porting the constitutional provisions for certain civil liberties
which were now being denied. When the students organized
and marched from Pramain Ground to the Parliament Building
to press for the adoption of their proposals, the government
responded by declaring that even though the 1968 constitu-
tion had been promulgated, the population of Thailand was
still under a law which prohibited public assembly without gov-
ernment approval. Although this demonstration was relatively
small it could have been ruled an act of illegal assembly by the
government. Rather than engage in an unpopular confrontation
just before the election, however, the government complied
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with the demand of the demonstrators and lifted martial law in
Bangkok but retained it in the “threatened areas” of the outer
provinces.14
In February 1969, immediately following the general
election, there was a student demonstration against the raising
of bus fares. Thai students rely almost exclusively on the bus
system for transportation to and from the university. When
the government-supported and operated bus companies raised
bus fares 30 percent, many students felt this undue financial
hardship to be directed at them for their agitation before the
election. Hence a well-organized protest demonstration was di-
rected toward the government to lower the bus fare back to
its original price. Instead of confronting the students over what
was considered a rather minor issue by top government offi-
cials, the prime minister ordered the bus fare lowered to its
original price. Soon after this successful demonstration, student
representatives from Thammasat, Chulalongkorn, and Chiang
Mai universities, and later other universities, formed the
National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT). The NSCT was to
play a growing role in all the major movements by Thai students
up through the student revolution which overthrew the military
government in 1973.
Demonstration Against Corruption in Chulalongkorn
University
Of all the Thai universities, Chulalongkorn has the largest
campus—and as the metropolitan area of Bangkok continues
to expand, the land value of Chulalongkorn continues to in-
crease accordingly. One of its holdings, rented to a private firm,
was later developed into a huge shopping center in the late
1960s. When the contract for the construction of the shopping
center expired, it was rumored that university administrators
were bribed while negotiating a new lease with the construction
company. Moreover, it became evident that the university re-
ceived much less money than it should have obtained from the
firm. On 8 September 1970, the students held a rally on the
campus and demanded to see the deputy director and secretary-
general of the university, but both administrators refused to
appear. Thereafter students marched to the office of the prime
minister and were joined along the way by students from other
universities. As they marched, some of the demonstrators
stopped to talk to onlookers and explained that “there is a case
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of corruption at Chulalongkorn University. If not suppressed it
will mean disaster for Chulalongkorn and other universities in
the future.”15
At the office of the prime minister ten student represen-
tatives went to meet with Thanom and requested that he fire
the three university administrators involved in corruption. The
students were specifically seeking the removal of the deputy
director, the secretary-general, and the dean of architecture.
If these three corrupt individuals were not fired, the students
said, they would resort to violent means to rid the university of
them. The students alleged that these three took part in a dis-
honest deal from which they gained great personal profit with
an overall loss to the university. Thanom assured the students
that he would talk to these administrators about the charges,
and also discuss the issue with students in the university audi-
torium.
The following morning the students began another march
to the office of the prime minister. After meeting with other
members of the National Student Center of Thailand, the stu-
dents decided that Thanom should take a much stronger stand
against the three administrators; a discussion with students in
the auditorium would not be sufficient. Again the students de-
manded to see Thanom, but this time the prime minister re-
fused to meet with them. The students then marched to the
Parliament Building nearby, forced their way in, and sat in the
places reserved for members of Parliament, vowing that they
would not leave until they received a definite answer from the
prime minister on the dismissal of the three administrators.
Finally Thanom came to see them and explained that he had
talked to the authorities of Chulalongkorn University the pre-
vious evening until 1:00 A.M. and had then called an urgent
meeting of the University Council to consider the matter. He
further explained that the council had made two important de-
cisions: First, a special committee would be set up to inves-
tigate the allegations of corruption; second, the three persons
would be removed from their administrative positions but would
remain on the university staff with professor status. Fur-
thermore, Thanom explained that the three could not be fired
until there was conclusive evidence of their guilt; legally, their
case was still pending. The students expressed satisfaction with
the results of the University Council meeting and finally aban-
doned the Parliament Building and their protest.
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From this point onward, all major demonstrations would in-
volve the National Student Center of Thailand, a newly formed
student organization with nationwide membership. The for-
mation and growth of this student organization was to become
one of the most significant developments in Thai student ac-
tivism.
FOUNDATION OF THE NSCT
Before the founding of the National Student Center, students at
most Thai universities were organized through student unions.
Although strong student unions at each university were usually
well organized for such social functions as cheering at uni-
versity soccer matches, they were characteristically nonpo-
litical and, for the most part, not linked with other universities.
It was not until 1969 that student union leaders from the
various universities began cooperating on social and political
issues. The first occasion for interuniversity cooperation was
the national elections of 1969, when students of all the uni-
versities organized informally to supervise the voting at polling
places in Bangkok. Ostensibly students were to assure an
honest election and prevent the many irregularities which had
occurred in the national election of 1957.
After the national election of 1969, a meeting of a student
organization called the World University Service was planned
for in Chiang Mai. Representatives of all Thai universities at-
tended this meeting and jointly proposed that Thai students
should have an interuniversity organization. This assembly was
followed by meetings at Kampansan district (Nakonpathom),
at Kasetsart University in August 1969, at Chulalongkorn Uni-
versity in September 1969, and at Prasammitra Teachers
College in December 1969. A resolution at the last meeting
called for students of all undergraduate institutions to organize
a student center which became known as the National Student
Center of Thailand (NSCT). A committee to draft the consti-
tution for this organization was also appointed at this meeting.
There would be two members from each of the eleven insti-
tutions: Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University,
Kasetsart University, Silapakorn University, Mahidol University,
Chiang Mai University, Khonkaen University, Songkla Uni-
versity, Prasammitra Teachers College, Bangsaen Teachers Col-
lege, and Patumwan Teachers College.
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The constitutional drafting committee set up the following
goals for the NSCT:
1. To promote a good relationship among the students of all
Thai universities and between Thai students and those of
other countries
2. To serve and promote the welfare of the students
3. To promote the students’ freedom and to protect their
benefits
4. To further educational standards and academic cooper-
ation
5. To promote understanding between students and the
people
6. To preserve and promote Thai culture
7. To render services for the welfare of society
Although the constitutional drafting committee began its work
in 1970, the final document was not disclosed to the public until
February 1973. It provided for the separation of functions and
responsibilities described in the following paragraphs.
Figure 2 Structure of the NSCT
The NSCT’s organization has three main executive organs:
the Executive Committee, the Secretariat Committee, and the
Financial Committee. Figure 2 indicates the organizational
arrangement of the NSCT. The Executive Committee consisted
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of the chairmen and women of the student unions of every
university. The main duties of the Executive Committee were
twofold: to formulate policy for the NSCT and to select the
leaders of all units working under the Secretariat Committee.
The Secretariat Committee consisted of one secretary-general
and three deputies, all of whom were directly responsible to
the Executive Committee. The Secretariat Committee acted as
the spokesman of all the universities’ leaders. There were func-
tionally oriented subcommittees under the Secretariat Com-
mittee: public relations, foreign affairs, academic affairs, vol-
unteer and public welfare, office arrangement, sports,
fundraising, and security. The Financial Committee took care of
the financial affairs of the center and consisted of a represen-
tative from each university. This committee was directly respon-
sible to the Executive Committee.
The secretary-general was the most powerful person in the
organizational hierarchy and was ultimately responsible for all
NSCT activities. The first secretary-general was chosen from
Thammasat University in 1969, as was the second for the aca-
demic year 1970–1971. During this period, the NSCT did very
little concerning political matters and concentrated its efforts
on such social services as fundraising for flood victims, orga-
nizing a television program blessing the king, and providing
various counseling services to graduating high school students.
For the academic years 1971–1972 and 1972–1973, Thi-
rayuth Boonmee, an engineering student at Chulalongkorn Uni-
versity, was elected secretary-general. Thirayuth was a brilliant
student. He not only graduated at the top of his class from one
of Thailand’s most famous and oldest high schools, Suankularb,
but also achieved the highest score of all high school graduates
in Thailand on the nationwide university entrance examination.
It was under Thirayuth’s leadership that the activities of the Na-
tional Student Center of Thailand turned toward major political
issues. Thirayuth started the NSCT on its path toward nation-
al recognition and political orientation with a nationwide cam-
paign against Japanese goods in November 1972.
DEMONSTRATIONS AFTER THE 1971 COUP
Before the government elected in 1969 had completed its term
of office, the military carried out a successful coup. In No-
vember 1971, Thanom Kittikachorn overthrew his own gov-
ernment and subsequently dissolved Parliament, abrogated the
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1968 constitution, and declared martial law. Thereafter he
formed a government ruled by the National Executive Council
and proclaimed himself its leader.
The Campaign Against Japanese Goods
The first incidence of student activism after the 1971 decla-
ration of martial law occurred about a year later in November
1972. For more than ten years Thailand had faced a deficit in
the balance of trade with Japan—a deficit that was increasing
at an alarming rate for the fiscal years of 1970, 1971, and
1972. By the end of 1972, the trade deficit with Japan was
placed at approximately $215 million.16 In November 1972, the
students started a campaign against the purchase of Japanese
goods by distributing leaflets to the public. Student leaders
then proclaimed 20 to 30 November as “Anti-Japanese Goods
Week.” During this period they requested the cooperation of the
public in refraining from buying Japanese products. The stu-
dents of various universities acted together under the name of
the National Student Center of Thailand. The following trans-
lated passage represents parts of the text of the leaflet that was
prepared and distributed by the National Student Center:
Dear Thai Citizen,
We, the students, who are also your children, are coop-
erating with one another to refrain from buying Japanese
products during “Anti-Japanese Goods Week.” The reason
for this is that Japan is taking advantage of us by using
various business ploys to cheat us and also because the
trade dominance by the Japanese in Thailand has increased
alarmingly during the past ten years, putting Thailand
gradually into a position of Japan’s economic slave.
What we are stating here is not far from reality. If you study
the actions of Japan or look around and see Japanese domi-
nance in trade and cultural spheres, you will see that what
we say is true.
We would not be in trouble at all if the Japanese role was to
help to develop our country’s economy as they often claim.
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If you look at the numerous Japanese goods which have
glutted Thai markets and become a part of the everyday
life of the Thais, and the influence of advertising (created
by Japanese firms), you will realize that a large number of
these products are not essential at all. Furthermore, they
will cause more damage to the national economy.
We do not want violence because we realize the need for in-
ternational relations. But if robbers come to our house we
have to fight them seriously until they flee or change their
behavior.
This movement may be only an insignificant starting point,
but it needs cooperation from every sector of the pop-
ulation as it is a fight for righteousness and national
progress.
The National Student Center of Thailand, therefore, has
asked you to sacrifice your happiness and conveniences,
and to save the money you might spend on buying and
using Japanese goods and services during Anti-Japanese
Goods Week, 20 to 30 November, to show that Thai blood
runs thick and cannot be dishonored by anyone.
National Student Center of Thailand
16 November 197217
The students also proposed a ten-point plan for economic
revival and presented it to the government on 20 November
1972.18 Among the major points were the following proposals:
1. The government should urgently enforce laws pre-
venting aliens from taking jobs away from local resi-
dents.
2. The foreign-owned department stores are not necessary
to the country and the National Executive Council should
prohibit the expansion of existing stores and the estab-
lishment of new ones.
3. The government should consider controlling or prohi-
biting the importation of unnecessary goods and invest-
ments.
Even though martial law was in existence, the prime min-
ister did not attempt to stop this student movement. He did,
however, warn the students that “there must be no violence, not
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even demonstrations outside the Japanese embassy.”19 Thanom
and the deputy prime minister, General Prapas, unofficially ex-
pressed admiration for this peaceful student movement against
the unpopular Japanese by remarking at one point that the
demonstration was a “masterpiece.”20 King Bhumibhol said that
the idea of the movement was “excellent” and should receive
support because purchases of luxury goods needed to be re-
duced. However, the king also stated that “careful considera-
tions must be given to what demands are made or the goals of
the movement might be defeated.”21
The movement received general support from the public,
and the sale of Japanese goods was greatly reduced during that
week. Moreover, in the midst of Anti-Japanese Goods Week the
government issued a decree designed to control and protect the
Thai economy against Japanese products and investments. The
text of the government decree reflected most of the concerns
which were stated in the ten-point plan prepared by the Na-
tional Student Center.
On the last day of Anti-Japanese Goods Week, the students
organized a protest march from Pramain Ground to the head-
quarters of the National Executive Council.22 Chulalongkorn
students tried to go by bus to Pramain Ground, but the police
stopped the drivers and ordered them not to transport the stu-
dents. The students then had to walk to meet fellow students
from other universities who had marched from Pramain Ground
to the NEC headquarters. When they attempted to get inside
the building to see the prime minister, they were stopped by
police and security guards. Reporters at the scene of the
demonstration gave the following account: “Thousands of
shouting students carried their Anti-Japanese Goods protest to
the gates of the National Executive Council headquarters last
night, but were prevented from forcing their way in by rein-
forced police and security teams.”23
Student leaders calmed the demonstrators who at many
points nearly clashed with police and security guards. The
prime minister did not come out to meet all the students but
did send representatives to talk with six student representa-
tives. The prime minister’s representatives told the students
that Thanom supported them and would attempt to enforce fea-
sible sections of the ten-point plan presented to the government
one week earlier.
Thailand in Transition
57
Demonstration Against Executive Control of the Judiciary
On 12 December 1972 the National Executive Council issued
Decree 299, which in effect gave the power to control the
nation’s judges to the minister of justice, a political appointee
of the prime minister. According to the Justice Act of 1952,
it was the chief justice of the Supreme Court who held the
highest position in the judicial system, presided over all judges
in Thailand, and also served as chairman of the Official Judici-
ary Committee. Decree 299, however, was designed to transfer
the chairmanship of this committee to the minister of justice.
In addition to assuming all the duties of this chairmanship, the
minister of justice, who was directly responsible to the prime
minister, was also given expansive power including the power
to retire any judge to another ministry if the judge in question
agreed to the transfer.
The law students of Thammasat University were quickly
made aware of the political implications of Decree 299 as it
applied both to their own career goals and to the future of
the Thai judicial system. The very next day the law students
began a protest movement against the decree. On 15 December
1972, the law students, joined by about two thousand students
of other faculties of Thammasat, marched from their campus
to Chulalongkorn University. They carried signs, banners, and
placards proclaiming such ideals and demands as “Give us back
the court,” “Dedicated to judiciary power,” and “Justice sup-
ports the world.”24 Student representatives at Chulalongkorn
agreed to support the protest movement and the demands of the
Thammasat law students. Soon thereafter, representatives from
other universities declared their support for the movement, and
on 17 December representatives from all the universities except
Songkla presented a letter to the prime minister urging him
to retract Decree 299 and order a continuance of the Justice
Act of 1952. On the evening of 19 December, thousands of stu-
dents began a protest rally and a sit-in at Pramain Ground. They
remained at this popular protest site throughout the evening
and did not disperse until 8:00 A.M. the following day. In the
meantime students at the largest and most prestigious uni-
versity in the provinces, Chiang Mai University, held a protest
rally on their campus with students giving speeches denouncing
Decree 299.
Almost simultaneously the newly formed cabinet met hur-
riedly and came to a unanimous decision retracting Decree 299.
At 2:27 P.M. the national Thai radio station broadcast the news
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that the government was going to attempt to approach the
demonstrators at the sit-in protest that evening. One cabinet of-
ficial personally carried the decision and a special message to
Thammasat students who were planning to return to the sit-in.
Nevertheless, the students decided to go on with the second
stage of the sit-in as planned. Aware that the newly appointed
Legislative Council had the final authority in the matter, the stu-
dents wanted decisive action, not promises from government of-
ficials. On 22 December, the Legislative Council convened for
the first time and Decree 299 was placed at the top of the
agenda. Before its first recess of the day the council voted to re-
tract Decree 299 and reenact the Justice Act of 1952.
Demonstration at Ramkamhaeng University
Although Ramkamhaeng University was the last major uni-
versity to be founded in Thailand, it has the largest enrollment
(see Table 3). For Ramkamhaeng, unlike all the other major uni-
versities, does not require students to take an entrance exami-
nation; rather, it is obliged to consider any student with a high
school diploma for admission. Ramkamhaeng University was es-
tablished not only to educate the many students who failed the
entrance examinations of other universities but also to meet
one of the primary goals of the five-year plan for higher ed-
ucation; to make a college education available to all who had
met the minimum requirements. Because of its limited facilities
and enormous enrollment, Ramkamhaeng University allowed
and even encouraged students to study at home, and classroom
attendance was generally not required. Many students came
to the university only at the end of the semester to take their
final examinations. Such liberal policies on admissions and at-
tendance do not exist in the other established universities.
The setting for one of the largest protests in the history of
Thai student activism began in June 1973, when nine students
were expelled from Ramkamhaeng University by order of the
rector. Dr. Sakdi Phasooknirand. These students were accused
of issuing an illegal magazine attacking the government and
personally criticizing the prime minister and deputy prime min-
ister by depicting them as “beasts” in the cartoons and edito-
rials. When classes commenced during the first semester on 20
June 1973, students began to distribute leaflets decrying the ex-
pulsion of the “Ramkamhaeng Nine.”25
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In one incident, as students were distributing leaflets at the
gate of the university campus, men drove up in a car and began
beating them. Other students in the immediate vicinity rushed
to the aid of the students being assaulted and in the melee that
followed, one of the attackers pulled out a gun and forced the
students to retreat while he and his fellow assailants fled in a
waiting car.
The following day ten busloads of Ramkamhaeng students
were on their way to Chulalongkorn to gather support for their
cause, when the buses were stopped by the police and the
drivers forced to relinquish their licenses. The government’s
tactic merely provided an impetus to the movement, however,
for the Chulalongkorn students joined the protest and, after
meeting with the stranded Ramkamhaeng students, marched
together to the Ministry of Government Universities and de-
manded to see the minister, Dr. Bunpod Bintason. The minister
refused to meet with the throngs of students whose number had
grown to an estimated ten thousand strong. The students then
changed their strategy and decided to congregate at the tradi-
tional rallying point: Pramain Ground.
Upon their arrival at Pramain Ground they were greeted by
hundreds of students and onlookers. The students then held a
huge protest rally with speeches from various student leaders
and thereafter proceeded to march to the Democracy Mon-
ument. As they advanced they sang a marching song written by
some of the students. The lyrics reflected their determination
and idealism: “Fight without retreat, for the masses are waiting
for us…. We have joined together to fight for democracy!” The
students’ placards and huge banners expressed the immediacy
of the crisis at hand. The banners proclaimed to the onlookers
that “Absolutism is taking over higher education” and that
“Ramkamhaeng is hot with power” and asked the general pop-
ulation to “Help us escape this danger.” On the same day,
the official student organization of Chiang Mai University, the
Student Front, threw its support behind the student protesters
in Bangkok through a communique.
A group of lecturers from various Bangkok universities
issued an open letter protesting Ramkamhaeng’s dismissal of
the nine students. This letter was signed by eighty-two pro-
fessors, later referred to as “Young Turks,” from Chulalongkorn,
Thammasat, Silapakorn, Kasetsart, and the National Institute of
Development Administration (NIDA).
Catalysts of the Transition: The Thai Student Movement
60
At the Democracy Monument, the students staged a protest
rally and heard speeches from various leaders. The topics of the
speeches were not confined only to the case of the nine students
at Ramkamhaeng. The students addressed the many problems
caused by “power and profit mongers” in high government po-
sitions. They called for a new constitution to replace the one
that had been abrogated through a military coup in 1971, an
end to corruption, and measures to deal with the increasing
price of rice and the sagging Thai economy. Determined to
remain, the students camped near the monument overnight.
Late the same evening, the government ordered the closing
of all major universities in Bangkok, including Kasetsart, Chu-
lalongkorn, Thammasat, Mahidol, Ramkamhaeng, Silapakorn,
and Prasammitra. The order carried with it a penalty of arrest
for any student who tried to enter any campus of these univer-
sities. Simultaneously, the government sent about five hundred
metropolitan police of the Crime Suppression Division to sur-
round the student camp-in. This “commando” police force pro-
ceeded to form a human barricade blocking all routes leading to
the Democracy Monument (see Figure 1). The students sought
support from the general civilian population by distributing
leaflets to publicize their dilemma. The following excerpt is
taken from one of the leaflets (translated from Thai):
To fathers, mothers, and fellow citizens … Now these incidents
have indicated that we are ruled by tyrants. They oppress us.
They want us to starve because rice is so expensive. No one up
there paid any attention to our distress. Our peaceful begging for
help did not mean anything to them. Last night students all over
the country joined this movement in peace to ask for the rights
and freedom which belong to all humanity. We were hungry and
cold, but we stayed here until morning. However, the police sur-
rounded us. They are now saying that they will let your children
starve and walk voluntarily up to the barrels of their guns.26
The government’s move to close the universities proved to
be a great mistake. With the universities closed, many stu-
dents who would have gone to class decided instead to join
the sit-in at the Democracy Monument. Kasetsart and Tham-
masat students came in groups to the scene of the rally. About
four thousand Kasetsart students, thwarted by police when at-
tempting to take the bus, walked some twenty kilometers to
the Democracy Monument. Before leaving the area around the
campus these students held a short rally by the National
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Museum. Several thousand Thammasat students were the first
group to arrive. The police, who had joined to form a human
barricade around the Democracy Monument, almost clashed
with the arriving throngs of students. After minor skirmishes
of pushing and shoving along the barricade line, however, the
police finally decided that they had no choice but to allow the
thousands of arriving students to go through the line and join
the other protesters peacefully.
After the arrival of Kasetsart students the number of the
protesters swelled to around thirty thousand,27 and by midday
the figure was placed at about fifty thousand.28 Almost as im-
pressive as the unity of support by students of all the major
universities was the favorable response of the civilian popu-
lation, who donated money, food, and drink to the protesters
throughout their campaign. One report of the incident noted:
During the long hours of protest, a large amount of food, drink,
and money was donated from sympathetic citizens from all walks
of life, ranging from street vendors to well-known personalities….
The amount of money collected was more than 40,000 baht [about
$2,000].29
Periodically during the protest the demonstrators would turn,
face the palace, and sing the King’s Song, as if to emphasize
that even though they were hostile to the government, they still
respected the king.
In the meantime, the government attempted to deal with
the expanding dimensions of the protest. The cabinet members
held an urgent meeting on the morning of 24 June to discuss
the matter. After long debate the cabinet members invited the
representatives of the students, including the nine expelled stu-
dents, to see the prime minister and other high officials. As a
result of the meeting, the government agreed to the following
points:
1. The case of the nine students who were expelled from
Ramkamhaeng University would be reconsidered by the
Council of Universities.
2. The students’ demand for the removal of the rector of
Ramkamhaeng University would be reviewed and taken
under consideration by the government.
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3. The persons who assaulted the students distributing
leaflets on the first day of the campaign would be tried
and the matter would be taken up by the police de-
partment.
4. The government would declare the reopening of all
closed universities, and all restrictions pertaining to the
shutdown would be retracted.
After the meeting the student leaders reported back to the
waiting protesters, explaining that the government, while not
conceding to all the demands, did agree to most of what the
students wanted. Thereafter the leaders advised the students to
disperse and go home.
The next morning, however, the rector of Ramkamhaeng
University announced his decision to change the expulsion of
the nine students to suspension for one semester.30 Moreover,
one of the nine students, who had been reprimanded by the uni-
versity administration before this incident, was to be suspended
for two semesters. The student leaders who had called an end
to the protest demonstration did so with an understanding from
the prime minister that the Ramkamhaeng Nine would most
likely be readmitted without conditions. The rector’s decision
to punish the students with suspension succeeded only in an-
gering the student leaders, who thought the crucial issues to
be freedom of the press and the right of students to criticize
the government—essential freedoms that should not be com-
promised. Word quickly spread throughout student circles that
the government had broken faith with the students and tricked
them into dispersing. The student leaders of all the universi-
ties reconvened and planned another massive demonstration,
announcing that this time they would not waste their time
seeing the prime minister.
As the movement for the new protest gained momentum, the
government suddenly held a high-level meeting and announced
that the nine students would be readmitted without any condi-
tions.31 Ironically, at this crucial meeting none of the cabinet
members even attempted to defend Dr. Sakdi, the rector.
Moreover, some cabinet members encouraged the prime min-
ister to remove Dr. Sakdi for the way he handled the entire
matter. A few days later, Dr. Sakdi submitted his resignation. It
was promptly accepted by the government.
In achieving all of the students’ original demands without
having to carry through with the planned follow-up demon-
stration, the unified and persistent nature of the movement
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was seen as a masterpiece of the National Student Center of
Thailand. The government leaders were unable to sway the de-
termination which marked this movement, even after the stu-
dents had dispersed. The cooperation among the various univer-
sities in support of nine fellow students, as well as the swelling
public support, gave an entirely new dimension to the strength
and significance of the National Student Center of Thailand and
its leadership in the politics of Thailand.
In the aftermath of this movement, however, there emerged
another striking event. A group of students and professors
protesting both the government’s decision and the role of the
National Student Center staged a counterdemonstration sup-
porting Dr. Sakdi. Approximately a thousand Ramkamhaeng
University students marched around the campus with placards
and banners, one of which read: “We don’t want those nine
students!”32 By midday the number of protesters had grown
to about six thousand. After a rally held on campus the pro-
testers decided to march to the prime minister’s office, where
they demanded to see Thanom. While waiting for a reply to their
demand, they held a public forum and made speeches calling
for the return of Dr. Sakdi and expulsion of the nine “trouble-
makers.” Outside the prime minister’s office the protesters pe-
riodically sang the King’s Song and the national anthem to em-
phasize their loyalty to both king and country. The government
was apparently unimpressed; it did not even send a represen-
tative to see them. The government did, however, let it be
known that unless the protesters dispersed it would be forced to
use violent measures to restore order. Several hours later, after
much discussion and rumor, the counterdemonstration broke up
and Dr. Sakdi’s removal was upheld.
The organizational effort of the leaders of the National
Student Center of Thailand had been praised by the government
during Anti-Japanese Goods Week. Now, in the campaign to re-
instate the Ramkamhaeng Nine, the National Student Center
grudgingly won the government’s respect as an effective oppo-
sitional force in the ever changing realm of Thai politics. Gov-
ernment leaders unofficially reported on the fearsome potential
of organized student pressure in domestic politics. The NSCT
was able, on occasion, to enlist considerable support from the
working class, the middle class, and the intellectuals. Indeed, it
was establishing itself as the voice of the people, promoting a
democratic form of government in the face of a government de-
termined to rule by martial law. This characterization of contem-
porary student activism in Thailand was explained in a special
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paper distributed by the National Student Center and written
by its elected leader, Thirayuth Boonmee. In this paper, entitled
“The Students Begin to Find Their Target,” Thirayuth explains
the relationship between the students and people:
Nobody can hurt the students without hurting the people. This
is because, first, students are the children of the people and,
second, the people have great faith in students. The students have
proved that they are grateful for the taxes collected from the
people for educational purposes. The students also try hard with
all their ability to solve the many social problems. As long as the
students stay on the people’s side, the people’s faith in them will
remain. This will mean increased bargaining power with the gov-
ernment.33
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About the students’ perception of their own power, he writes:
Student activism can change society, as witnessed in Indonesia,
Turkey, France, Japan, the United States, and other countries.
We study and understand what has happened in other countries
… but I hope that the students do not overestimate their power.
Power has to be controlled and used in a purposeful manner. Oth-
erwise it can cause destruction and chaos. And this we do not
want to see.34
On the future of the student movement, Thirayuth predicts with
confidence:
We came through in the past and we shall not destroy our
movement in the future.35
Thirayuth’s confidence in the future of the student
movement as a social and political force capable of changing
the Thai political system soon became a reality. Less than five
months after the major demonstration regarding the
Ramkamhaeng Nine, Bangkok witnessed a violent student rev-
olution which brought down the Thanom government and
stopped military rule by martial law.36
Although this revolution was the outgrowth of yet another
demonstration against the arbitrary decision of the military gov-
ernment and rule by martial law, its overriding significance to
the Thai student movement and the future of the Thai political
system merits special consideration here. The next section ex-
plains in detail the events leading up to the demonstration and
subsequent violent revolution and depicts the political atmos-
phere in the immediate aftermath of the student revolt.
THE STUDENT REVOLT OF OCTOBER 1973
The fate of the Thanom military government and the future di-
rection of the Thai political system were suddenly altered by
a series of critical events which occurred between 6 and 15
October 1973. Commonly referred to as “The Ten Days,” this
period of 1973 may well become known as the most important
series of events in Thai political history since the “revolution” of
1932. We turn now to an account of these eventful ten days.37
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After the huge demonstration in June, Thirayuth Boonmee
and other student leaders kept the pressure on the government
to accelerate the promulgation of the constitution. On Saturday,
6 October 1973, Thirayuth and ten other political activists were
arrested by special police agents while distributing leaflets
urging support for the early drafting of the constitution. The
leaflets specifically referred to 10 December 1973, Thailand’s
Constitution Day, as the date by which the constitution should
be promulgated. Thirayuth and the other activists were accused
of violating a National Executive Council decree which forbade
more than five people to gather for political purposes. Those ar-
rested with Thirayuth included Prapansak Kamolpetch, a former
Bangkok parliamentary candidate, Boonsong Chalethorn,
deputy secretary-general of the National Student Center,
Bandhit Hengnilrat, a liberal arts student at Thammasat Uni-
versity, Visa Kanthap, a humanities student at Ramkamhaeng
University, and Thanya Chunkathatharn, a writer for the weekly
Maharaj magazine. Also arrested were Thawee Muenthikorn,
a Thammasat economics instructor, Montri Juengsirinarak, a
writer for the weekly Social Science Review, Nopporn Suwan-
panich, a former Chulalongkorn arts instructor, Preedi Boonsue,
a Thammasat political science student, and Chaiwat Suravichai,
former vice-president of the Chulalongkorn Student Union.
Those arrested were first taken to police headquarters and
thereafter escorted to their homes where detectives carried out
an extensive search for “more incriminating evidence.” In or-
dering the arrest of the students in lieu of freedom of assembly,
and the search of their homes in lieu of freedom from unwar-
ranted search and seizure, the Thanom-Prapas governing clique
only added fuel to the flames of discontent and provided visible
proof to the Thai public that student claims of government re-
pression were correct. Moreover, when the military government
ordered the confiscation of all leaflets calling for the promul-
gation of the permanent constitution as a matter of domestic
security, it was quickly interpreted by the general Thai public
as further evidence that Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn
and Deputy Prime Minister Prapas Charusathien had no real in-
tention of relinquishing their powerful positions to a constitu-
tional government.
The train of government errors continued the following day,
Sunday, 7 October 1973, when the deputy director general of
the Police Department, Lt. Gen. Prachuab Suntharangkoon, or-
dered the arrest of Kongkiat Kongka, who was accused of being
an outspoken member of another activist group demanding
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early promulgation of the permanent constitution. Meanwhile,
on this same day, the leaders of the powerful National Student
Center of Thailand threatened retaliation for the government’s
actions.
Setting the Stage for Confrontation
The stage was being set for confrontation as the government
continued to remain insensitive to students’ demands and ap-
parently ignorant of their determination. This was clearly seen
the next day, Monday, 8 October 1973, when Prapas ruled out
the possibility of early bail for the twelve arrested activists
and publicly announced that confiscated documents linked the
twelve with a plot to overthrow the government. Prapas, in a
further attempt to retrieve public support for the government’s
seemingly repressive acts, claimed that the police had seized
documents “about communism” in both Thai and Chinese. The
Student Organization of the National Institute of Development
Administration also appealed to Prime Minister Thanom to drop
the charge of inciting the public to act, but the government re-
fused.
The implication by Prapas that the activists were engaged
in some communist-inspired plot only angered the students
further, and on the following day, Tuesday, 9 October 1973,
more than two thousand Thammasat University students con-
gregated for an antigovernment rally. Meanwhile, the entire
metropolitan police force was put on full alert as police received
reports that the students threatened to march to Bang Khen de-
tention center where the twelve arrested activists were being
held. Thammasat students also symbolically registered their
disgust with the government by lowering the national flag and
putting up a black flag as a sign of mourning. Although the
black flag was removed by Thammasat University authorities,
students refused to attend classes to take their first-semester
examinations, which had to be called off for an indefinite period.
In the meantime, small groups of students went to Bang Khen
to visit the arrested activists but were allowed to see only five of
the twelve. The continued refusal of the police to allow personal
visits to the remaining seven activists (among them Thirayuth)
eventually led to rumors late in the week that they had been se-
riously tortured or even killed in captivity.
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During the afternoon of 9 October, the Thammasat Student
Legislative Body voted approval of a four-point proposal to be
carried out by the Thammasat Student Council. These points
were:
1. Nonviolent protests will be made first, and the students
will remain at the Photi compound until the release of
the twelve detainees.
2. Ten representatives will be appointed to negotiate with
the government for a speedy release of the twelve de-
tainees.
3. Letters will be sent to all universities and institutes,
calling for a show of strength and unity to support the
negotiations.
4. If the government still refuses to release the twelve after
these nonviolent protests have been made, the students
will resort to violence in the form of demonstrations and
bloodshed.
Rallies were held on other campuses on 9 October, but the
topics of protest were not always political. The case of one very
practical group of students at Prasammitra Teachers College
was reported by the Bangkok Post as follows:
Several student leaders voiced their opinion during a mass
student rally at the college yesterday that toilets are most im-
portant during student demonstrations. They pointed out that
past demonstrations showed the marchers could not hold on
longer than a few days since all of them have to go to toilets,
change their clothes, and brush their teeth. They reasoned that
if movable toilets are set up at the demonstration sites, the
marchers could hold on longer in their fight for justice and
democracy …38
After the rallies, students from Thammasat and Chula-
longkorn universities and several of the teacher training col-
leges of Bangkok joined in an all-night vigil, braving the cold
and light showers, and vowed “full support” to those arrested.
The arrested now included a former member of Parliament,
Khaisaeng Suksai, as the list of political prisoners climbed to
thirteen.
The following morning, 10 October 1973, the students made
good their promise of support and an additional thousand stu-
dents joined in the protest rallies. Much to the satisfaction of
the swelling crowds, student leaders declared that the Thanom-
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Prapas clique had staged the revolution “of itself, for itself,
and by itself.” As the crowds at the rallies continued to grow
throughout the afternoon, with mounting tension, the gov-
ernment announced that Deputy Prime Minister Prapas had
been appointed head of a special independent organization to
“restore peace and order.” At the same time, the commander-
in-chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Kris Sivara, was named
as Marshal Prapas’s deputy in the new suppression force which
had its headquarters, interestingly enough, at the Communist
Suppression Operations Command (CSOC).
On the following day, 11 October 1973, Prapas agreed to
meet with student representatives of the National Student
Center of Thailand, who promptly demanded the release of
the thirteen political prisoners. Prapas refused the demand but
vowed to have a constitution ready in twenty months. When
asked why Article 17, which allowed arrest and detention
without due process, was invoked against the political activists,
Prapas explained that it was for the benefit of the detainees
because authorities would be empowered to expedite the case
without going through normal legal procedure in postponing lit-
igation. Thai student leaders remained unimpressed with the
government’s attempt at negotiation and were particularly per-
turbed with Prapas’s refusal to release the thirteen political
activists. They returned to the rally, which had now moved to
the Thammasat University football grounds to accommodate the
growing crowd of more than fifty thousand, to announce that
the NSCT would take sole responsibility for the school closures
and student walkouts. At that point about 70 percent of all
private and government schools in Bangkok had already called
off classes either by official order or by action taken by the stu-
dents to join forces with the NSCT at the Thammasat campus.
In the meantime, the thirteen political activists being held
at the Metropolitan Police Training School in Bang Khen staged
a hunger strike to protest the delay in police investigations
and to give moral support to the mass rally of students. Seem-
ingly worried over the course of events, Prime Minister Thanom
and Deputy Prime Minister Prapas consulted with the king in
a special audience that evening at Chitrlada Palace. In a dis-
cussion which lasted about two hours, the king reportedly ex-
pressed grave concern over the present student uprising.
The next morning, in a move which was apparently designed
to avoid confrontation with the students, the government made
an announcement: “If any investigations show that the students
were purely and sincerely demanding the constitution, they will
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be released with fines for holding a political gathering of more
than five persons.” Making a clear distinction between young
students and adult politicians, however, the government main-
tained that legal action would be taken against the eight politi-
cians who were arrested if they were found guilty as charged.
It was apparently an offer of too little and too late, for the
day began in a frenzy as thousands of students from univer-
sities, technical colleges, teachers training colleges, vocational
colleges, and secondary schools streamed toward the Tham-
masat University rendezvous from all directions. Many of the
students arrived on foot, often accompanied by sympathetic
teachers and lecturers while several passersby donated money
to the marchers. The number of students pouring into the Tham-
masat grounds swelled to tens of thousands by midday as it was
announced that all schools in Bangkok had been closed indefi-
nitely. Chulalongkorn University and Ramkamhaeng University
also announced the indefinite postponement of all examina-
tions. Moreover, the Chulalongkorn Student Union declared in a
formal statement that they “openly opposed” the government’s
action on the arrests, as “they could not bear the injustice any
longer.”
Meanwhile, the students stepped up the pressure on the
government by announcing a demand for the unconditional re-
lease of the thirteen detainees. The NSCT gave a 24-hour
deadline starting from midday and warned of “decisive action”
if the demand was not met. The director-general of the Public
Relations Department, Maj. Gen. Prakob Charumanee, issued
an assurance that no force would be used against the demon-
strating students, and he appealed to the public to avoid the
congested area around Thammasat University. An extraordinary
emergency cabinet meeting was called at the Communist Sup-
pression Operations Command at 2:00 P.M. to consider the ulti-
matum. The meeting went on for several hours before a solution
was found; meanwhile, at Thammasat, tension was building as
students waited for an answer from the government on their
demands. An hour-by-hour countdown was started as student
leaders informed the crowd that there were 23 … 22 … 21 …
hours to the deadline.
On the evening of 12 October 1973, about five hours after
the ultimatum was received by the government, it was an-
nounced to the waiting students that the thirteen political ac-
tivists would be released on bail. A great cheer went up around
the crowded field as most students appeared satisfied. Some
student leaders were still disgruntled, however, pointing out to
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the rally that they had demanded an unconditional release, not
release on bail. One of the thirteen activists being held by the
government, Chaiwat Suravichai, was sent to explain the situ-
ation. At the rally he indicated that the other twelve prisoners
were willing to remain in the detention center and that their
release should not affect the continued protests for an early
promulgation of the constitution. After hours of debate, the ma-
jority of the students present decided to reject the bail offer. At
11:25 P.M. the remaining twelve political activists, upon learn-
ing of the NSCT’s decision, refused to sign a paper accepting
their temporary release.
This offer, though not all that the students wanted, was ob-
viously as far as the government was prepared to go. Using
previous demonstrations as a yardstick for compromise, the
government obviously felt that release of the thirteen activists
would allow both the students and government to save face
while avoiding a violent confrontation. This time, however, the
government gravely underestimated the determination of the
students on the constitutional issue. Discontent among students
and the Thai public at large had reached an all-time high,
and student leaders were well aware of the implications and
power of their position. Moreover, they had been misled by
promises of release just three months before in the case of the
Ramkamhaeng Nine. They were not about to disperse as they
had in the last demonstration and relinquish their powerful po-
sition, only to have the government renege on its promises.
After the students flatly refused to accept anything less than un-
conditional release of the thirteen, the government found itself
with an uncomfortable choice: either complete loss of face or
an impressive show of force. In choosing the latter, they set the
final stage for confrontation.
Confrontation and Violence
At 11:30 on the morning of 13 October 1973, soldiers took up
positions along the perimeter of the Communist Suppression
Operations Command headquarters while the twelve remaining
activists stayed on the grass outside the Bang Khen detention
center refusing to go with the police to Patumwan head-
quarters. They were waiting for activist Chaiwat to return with
the results of his discussion with protesting students at Tham-
masat University. About a half hour later, the government an-
nounced that it would not back down on its refusal to release
the thirteen activists unconditionally. About the same time, all
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gates leading to Thammasat University were closed as the
demonstrators took up their positions. As a result, Chaiwat was
unable to leave Thammasat to rejoin the other twelve activists,
who at this point had gone back into their detention cell and re-
fused to leave.
While the students were completing their plans to make
the customary march along Rajdamnern Avenue, pandemonium
nearly broke out at Bang Khen as police, under the direction
of the Special Branch police commander, Maj. Gen. Chai
Suwansnasorn, tried to persuade the twelve activists to leave
since they were officially released on bail. A team of more
than twenty commandos entered the cell where the twelve ac-
tivists were staying. After heated discussions, the twelve ac-
tivists, including Thirayuth Boonmee, voluntarily walked out
from the detention center and waited patiently near the su-
perhighway for a “final decision” from the National Student
Center of Thailand. When word came, however, that the student
demonstration had gained momentum, most of the detainees
joined the NSCT leaders near Thammasat.
In the meantime, some 200,000 protesting students left
Thammasat University campus in a protest march to demand
the unconditional release of the thirteen activists. Preparations
were made for a prolonged demonstration at Thammasat Uni-
versity as the NSCT food and welfare committees loaded about
ten small pickup trucks with food, fruit, and other necessary
supplies. The chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Com-
mittee of the NSCT, Rachan Wiraphan, said that if the thirteen
constitutional activists were not released by noon the students
would march to the Parliament Building. He also revealed an
alternative plan which called for the marchers to rally at the
Democracy Monument if they were blocked by government
forces on Rajdamnern Avenue at Makkhawan Bridge. The
strategy for the organized protest directed each university and
school participating in the demonstration to assemble in a spe-
cific area so that leaders could detect any “third hands.” Tough
engineering students were to make up the front column of the
protest march in case of clashes with government forces.
As the march began, it became obvious that the NSCT
leaders had been meticulous in their plans. First a group of
scouts was sent ahead to clear the way for the protest march.
Groups of students were organized into separate sections to be
responsible for food, first aid, coordination, commando duties,
and so forth, each with its own colored armbands. (See Figure
3.) Some engineering students carried wooden or metal bars
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Figure 3 Organization of the NSCT during the five-day protest
while others wore protection against tear gas. A group of girl
students marched ahead of the column carrying pictures of the
king and queen. Close behind the girls was a group of young
men with thick sacks for placing on barbed wire obstacles and
for throwing over police dogs. This group was referred to as the
“antidog” unit. Small groups of first aid workers walked among
the marchers holding Red Cross flags aloft for easy identifi-
cation. While the students were protesting peacefully at Sanam
Luang and Rajdamnern Avenue, the king met with an NSCT del-
egation of nine, among them some of the released activists from
Bang Khen center.
Meanwhile, public support swelled as large amounts of cash,
food, and supplies flowed into the donation booths in and
around Thammasat University. By noon the NSCT announced it
had collected more than 400,000 baht (approximately $20,000).
It was also reported that the majority of Bangkok buslines
running to the Sanam Luang area would not pick up passengers
other than those going to Thammasat University, and bus con-
ductors were turning away passengers who indicated they were
not going to attend the rally. The conductor of a packed bus
which avoided the regular bus stops and went directly to Tham-
masat University simply explained his behavior by asserting
that “we are all fighting for the constitution.”
Before the protesting marchers, now more than 400,000
strong, moved from the Democracy Monument, there was news
that the government had agreed to the NSCT demand calling
for the unconditional release of the thirteen activists. The stu-
dents had gained an important victory involving the uncondi-
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tional release of the activists. Although the activists had already
been released on bail and allowed to leave the detention center,
they would eventually have had to face the charges in court.
The government also promised that the permanent constitution
would be promulgated by October 1974. Having achieved what
they considered a victory, the student leaders called off the
demonstration at the Democracy Monument and returned to
Thammasat University to celebrate.
More than 200,000 students remained on the streets,
however, and thousands of them refused to disband. This group,
which included the hard-core vocational and engineering stu-
dents, was under the direction of Seksan Prasertjul, a student
of political science at Thammasat University.39 These students
were dissatisfied and wanted a guarantee that the government
would keep its promises to the students. Seksan tried to control
the restless crowd, urging them to avoid any violent measure
and attempting meanwhile to reach the other leaders of the
NSCT, but his efforts were in vain. At about twelve o’clock, mid-
night, Seksan decided to lead the crowd to the royal palace
to request the king’s advice. At that point some of the other
leaders of the NSCT showed up and tried to persuade the crowd
to go home and not follow Seksan. After Seksan and other
leaders of the NSCT, including the former secretary-general,
met and discussed what had happened, however, the two sides
reached an understanding. What actually went on at this meet-
ing is still open to question, but according to some of the
student leaders two major points were discussed.
In the first place, since their personal safety was not guar-
anteed by the government there seemed to be little advantage
to disbanding. Second, it was generally agreed that if con-
frontation was going to occur it should take place near the
palace so that retreating students could take refuge in the
palace grounds. This strategy, though a departure from all pre-
vious routes of confrontation which usually bypassed the palace
in favor of the government buildings, was actually part of a
contingency plan. The leaders in their meeting discussed this
plan along with other proposals, many of which reflected the
writings of a famous Thai revolutionist known only as “Jit” to
many of the student leaders. This brilliant student of Chula-
longkorn University, upon graduation, chose communist insur-
rection in the jungle rather than the Thai bureaucracy in Bang-
kok. After his death in 1967 in a fight with government forces,
his writings, representing a blueprint for the Thai peoples’ rev-
olution, began to emerge in books and newspapers around the
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university campuses. It is noteworthy that the events which fol-
lowed this meeting are neatly outlined in several of these revo-
lutionary essays.
It was still the same fateful Sunday morning of 14 October
when the students reached the palace. Only the king’s represen-
tative, however, Col. Vasit Dejkunchorn, came to see them about
5:30 A.M. This representative read the king’s advice to the stu-
dents—which was to disband peacefully since the thirteen ac-
tivists had been unconditionally released and the constitution
had been promised before October. After reading this message.
Colonel Vasit told the students that ‘their majesties had been
unable to sleep for four nights running during the protest. Now
the king would like all of you to go home.”
It looked for a moment as though the situation would return
to normal as the students themselves, after singing the national
anthem together, prepared to go home. As the demonstrators
started to disband, however, an unfortunate incident triggered
a violent riot which was to last for the next two days. When
the demonstrators attempted to leave the street in front of the
palace, Lt. Gen. Monchai Phankongchuen, assistant director of
the police department, ordered his men to form a barricade so
that the students should leave the area in only one direction
to ensure an orderly dispersal. The mass of students, however,
proved too large, and when the students’ request that another
exit should be allowed was refused, a wave of resentment ran
through the mass of demonstrators.
It was about 6:30 A.M. when this confrontation turned into
a violent clash. Exactly what happened has been reported in
various ways. Some eyewitnesses claim that the police began
clubbing the demonstrators because they were shoving against
the police line. A reporter at the scene claimed that a bag of
ice thrown from the crowd hit a policeman squarely on the
head and knocked him down, after which the police began using
tear gas and threatened the students with their weapons. In
any event, Molotov cocktails started flying in the direction of
the police, while the police opened fire on the students. Many
demonstrators were injured as some attempted to fight back
with wooden clubs. Most of the students, however, attempted
to run from the area. Some jumped into the moat nearby while
others ran to take refuge inside the palace grounds.40 Three girl
students were said to have been beaten to death by the police.41
Many of the demonstrators ran back to the Parliament Building
while some returned to the Democracy Monument and others to
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Thammasat University. They quickly spread the news of police
brutality in the palace clash. The story about the girls being
beaten to death was told and retold.
The demonstrators were now without leaders as all NSCT of-
ficials had disappeared from the crowd. Seksan was said to have
collapsed from exhaustion due to his intense and continued ac-
tivity in the last four to five days.
Meanwhile, at Thammasat campus, the students started to
regroup, anxious to gain revenge on the police for their bru-
tality. At about 7:45 A.M., a group of demonstrators set fire to
a police booth beside Thammasat University. From that time
on the violent clashes between students, who were joined by
the public, and government forces continued along Rajdamnern
Avenue for two days and one night. The heaviest fighting oc-
curred near the end of Rajdamnern Avenue in the proximity of
Pramain Ground. The government brought several tanks and
some five hundred soldiers to the aid of the Bangkok police
force in combating the demonstrators. The demonstrators re-
fused to disband, however, and many fought back with wooden
clubs while a few had pistols. When the demonstrators were
first confronted by the tanks, they thought the soldiers would
not actually use them against students. This assumption proved
false, however, as the army fired M-16 rifles and tank machine
guns into the crowds of demonstrators. These weapons, along
with the government’s helicopter gunships, were responsible
for most of the casualties.42 Several hundred students were
shot and wounded; more than one hundred were killed. A small
number of soldiers was also killed or injured.
Throughout the violent confrontation, the government used
the media to broadcast news reports claiming that the demon-
strators were not students but communist agents and that the
student leaders had been forced to join a plot to overthrow the
government. The government greatly exaggerated the rioters’
capabilities by claiming that some demonstrators possessed ma-
chine guns and had killed many soldiers. The broadcasts never
gave any account of the number of demonstrators killed or
wounded.
At about 3:30 P.M. the military gained control of Thammasat
University, and large numbers of demonstrators had to
withdraw across the Chao Phraya River, jamming the Pran Nok
landing. As the demonstrators realized the futility of fighting
tanks and machine guns with clubs and Molotov cocktails, they
turned their frustration on other symbols of government au-
thority. Many of the government buildings along Rajdamnern
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Avenue were set afire as people from all over Bangkok traveled
to the scene of the fighting. The mass of demonstrators and on-
lookers grew to over half a million people as crowds began to
pour into Rajdamnern Avenue. Finally, at about 5:30 P.M. on 14
October, the government gave up the battle and the soldiers
were ordered to withdraw from Rajdamnern Avenue.
At about the same time, the government announced over
Radio Thailand that it had tendered its resignation to the king.
At about 7:15 P.M. the king addressed the nation on television
and all radio stations, officially announcing that Thanom’s gov-
ernment had resigned and Professor Sanya Thammasakdi, the
rector of Thammasat University, had been appointed as the new
prime minister. At that point, many people cheered and ran into
the streets shouting victory. Late that night Professor Sanya ad-
dressed the nation by television and radio, promising a consti-
tution and election within six months.
Thereafter thousands of students and other demonstrators
congregated at Democracy Monument where speakers were
asking them to disband and go home. Many students, however,
were still angry over the slaughter of hundreds of young and
unarmed people. They argued that it was not enough that the
government had resigned as long as Field Marshal Thanom re-
mained supreme commander of the armed forces and Prapas
was still director general of the Police Department. Many
demonstrators wanted to continue the protest until they were
sure that Thanom and Prapas were powerless; others wanted
to see both men dead. The hard-core “Yellow Tiger” commando
unit of the students directed their hostility to the metropolitan
police headquarters, which was now symbolic of the entire
police force. The police protecting the headquarters had ma-
chine guns; several students had rifles and pistols.43
The gun battle between students and police in and around
the police headquarters lasted from late on 14 October until
the following afternoon. At 7:00 A.M. on 15 October, the com-
mando students at Phanfa Bridge were still holding out but
were planning to retreat to the Democracy Monument. It was
reported that a doctor, a medical assistant, and five nurses had
been shot dead near the bridge by what was believed to be ma-
chine gun and M-16 rifle fire as they were tending to casualties
in the “battlefield” facing the metropolitan police headquarters
several hours before dawn. As the battle ensued, hundreds of
demonstrators were gunned down as they tried to close in on
the police headquarters.
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Finally the police abandoned the building when the students
set it afire. The technique they employed was as ingenious as
it was daring. After hijacking a fire engine at the scene, the
Yellow Tiger squad emptied the water from the tanks and si-
phoned gasoline from a nearby gas station. They then sent a
jet of the high-octane gasoline from a fire engine hose into the
metropolitan police headquarters near the bridge and tossed
Molotov cocktails into the pool of gasoline. An eyewitness at
the scene said, “Some were shot down, but the remainder suc-
cessfully sent gasoline from a powerful hose into the building
and then set in on fire.”44 In the meantime, rioting students and
the public, many of them in their teens, roamed the streets,
packed into commandeered buses and trucks, and burned down
or smashed most of the city’s police booths, traffic lights, and
traffic signs.
At about 9:00 P.M., an unexpected calm came over the ri-
oters when it was announced via radio and television that Field
Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal Prapas
Charusathien and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn had left the
country.45 As the gatherings dissolved, bus companies joined
army buses in giving students free rides home while other
students remained to direct traffic and put out the fires. It
was clearly a victory for the students and other demonstrating
civilians. Not a single uniformed policeman was in sight on the
streets of Bangkok. One student, armed with a fire hose to fight
the flames which still raged along Rajdamnern Avenue, summed
up the significance of these historic ten days in October when
he remarked, “We have made a new Thailand but it cost us a
lot.”46
The Revolt in Retrospect
While the role of the students in overthrowing the military gov-
ernment was no doubt the most significant contribution to its
downfall, there were other groups and certain conditions which
aided the students’ cause. A major supporting condition was the
growing cleavages within the military itself which had under-
mined much of the support for the Thanom and Prapas regime.
The Royal Thai Navy, which had remained subservient to the
powerful army cliques ever since the “Manhattan Affair,”47
openly supported the students’ cause. Even within the army and
the air force there were officers who found reasons not to come
to the aid of the police force while it was under siege by the stu-
dents. The intellectuals and former opposition politicians also
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helped the students’ cause. Common laborers and other civilian
workers who went out on wildcat strikes in August and Sep-
tember aided in creating the atmosphere for revolt, and many
of these people also participated in the demonstrations against
the government in October.
The overall effect of the efforts of the students and their sup-
porters was the creation of a free but chaotic atmosphere in the
immediate aftermath of the revolt, at which time the NSCT and
other breakaway student groups attempted to consolidate their
power. More important, the student revolution created in its af-
termath at least the atmosphere, for change. Significant steps
toward the establishment of democratic institutions could now
be taken.
STUDENT ACTIVISM AFTER THE OCTOBER
REVOLT
The successful student revolt of October 1973 marked a sig-
nificant departure from all previous changes of government in
Thailand. The new government was not only run by civilians
but it had ascended to dominance through the efforts of a
prolonged and well-organized demonstration led by students.
Moreover, the victory for the civilian-led government was ob-
tained at the expense of the army and the police even though
these two groups were in complete control of a government
ruling by martial law. This was no small accomplishment, and
the students were quick to grasp the implications of their in-
creased power base. While the period immediately following the
formation of a civilian government showed a sudden decrease
in general civilian protests and related political activities, there
was a steady increase in student activism and protest demon-
strations throughout the country.
In the months immediately following Sanya Thammasakdi’s
accession to the post of prime minister, student protests were
mounted against provincial governors, high-ranking university
officials and other educators, a major Thai newspaper, the
United States ambassador, and certain American military offi-
cials. One such protest occurred on 21 October and involved
an estimated five thousand students in the northern province
of Lamphun. Students demanded and obtained the resignation
of the governor, Rond Thasanachalee, for alleged corruption in
administering a fund allocated for local school projects.
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More important than the shift in government officials at
the top of the bureaucracy was the fact that the appointment
process, so prevalent in the Thai bureaucracy, was overruled
in favor of a democratic elective process. As this system of
selection became accepted, it permeated various levels of the
government bureaucracy in other educational and service-ori-
ented institutions. Moreover, significant changes began to take
place in making the traditional bureaucracy more accountable.
While there were early indications that other institutions (such
as Kasetsart University) were ready to adopt the new system,
there were also signs of resistance to this system by those
who maintained that it was incompatible with Thai culture. In
the meantime, student leaders blacklisted many of the high-
ranking officials in the bureaucracy. Although the students were
seldom able to have these people removed from government
service, they did manage to have many of them transferred to
less sensitive positions in some of the most remote provinces
of Thailand. The students therefore effectively utilized the age-
old bureaucratic technique of transfer in order to remove many
supporters of the Thanom-Prapas clique.
Some student leaders, however, realized the necessity to
change the cultural values of the established authorities, par-
ticularly those of the educational administrators. An informal
practice which eventually came to be known as lang kru
(“washing” or “cleanup”) began to be carried out by students
at every level of the Thai education system, particularly in the
universities and high schools. The ostensible purpose of the
“washing” exercise was to modernize teacher attitudes toward
students and to promote student-oriented programs. Moreover,
it grew out of the students’ desire to have teachers understand
their values, behavior, and aspirations. The harsher interpre-
tation of lang kru‚ however, is to “clean out,” by removal or
transfer, teachers seen as corrupt or reactionary. Protest
leaders realized that if permanent acceptance, tacit or real, of
the democratic innovations proposed by the students was to
become a reality, change in various crucial levels of the Thai bu-
reaucracy had to take place.
Another significant departure from all previous Thai student
movements was the emergence of influential independent
student organizations which broke away from the moderate
centrist positions of the National Student Center of Thailand.
The most significant of these organizations was the Free Tham-
masat Movement led by Seksan, the political science student
who played a significant role in the demonstrations leading to
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the overthrow of the military regime. A close affiliate of the
Free Thammasat Movement and an apparent counterpart at
Chulalongkorn University was the Independent Chulalongkorn
Student Group. Both student organizations were extremely na-
tionalistic, and both supported more socialistic positions on do-
mestic issues and anti-imperialistic positions on foreign policy
issues than did the National Student Center.
A New Wave of Protest
These two groups continue to be in the vanguard of the protest
demonstrations for structural and policy changes in Thai gov-
ernment. In fact, it was the Independent Chulalongkorn Student
Group which launched a citywide protest against the newly ap-
pointed American ambassador William Kinter in mid-November
1973. Posters demanding “Chase Kinter Away!” were displayed
around the Chulalongkorn University campus while students
distributed more than thirty thousand leaflets at all the thor-
oughfares in Bangkok. The leaflets described Kinter as a career
military man and warned the Thai people that the new U.S. am-
bassador would be “war-minded” in his approach. Kinter had
been a colonel in the U.S. Army, in fact, and had also worked
for the CIA for two years in Washington. The leaflets further at-
tacked American “imperialism” and contended that:
American intervention in Indochina has caused adverse effects on
Thailand. Support for the previous military government has led
to the decay of democracy in Thailand, and American bases here
have tarnished the good image of Thailand as an independent
country.48
It took less than two months for Ambassador Kinter to fulfill
the students’ prophecy of intervention, for a widely publicized
CIA blunder provided adequate proof that this agency was in
fact meddling in the affairs of the Thai government. The bizarre
incident involved a CIA agent whose base of operation was the
provincial town of Sakhon Nakhon in northeastern Thailand,
an area where communist insurgents had steadily increased
their activities. The agent apparently sent a phony letter to
Prime Minister Sanya Thammasakdi, and several newspapers
as well, proposing a cease-fire with the insurgents in exchange
for granting autonomy to rebels in Thailand’s northeastern
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provinces. The letter from the CIA agent was sent in the name of
the local rebel commander of the estimated five thousand com-
munist insurgents in Sakhon Nakhon.
The CIA’s involvement was revealed by an apparent blunder
by a messenger boy who had the letter registered—thereby al-
lowing Thai officials to trace it to the CIA office in Sakhon
Nakhon. While Ambassador Kinter, in his official apology to the
Thai government, described the agent’s actions as a “regret-
table” and “unauthorized initiative,” suspicious Thai officials
wisely surmised that the letter was designed to assess the new
government’s response to a cease-fire with the communists. Ap-
parently the students also realized that the most regrettable
aspect of the incident, as far as the U.S. embassy was con-
cerned, was the fact that the CIA agent’s activities had been
exposed. With the support of most of the Thai-language news-
papers, the students launched a series of protest activities di-
rected at U.S. intervention in Thai affairs. On 6 January 1974,
Thai students laid a wreath in front of the embassy bearing
the slogan “Go home, ugly Americans.” The newspapers, mean-
while, carried anti-CIA editorials and cartoons.49
Hoping to stem the tide of anti-CIA and anti-American sen-
timent which was on the rise after the incident, Ambassador
Kinter disclosed on 8 January that the CIA agent responsible for
the letter had been transferred out of Thailand, and an embassy
spokesman revealed that “appropriate disciplinary action” was
being taken. The students were apparently unimpressed with
Kinter’s explanation, however, for on the very next night, 9
January, some five thousand students protested at the U.S. em-
bassy grounds while student leaders attacked the CIA over a
public address system outside the embassy gates. More im-
portant, several days after the CIA incident senior Thai officials
revealed that the CIA would be told to close its field posts and
stay out of Thailand’s internal affairs.
Previously the CIA had enjoyed the Thai government’s co-
operation for most of its clandestine activities. Operating out
of the political section on the fourth floor of the U.S. embassy
under the agency’s Plans Directorate, the department became
known as the “dirty tricks department.” The CIA operation in
Thailand had been one of the agency’s largest overseas units
and had cultivated an exceptionally close relationship with the
former Thai prime minister, Thanom Kittikachorn. According
to informed Thai sources, the relationship was so close that
Thanom often made himself more available to the CIA chief than
to the U.S. ambassador.
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During the same tumultuous weeks of the CIA incident,
thousands of Thai students gave Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka a hostile reception as he arrived in Bangkok for a two-
day visit. The students massed outside Tanaka’s hotel, blocked
all the entrances with buses, and demanded that Tanaka leave
the country immediately. They withdrew that threat and moved
the buses only after Japan’s ambassador accepted a list of de-
mands from them. These demands included:
1. All Japanese loans to Thailand must be without condi-
tions.
2. Japan must lift its import quotas on Thai products.
3. The Japanese government must educate all prospective
Japanese investors in Thailand regarding Thailand’s
needs, traditions, and culture.
Thereafter the students allowed Tanaka to leave his hotel, but
as he left they beat on his limousine and shouted “Japanese go
home!” The police did not interfere; only student marshals with
red armbands held back the noisy crowd of students who began
burning paper effigies of Japanese cars in front of the nearby
Japanese Trade Center.
During the months following the student revolt, a major
student protest was also launched against Thailand’s most influ-
ential Thai-language newspaper, Siam Rath, because of a letter
critical of King Bhumibhol. Two Thais in Sweden had criticized
the king for not controlling troops and police during the student
revolt in October 1973. At a student rally, the newspaper was
publicly burned as a symbol of the students’ discontent with
the letter and determination to censor the editor from further
publication. Shortly thereafter, the Thai police suspended the
editor’s license indefinitely for having published the letter. The
editor, Nopporn Boonyarit, tried in vain to defend himself by as-
serting that the paper was simply trying to expose attempts to
undermine the monarchy.
The monarchy, and particularly the present king, has always
commanded significant respect and admiration from all Thai
student movements. King Bhumibhol has been continually in-
volved in public activities, especially those related to Thailand’s
youth. Moreover, since his accession in 1955 he has personally
presented the diploma to every university graduate in the
country. A photograph snapped of each presentation is hung
on the walls of around fifteen thousand Thai homes every year.
While the student protest was an attack on the newspaper Siam
Rath and in support of the king, it had the intended effect of
Catalysts of the Transition: The Thai Student Movement
84
putting all newspapers on notice that public criticism of those
people and ideals held sacred by the new student revolution
would not be tolerated. Growing intolerance of criticism di-
rected at student-supported individuals and ideals became more
significant as the student leaders continued in their strategy to
change the Thai society and political system.
The Role of the NSCT
Public support for the main student organization, the NSCT,
continued after the October uprising. In fact, by December
1973 the NSCT had received almost 20 million baht (approxi-
mately $1 million in U.S. currency) in donations from the public.
Some of the money was used to help the families of those
who were killed during the uprising; other funds went toward
paying the medical bills of demonstrators who were injured. The
NSCT also set aside a huge sum as a proposed budget for the
Teaching Democracy Program which was to take place during
the 1973–1974 academic year, and university authorities coop-
erated with the proposed program by rescheduling classes for
students who wished to participate.
The NSCT’s Teaching Democracy Program was originally
designed to have people in all the provinces become aware
of the purpose and political implications of democratic insitu-
tions and principles. The students had planned to bring the
message to the people through the use of several thousand ded-
icated NSCT members who could spend their time and energy
“teaching democracy” in the outer provinces and remote vil-
lages of Thailand. The “teaching democracy” aspects of the
program became somewhat misleading, however, and after
initial setbacks the student leaders and advisors who were pro-
moting the program adjusted their objectives to provincial con-
ditions. Before the program had officially begun, FIST, the
newly formed breakaway student group from the NSCT, under
Seksan’s leadership decided to carry their cause to the
provinces. The westernized middle-class and urban background
which characterized many students of this group hindered them
from establishing the necessary rapport with the common
people of the provinces, however.
Learning primarily from the mistakes and successes of
Seksan’s experiment and the performance (or lack of it in many
cases) of the Democracy Development Program of the late
1960s, the Teaching Democracy Program was redirected in the
form of a domestic Peace Corps with a predominant philosophy
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approaching thought reform. To establish rapport with vil-
lagers, some five thousand students were selected for specific
assignments on the basis of their knowledge of the province
in question. Hence an attempt was made to assign students
from the northeast and south and other provincial areas to their
home towns; rather than “teach democracy,” they were to reac-
quaint themselves with the concerns of the villagers. Moreover,
students from metropolitan Bangkok were urged to shed their
urban and Western life-styles and live like the people whose in-
terests they wish to serve and to listen to the villagers’ problems
before discussing politics. Student leaders believed that the
success of their cultural revolution in the provinces would, in
large part, determine the permanency of the political changes
they had already achieved as well as the acceptance of effective
consitutional government in the future.
The Reemergence of Parliament
Serious problems soon arose, however, since the military
leaders were not ready to acquiesce mildly to the results of the
new order of government for any length of time. The military
had played a significant role in the Thai government’s decision-
making process since 1932, and it was reasonable to assume
that they would remain a major influence in the shaping of the
new government in the future. In 1974 there was considerable
speculation that the military would resort to a coup if the dem-
onstrations became more violent or were directed against the
present military leaders or in the event that the ongoing student
movement became exceedingly leftist in nature and tactics.
As the proposed campaigns and platforms of the Prachatipat
and various other political parties began to enfold and dominate
the media in February and March of 1974, the role of student
leaders and activists became increasingly vague. The Thai
public and media, which had steadfastly supported the students
on almost every issue before, during, and after the October rev-
olution of 1973, began to turn their attention to the upcoming
elections and criticize the behavior and proposals of student
leaders.
Moreover, it seemed as though the public had begun to show
weariness with the many strikes, demonstrations, and the some-
times violent fighting among students from various vocational
schools which had become commonplace in the three months
which followed the October revolt. Since the military had been
overthrown and the new constitution was already drafted, the
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public seemed to feel that the students had accomplished their
main mission. Therefore, in view of rising inflation, the energy
crisis, and a sagging economy, the Thai public became more in-
terested in practical solutions and traditional approaches to po-
litical change.
The student leaders, however, remained determined to con-
tinue the movement even though it had lost much of its mo-
mentum by March 1974. Students began to attack various ac-
tivities of the government and business leaders in search of an
issue that would gain nationwide support. With the major op-
position—the former military ruling clique—no longer in power,
even the moderate NSCT had a difficult time persuading a
public suffering from a major economic depression to support
them on various idealistic issues.
Events in Thailand in the months of May and June 1974
increased the power of the moderately liberal civilian gov-
ernment. A brief military alert after the resignation of Sanya
and his cabinet gave rise to speculation about a return to mil-
itary rule, but Sanya was persuaded to resume office and, in
doing so, rid the cabinet of all remnants of the old military
regime. In their place he appointed younger and moderately
liberal persons of high integrity. In the meantime, organized
student groups began to ally themselves with worker and
farmer causes. They were successful in organizing strikes
among textile and other workers and forced the resignation of
several high-ranking government officials.
The Sanya government and the Thai bureaucracy continued
to avoid confrontation by appeasing the new forces on the
left. Between October 1973 and June 1975, about 90 percent
of the demands of all major protest movements by students,
workers, and farmers were eventually met by the government.
Overall this period of transition witnessed an unprecedented
proliferation of interest groups in Thai politics. The prospects of
some of the new groups, moreover, began to improve at the ex-
pense of old established groups. While for the most part violent
confrontation between these old and new forces was avoided
during this period, the prospects for a stable government and
a lasting parliamentary democracy became a major concern of
the 1975 elections.
The election of 1975 was to be an important step in the
process of building lasting democratic institutions, and many
university students and intellectuals helped organize and
support the new socialist-oriented political parties (the Socialist
Party of Thailand, New Force Party, Farmers Party, and others).
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The campaign and elections of 1975 also created an atmosphere
for participation of previously unrepresented sectors of Thai so-
ciety.
Between 1973 and 1976, student activism as well as all
other forms of protest behavior against the government gained
momentum and became a significant means for political change
in Thailand. Workers, farmers, fishermen, teachers, and nu-
merous other grass-roots organizations began to mobilize and
press demands upon the fragile civilian governments of Sanya
Thammasakdi (1973–1975), Seni Pramoj (1975), and Kukrit
Pramoj (1975–1976).50 By 1975, student protests had become
more radical and leftist in orientation and tactics. Leadership of
the student body at Thammasat University in 1975, for example,
claimed to be Maoist and promoted anti-imperialist, antimil-
itary, and anticapitalist demonstrations. Some student factions
even claimed to be antimonarchy.51 In attempting to promote
their socialist causes, some of these politically conscious stu-
dents from Thammasat were resisted by right-wing student
groups and often confrontation and violence resulted. This was
the case in October 1976 when a mass protest demonstration
by students at Thammasat University led to a bloody battle be-
tween leftist students, right-wing youth groups, and the police.
The battle at Thammasat precipitated a declaration of martial
law by military leaders, the end to the newly elected gov-
ernment of Seni Pramoj, the closing of Parliament, and an end
to all other forms of political participation by students, workers,
and farmers.
Return to the Right: 1976–1979
After the 1976 clash between students and the police, the
staunchly conservative regime of Thanin Kraivixien began a
campaign to suppress all forms of activism by students,
workers, and farmers. It was during this period (1976–1979)
that numerous assassinations took place, particularly among
leaders of various farmers’ organizations. It was also during this
period that many of the student leaders and a few labor leaders
and socialist politicians fled to the jungle and joined the Com-
munist Party of Thailand. Most notable among the students who
decided to continue their struggle in the jungle with the com-
munists were Thirayuth and Seksan, who eventually became
prominent members of CPT front organizations in 1977.
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Meanwhile, student-initiated activism at the major univer-
sities involving political issues was reduced to nil. Political cam-
paigns and elections, which have traditionally been a means
of student leaders to revitalize student interest and activism,
failed to attract participation in 1979. In fact, in the 1979 cam-
paigns and elections university students were most conspicuous
by their absence.52
The years from 1976 to 1979 seemed like a return to the
late 1960s as student activities on the Thai university campuses
were manifested in nonpolitical issues such as degree require-
ments. Moreover, most violent confrontations occurred among
students from different universities or among students from
various disciplines at the same university. Unrest among Thai
university students in 1978–1980 was characterized by battles
involving vocational and engineering students over traditional
university rivalries and included the use of guns, knives, and
plastic bombs. In September 1979, one such student riot was
apparently sparked by a soccer match between rival schools at
the national stadium. In what was reported by observers as an
“orgy of violence,” ninety-one students were arrested, several
students were shot, and some policemen were injured.53
The Reemergence of Student Activism
After the 1979 elections and a shift away from the conservative
policies of Thanin to the more liberal regimes of Kriangsak
Chamanand and Prem Tinsulamond, student leaders at some
of the major universities began to resurface and promote po-
litical reforms. In the fall of 1979, a memorandum from student
leaders at nineteen Thai universities was sent to Vietnamese
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong protesting the exodus of
refugees from Vietnam to Thailand.54 This memorandum did not
in any way oppose the Thai government and in fact supported
the government’s policy at the time. It was significant, however,
in that student leaders were once again gaining visibility and
beginning to articulate positions on political issues.
This strategy of using a mild form of political protest on a
national policy issue had been used by NSCT leaders in No-
vember 1972, we recall, to mobilize students in a week-long
Anti-Japanese Goods demonstration. That protest rally, which
was also in keeping with the prevailing government sentiment,
even gained praise from the Thanom government and the king.
The major difference, of course, is that in 1972 the NSCT did
much more than write a memorandum. The earlier student
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leaders of the NSCT seized the opportunity and gained national
recognition by taking action through promotion of a boycott,
protests, and demonstrations.
The new student leaders of the 1980s began their first
demonstration in almost four years when two hundred uni-
versity students protested a move by the military officers and
politicians to extend the term of General Prem as army
commander-in-chief. Normally in a civilian government this post
is held not by the prime minister but rather by another person,
usually a high-ranking military officer. The students protested
that extending Prem’s term as army commander-in-chief would
lead to a revival of the “dictatorship” and martial law of pre-
vious Thai military governments. Major political parties, pri-
marily the Democrat Party (Prachatipat), openly opposed
Prem’s extension, and the students became part of this tra-
ditional form of protest. After holding their protest rally, the
students went to the Democrat Party headquarters to support
parliamentary opposition to the extension.
About a month later, in December 1980, leaders of nineteen
student unions joined representatives from the Labor Congress
of Thailand (LCT) at the House of Representatives and formally
recommended that the government reconsider the price of
sugar, introduce clear and effective measures to stop hoarding,
control the price of commodities, and announce a guaranteed
just price for agricultural products.
Some weeks prior to the presentation of these recommenda-
tions to Parliament, students from Thammasat, Chulalongkorn,
Mahidol, and Ramkamhaeng universities displayed placards at
the Ministry of Commerce denouncing the “irresponsibility” of
raising sugar prices. The students also planned an antigov-
ernment campaign, but they called it off when Deputy Prime
Minister Boonchu escalated his verbal offensive against them.
Instead, Anuphap Choon-orn, president of the Thammasat Uni-
versity Student Union, decided that this student committee
would “collect facts and data on the general economy and
present them to the government’s economic team for consider-
ation.”55 When pressed by a reporter, Anuphap admitted that
the strategy had been changed because “the students have
no power to pressure the government.”56 The government re-
sponded to this more compromising approach in a positive way.
The following month labor and student representatives were in-
vited to the House Economic Commission meeting at the Parlia-
ment Building to discuss the LCT’s recommendations to the
government on economic issues.57
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Hence the student leaders began to broaden their base for
support among workers but kept within acceptable forms of op-
position by bringing their grievances to Parliament. Throughout
1980 and 1981, student leaders continued to “use the system”
by presenting their demands and grievances to the appropriate
committees of Parliament.
The Revival of Direct Action
In April 1982, however, the students resorted again to direct
action and began a protest demonstration at Government House
on the issue of bus fares. The bus-fare issue had once before
been a rallying point in 1969 when student leaders used it
to mobilize students and workers against the government of
Thanom. In fact, it was the bus-fare issue that helped give cred-
ibility and support to university students’ political activities.
Immediately after the student demonstrations succeeded in re-
ducing bus fares to the original price in 1969, representatives
of various universities met to establish the National Student
Center of Thailand.
In keeping with the antimilitary tone of the new activism,
student leaders from Thammasat and Chulalongkorn univer-
sities submitted a joint letter to Prime Minister Prem asking
him not to choose his close associates and military officers to
fill seventy-five newly vacated Senate seats. The letter warned
that if General Prem continued to select senators from military
circles and those close to him, “he would face more political up-
heavals.”58
Just prior to that letter, students from four universities had
gone to Government House with an open letter to Prime Min-
ister Prem demanding a review of the bus fares, which had gone
from one to two baht. By the end of the day, after vocational
students chartered buses to join the gathering, the student
protest group had grown to about three hundred. The activists
threatened “strong action” by student leaders of all universities
and labor unions to press the government for a reduction in the
city bus fare.59
In the fall of 1982, student leaders began using new tactics
such as prolonged sit-ins, hunger strikes, and other nonviolent
means to get the government to negotiate with them on the bus-
fare issue. In November a huge rally of three to four thousand
people was organized by nineteen student unions and workers
at Thammasat University to oppose the increase in bus fares.60
At about the same time, however, another student group
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pledging opposition to the nineteen student unions emerged.
The spokesman for this “loyalist student group,” Samsak
Kaewsakul, claimed that his group “represented the majority of
the university students while the nineteen student unions rep-
resented the minority whose main purpose was to destroy the
nation’s economic system under the guidance of the country’s
enemy.”61
At the end of November, the student activists began a
hunger strike and sit-in at Government House. The students de-
manded to deal directly with Prime Minister Prem, rather than
with his ministers, and set a deadline of 30 November at mid-
night. Pressure mounted as the hunger strike intensified and
several labor unions joined in support of the students’ demands.
When Prem received reports that at least two of the hunger
strikers were near death, he returned from the People’s Repub-
lic of China where he was on an official mission.62
In a bizarre confrontation witnessed by the author, one of
Prem’s ministers maneuvered right up in front of the student
leaders’ podium at Government House in a small police car
about one hour before the deadline. Never leaving the police
car, he addressed the protesters through a microphone and
student leaders responded in the same way—although the two
parties were less than three feet apart. After several exchanges
the minister apologized, explaining that Prem was still en route
at Don Muang airport. More important, the minister explained
that Prem had instructed him to inform the students and hunger
strikers that the bus fare would be reduced and he would meet
with the students and consider their demands regarding the
removal of certain government transportation officials. Within
the next two months Prem did follow through on most of these
promises made to the students.
Some observers believed that the events in late 1982 were
a genuine revival of the student movement and would even-
tually precipitate a coup. In an interview with the author in
December 1982, however, Prime Minister Kukrit revealed that
“those people who were threatening a coup were probably the
same people who were behind the student activists in order to
create the conditions for a coup.” The following chapter places
the 1975 and subsequent elections and the Thai Parliament in
historical perspective while detailing the activities of the politi-
cians associated with this important aspect of Thai politics as an
oppositional force.
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The Thai Parliament as an
Oppositional Force
In our country the king is the one who takes the initiative, be-
cause he decides what should be done for the good of the country
and the well-being of the people in general. This is contrary to the
practice in any other country…. To conform with the way of the
European kings in ruling over a country like Thailand is imprac-
tical. For example, if we establish a parliament, there will be few
people who will be qualified as members; not all of them will un-
derstand governmental affairs, because they lack knowledge and
obvious training. The people may be upset, because they do not
understand; they think that this is unnecessary.
Thus spoke King Chulalongkorn, one of Thailand’s greatest
monarchs, and despite the passing of nearly a century, the
king’s comment would no doubt be held by many Thais to have
the same validity today as it did in the nineteenth century. For
amidst the swift current of events sweeping Southeast Asia,
Thailand has attempted not only to cope with vastly changed ex-
ternal intricacies but simultaneously to continue its creation of
a viable democracy.
This process of building a democracy, begun in earnest with
the October 1973 overthrow of the Thanom Kittikachorn
regime, has given rise to a situation in which the Thais may
long for any sort of authority which takes the initiative and
which can articulate and put into action a policy clearly for the
well-being of the country and its people. Rather than a bright
new world once the military retreated to the wings of the po-
litical process between 1973 and 1975, traditional values seem
to have crumbled. And as King Chulalongkorn predicted, most
of the populace were indeed upset, because they did not and for
the most part could not understand the process of which they
have become a part.
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CONSTITUTIONALISM: POLITICAL PARTIES AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
The periodic creation of political parties and national elections
provides some basis for conventional types of political partici-
pation for the Thais. Participation in elections, however, except
for a very small group of the voting Thai population, has been
characteristically ceremonial in nature. This is especially true
of the campaigning and elections which take place in the
provinces.1 Constitutionalism in Thailand, as elsewhere in tran-
sitional Southeast Asia, has served the country’s political
development by being a main element in the justification of po-
litical power.2 It has also been a symbol of the process of ad-
mitting broader groups into the political process while allowing
the ruling bureaucratic and royal elite to maintain their tradi-
tional status.
Constitutions, although manipulated and remade to serve
the regime in power, have created several basic institutions
that continue to have a certain vitality. With the nonpolitical
king as a point of stability, the cabinet and national assembly
are now, for the most part, established aspects of the Thai po-
litical system. National elections have been the most significant
aspect of the development of constitutionalism and are usually
carried out to meet specific constitutional provisions for the var-
ious national assemblies. The elections in April 1979 were the
fifteenth in an irregular string of national elections together
with various constitutions extending back to 1932.
The direct purpose of every election so far has been to
return candidates to a national representative assembly. Leg-
islative prerogatives are carefully limited, however, and political
discussions have had little relationship to political decision-
making. Participants in the House of Representatives have little
realistic expectation of influencing events since elected repre-
sentatives are balanced by appointed senators presumably loyal
to the governing group.
This persistent presence of appointed members in every as-
sembly since the first one in 1933 has characterized Thailand’s
political development as a “tutelary democracy.”3 The influence
of an absolute, paternalistic government and autocratic bureau-
cracy cannot be underestimated; it has usually been reflected in
the activities of the National Assembly, even though elected rep-
resentatives did force three no-confidence votes upon the gov-
ernment between 1932 and 1939. This form of political action
was successfully limited by the constitution of 1968, which pre-
The Thai Parliament as an Oppositional Force
94
vented the House from calling a no-confidence vote at all. The
1974 constitution, however, reinstated this power to the House
of Representatives. By 1970, Thai political parties were still in
their beginning stages of development and were more like po-
litical clubs or parties of “individual representation.”4 Because
of intervening periods of autocratic repression, political parties
have not been active between elections, and only one, the De-
mocrat Party, has maintained any continuity since its founding
in 1946.
It should be noted that the Social Action Party established in
1974 and headed by Kukrit Pramoj and the Thai Citizens Party
created in 1978 and headed by Samak Sundaravej have made
significant gains at the expense of the Democrat Party. Both
Kukrit and Samak were once leaders in the Democrat Party but
broke away to form their own political parties.
Most parties are still the personal followings of individual
leaders, or fronts for the autocratic cliques who control political
power, and tend not to be ideologically oriented. Political in-
terest and the political process are still a combination of many
loosely related functions within Thai society. The representation
of specific opinions and the aggregation of these opinions into
sufficiently strong public demand for government action are
concentrated within communal, personal, and social relation-
ships.
Opposition groups face a pervasive belief by those in power
that their independence will result in factionalism and sepa-
ratism. In the past, opposition politicians’ high-priced demands
for cooperation with the government contributed to the charge
of corruption and served to justify the coup d’etats between
1957 and 1971. The factionalism displayed during previous
brief periods of political activity has continued to the present.
The 1968 constitution provided less opportunity for democratic
opposition to the government than previous versions, and the
various restrictions became one of the centers of controversy
between the ruling group and elected representatives that
helped precipitate the coup of 1971.
The 1975 and 1976 elections, based on the relatively liberal
constitution of 1974, provided the first coalition of opposition
parties to take charge of the government. The civilian govern-
ments of both Seni Pramoj in 1975 and Kukrit Pramoj in 1976
were short-lived, however, and martial law replaced the fragile
parliamentary governments after the October 1976 coup. The
military has continued to resort to the coup when its interests
are perceived to be threatened by any form of opposition, even
Thailand in Transition
95
in the absence of ideological contention in Parliament. The fol-
lowing analysis of the elections between 1969 and 1979, and the
role of oppositional parties in the government formed after each
election, must be placed within the perspective of Thai politics,
which is dominated by military politics.
THE 1969 ELECTION
In 1969, as in 1975, there was a confusing array of candidates,
including party members who attacked the other government
candidates, independents who supported the government, and
others who fit neither progovernment nor opposition groups. Al-
though voters faced a difficult choice, it did heighten their in-
terest in the elections.
The results of the 1969 elections established in the House of
Representatives at least two opposition political groups: those
who were elected as nongovernment candidates, about seventy-
two in number, and the large group of seventy-two independent
politicians who could be expected to support or oppose various
government policies. The government party won about 35
percent of the seats: 75 out of 219. If the assembly was to
function, the ruling group had to come to terms with one or both
groups in order to gain support. The nongovernment political
parties divided into two tentative positions: the Democrat Party
and the Democratic Front Party.
The Democrat Party, with fifty-seven M.P.’s, had served as
both government and opposition but campaigned in 1969 as a
loyal opposition party. It had gained solid support in Bangkok,
where the party won all twenty-one available seats, and it also
won most of the seats in the northern provinces and a rea-
sonable share in the northeast and south. The party members
used good organization, campaigned on their policies rather
than as individual candidates, and pledged to try to amend
the constitution to make it more democratic. Thus they pre-
sented a conservative opposition, reasonably widely known and
respected.
Close to the policy position of the Democrat Party was the
Democratic Front Party, the third largest political party, which
elected seven members. It claimed to possess a large party
membership but nominated only fifty-four candidates. In parlia-
mentary maneuvering after the election, the leader shifted his
alignment away from the conservative Democrat Party toward
more extreme splinter parties and interested independents.
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This group of non-aligned M.P.’s included about thirty members,
approximately 50 percent from the smallest parties and the rest
from the independent House members.
In 1969, opposition parties had criticized the constitution
and during the campaign had promised to attempt its
amendment. With this purpose in mind, the prime minister was
questioned during the opening parliamentary debate on gov-
ernment policy. Visibly controlling his anger, Thanom stated
that the constitution would not be amended since it was pre-
sented by King Bhumibhol to the people.5 In later comments
to the press, opposition politicians elaborated on their criticism
that the government is not of the people until the elected rep-
resentatives are allowed to decide on its legitimacy through a
vote of confidence or no confidence.6 Maneuvers among the ex-
treme opposition aimed at unifying a position on a constitu-
tional amendment proposal, along with other “unreasonable”
demands by House members, eventually led to the 1971 coup
which settled the constitutional issue by declaring martial law
and dissolving Parliament.
THE 1975 ELECTION
The elections which took place in January 1975 were to be
a significant departure from all previous attempts at parlia-
mentary democracy in Thailand in that they were precipitated
by a student-led civilian revolt. In the midst of the student
and labor movements and increasing domestic trends toward
socialism, however, it was the Phuu Ying Yai, “Old Important
People,” who resumed control of the government. There was,
generally, a more liberal trend with a plurality victory for the
old loyal opposition (Democrat Party) and a surprising number
of seats (fifteen) for the new Socialist Party of Thailand. The
military and industrialists reemerged with significant influence
in the new government, however, as candidates associated with
the old United Thai People’s Party (UTPP), which had previously
been led by the deposed Prime Minister Thanom, won more
than a hundred seats under the banner of new party names. The
four major parties backed by former UTPP members included
the Social Justice Party which won forty-five seats, the Thai
Nation Party with twenty-eight seats, and the Social Agrarian
and Social Nationalist parties which won nineteen and sixteen
seats respectively.
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The problem of “independents” who had played a significant
role in the 1969 and previous elections was solved by the 1974
constitution, which banned independent candidacies. This new
constitutional provision—and the absence of a government
party—encouraged the emergence of more than forty political
parties, twenty-one of which won seats in the new Parliament.
Moreover, the plethora of political parties produced Thailand’s
first coalition government—the viability of which became
crucial to the success of the new Thai experiment with democ-
racy.
In 1969, the third largest party had just seven members
elected to Parliament; the 1975 elections resulted in nine
parties with at least ten seats and seven parties with fifteen or
more seats. Another significant difference was the trend toward
socialism, as socialist parties won more than thirty seats in the
new Parliament, Even the Democrat Party, which won a plurality
of seventy-two seats, advocated “mild socialism” as the path out
of Thailand’s economic crisis.
The multitude of parties added confusion to the election
process, even for the urban Thai in Bangkok. Although not
all forty-two parties contested seats in all the provinces, the
voter was confronted by more candidates and parties than ever
before. In Ubon province, for example, ninety-five candidates
representing more than twenty different parties ran for the nine
available seats.
While there were many new candidates, familiar faces as-
sociated with the military and industry still appealed to voters
in the provinces. Overall, about 50 percent of the candidates
elected had been closely associated with the old military estab-
lishment; around 20 percent had won seats in previous elections
under the former military party banner.
Seni Pramoj, leader of the Democrat Party and new prime
minister, was burdened with the responsibility of forming a gov-
ernment. As Seni struggled over the terms of alliances with
the leaders of loosely structured parties, the old UTPP groups
began forming a cohesive voting bloc. Even though the De-
mocrat Party won the most seats and had the apparent support
of the liberal New Force Party and the leftist Socialist Party of
Thailand and the United Socialist Front, it was the old UTPP
M.P.s and their allies which emerged as the dominant force
in the new Parliament under new Party banners.7 After the
new National Assembly convened for the first time to elect
the speaker and deputy speaker, it became apparent that the
“Allied Parties”—made up of several smaller parties and the
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Thai Nation, the Social Justice, the Social Agrarian, and the
Social Nationalist Parties—significantly increased their in-
fluence in Parliament.
In attempting to seek a compromise within the House of
Representatives, Seni was at first pressured by his leftist sup-
porters to make a policy commitment of U.S. withdrawal from
Thailand. The first policy statement to the public was that with-
drawal would take place “as soon as possible.” The next day,
after much alarm expressed by supporters of the U.S. defense
programs, this statement was changed to “withdrawal in
eighteen months time.” When reporters pressed Seni for an
explanation of the sudden policy change, none was given.
Thereafter, when Seni presented his government’s policy
package to Parliament, a no-confidence vote was requested by
the opposition. The result was a 151 to 111 verdict which ended
the brief tenure of the left-of-center coalition government. It is
noteworthy that the heated debate which took place just before
the crucial vote of no confidence centered on Seni’s pledge in
his policy manifesto that all foreign troops would be withdrawn
in eighteen months.
There was considerable apprehension on the part of many
Thais in Bangkok that the fall of the Seni government would
provide an opportunity for the military to stage a coup. In an or-
derly manner, however, the members of the House of Represen-
tatives elected M.P. Kukrit Pramoj, leader of the Kit Sangkhom
(Social Action Party), as prime minister to head the new gov-
ernment.
There was something characteristically Thai in making this
selection. Kukrit, cousin of the king and Seni’s younger brother,
seemed to be a wise and safe choice. Though an outspoken
critic of the military government for many years, Kukrit was also
very critical of socialist-oriented policies. He had already served
effectively as speaker of the House under Sanya’s temporary
government. As speaker he played a significant role in drafting
the new constitution and the rules which guided the new Par-
liament. As leader of an aristocratic party supported primarily
by bankers, Kukrit posed no serious threat to those of the
upper and middle class who supported a capitalistic economy.
As leader of the Social Action Party which secured only eighteen
seats in the election, he posed no real threat to the military-
backed parties. It was no surprise, then, when the military-
backed parties joined in a coalition with the Social Action Party.
Kukrit, unlike Seni, was not committed to a socialistic program
of reforms; according to one report in a Thai newspaper, “even
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the CIA would not object to Kukrit as prime minister.”8 Although
Kukrit’s coalition government had to meet the challenge of new
communist governments in Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam, as
well as the internal problems of growing violence between new
groups of militant rightists and leftists, he somehow managed
to survive as prime minister until he was pressured to resign
in early 1976. His departure prompted another election in April
1976.
THE 1976 ELECTION
Violence, which was primarily directed against socialist-ori-
ented parties and candidates by various right-wing groups
(NAVAPON, Red Gaurs, and others), did have an effect on the
1976 election results. Left-wing parties such as the Socialist
Party of Thailand, the United Socialist Front, and the New
Force, which together had captured thirty-seven seats in 1975,
won only seven seats in 1976. Some parties on the right such as
the Thai Nation doubled their 1975 seat total (from twenty-eight
to fifty-six). This gain was mainly at the expense of their right-
wing rivals, the Social Justice Party, whose seat total decreased
from forty-five to twenty-eight, and the Social Nationalist Party
which went from sixteen seats in 1975 to eight in 1976. Kukrit’s
own party increased its seat total from eighteen in 1975 to forty-
five in 1976, but Kukrit lost his bid for a seat and any chance
he may have had to lead the new coalition government. The
biggest winner of 1976 was the Democrat Party, which captured
a surprising 115 seats in the new Parliament—forty-three more
than the seventy-two they had won in 1975. The Democrats’
large plurality was the result of a sweep of the twenty-eight
seats in Bangkok and strong support in the north, south, and
northeast regions of the country. The Democrat Party captured
seats in traditional socialist strongholds in the northeast as well
as right-wing strongholds in the north and south.
The campaign violence perpetrated largely by the right,
as well as the flood of Laotian, Kampuchean, and Vietnamese
refugees who carried lurid stories of communist rule to the
villages and towns of northeastern Thailand, were apparently
important factors in the Democrats’ victory. Voters seemed in-
clined to reject both extremes and opt for a return to the middle
path.
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Coalition Government Revisited
The overall election results meant that Thailand would have
its second coalition government in scarcely more than a year.
While the Democrat Party had won a convincing plurality of the
vote, its 115-seat total was still twenty-five short of the majority
needed to form a government. Thus the game of negotiations
and compromise began once again, as various scenarios on pos-
sible groupings of parties were proposed.
The general feeling among most political observers was that
the resulting coalition might be unstable, but it would be more
stable than the preceding Kukrit coalition government if for
no other reason than the fact that only four parties had any
real bargaining power. It was generally surmised at the time
that unless parties holding less than ten seats in the new Par-
liament formed an effective coalition, three of the four major
parties (Democrat, Thai Nation, Social Justice, and Social Ac-
tion) would most likely form a solid majority. The “Under Ten”
coalition drive was a failure, however, and most of the candi-
dates of these parties were forced to join in a loosely organized
opposition with Kukrit’s Social Action Party. After a week of ne-
gotiations, Seni Pramoj, leader of the Democrat Party, formed
a coalition government with the Thai Nation Party (fifty-five
seats), the Social Justice Party (twenty-eight seats), and the
Social Nationalist Party (eight seats)—which represented a solid
206 of the 279 seats in Parliament.
The Issue of U.S. Troops
The status of U.S. troops, which was a factor in the demise of
Seni’s feeble coalition government in 1975, again became the
major source of controversy surrounding Seni’s 1976 coalition
government. There was much speculation that Seni would re-
verse the order handed down by the previous government of
Kukrit, which demanded that all American troops except 270
advisers leave Thailand by 20 July 1976. Prior to the 1976
elections, military leaders and various right-wing groups had
demonstrated in support of a policy which kept at least four
thousand U.S. troops in Thailand, while students and various
left-wing groups held a series of anti-American protests to get
all U.S. troops out of the country.
Some expected that Seni would at least modify the policy
on U.S. troop withdrawals to approach a compromise between
the forces on the right, some of which were part of his new
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coalition government, and those on the left. Instead, Seni held
firm to the policy put forth by his younger brother Kukrit. An-
nouncing his official decision in a formal address to the public,
Seni emphasized that “the total withdrawal of American forces
will be the right thing and a good thing in the furthering of
peace in Southeast Asia.” Moreover, Seni stated that removal
of U.S. troops was in keeping “with the trend of the times” and
this action did not necessarily mean that other powers would
fill the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal. When Kukrit
was asked to comment on Seni’s surprising policy statement,
as well as his own poor showing in the elections, the ever-witty
former prime minister simply stated that he “wasn’t surprised”
by Seni’s statement nor was he worried by his own election
defeat because “after all, it’s all in the family.”
The Pramoj family arrangement notwithstanding, the Seni
coalition government still faced critical social and economic
problems which were left unresolved by the previous Kukrit
government. Inevitably, in October 1976, the military again re-
sorted to the coup and martial law and halted the demonstra-
tions, riots, bombings, assassinations, and strikes which con-
tinued virtually unabated throughout Kukrit’s tenure as prime
minister and culminated in the bloody battle between gov-
ernment and students at Thammasat University.
THE 1979 ELECTION
After nearly three years of martial law, Thailand resumed its
experiment with democracy and elected 301 candidates to the
new Parliament in April 1979. As expected, Kriangsak
Chamanand was retained as prime minister and head of the
new Thai government. Kriangsak’s success was the result of the
solid support of the appointed senators comprising the upper
house of the Thai Parliament. Although only 89 of the 301 pop-
ularly elected members of the House of Representatives sup-
ported Kriangsak, he was not required to share power in a
coalition government as was the case in Thailand’s two previous
elections in 1975 and 1976. The difference was due largely to
the special provisions of Thailand’s tenth constitution, which
was passed during martial law by the National Assembly and
signed by the king in December 1978.
Many provisions of Thailand’s tenth constitution were new
only in the sense that they were absent from the relatively
liberal constitution of 1974. Key provisions of the 1978 con-
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stitution were actually retrieved from the 1968 constitution
drafted during the period of martial law under Thanom. While
some Thai officials felt that the status-quo-oriented constitution
was necessary to ensure a stable government, opposition po-
litical party leaders were particularly dismayed by the consti-
tutional provision which gave the prime minister the power to
appoint, with the king’s approval, all 225 senators to the upper
house of Parliament.
The 1979 election was characterized by low voter turnout
due to the overall lack of enthusiasm generated by the cam-
paign in general. Although the customary crowds would gather
at the usual places to hear speakers from the various parties,
there was a conspicuous absence of university students. In fact,
students had assumed a low profile ever since October 1976,
when the bloody battle with the police and right-wing groups
at Thammasat University precipitated the military coup which
eventually brought Kriangsak to power. The combination of the
relatively noninvolved Thai middle class and apathetic students
and intellectuals opened the door to the common poorer Thais
(phuu noi) in Bangkok.
As election day approached, these phuu noi began attending
rallies in greater numbers than ever. While election rallies of all
parties had always been an inexpensive source of entertainment
for many of the phuu noi of Bangkok, they were always followed
by a particular pattern of voting that resulted in Thailand’s
oldest and most respected opposition political party, the De-
mocrats, winning most or all of the seats in the capital. This
had been the case in all three previous elections, and a similar
pattern was being predicted by all the experts during the cam-
paign.
They did not reckon on Samak, however, who broke away
from the Democrat Party to start his own Thai Citizens Party
and captured the imagination and votes of the phuu noi.
Through astute oratory and techniques of mass appeal, he cap-
tivated the huge crowds at his rallies with a verbal barrage
against Kriangsak, the Democrat Party, and the Social Action
Party. The result was a surprising landslide victory for Samak
and twenty-eight other Thai Citizens Party members in
Bangkok. Thanat Khoman was the only member of the Democrat
Party who managed to win a seat in Bangkok; the other two
seats went to Kukrit and Dr. Kasem, both leaders of the Social
Action Party. Several virtual unknowns of the new Thai Citizens
Party swept aside many prominent politicians and former gov-
ernment officials. The losers in Bangkok included Boonying,
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leader of the Freedom in Dharma Party (Seri Tham); Bhichai
Rattakul, former foreign affairs minister; Damrong Lathapipat,
former minister of commerce; and Chalermphan Srivikorn—all
of the Democrat Party.
The defeat of the Democrat Party to the upstart Samak and
his Thai Citizens Party in Bangkok was only the beginning of
what was to become a complete collapse of the Democrats’
strength throughout the country. As the results began to come
in from the provinces, it soon became apparent that voters
in the traditional Democrat Party strongholds had shifted to
Kukrit’s Social Action Party. The Social Action Party eventually
won eighty-six seats in the provinces and eighty-eight seats
overall.
Voter turnout in the provinces, at approximately 48 percent,
was about the same as in previous elections and more than
twice that of Bangkok. The low voter turnout was not a contrib-
uting factor in the demise of the Democrat Party, however. The
Social Action Party’s success in the provinces was due largely
to the personal appeal of Kukrit, who gave numerous speeches
in provincial towns in support of his party’s candidates.
Kukrit’s “Tamboon Fund,” which began when he was prime
minister in 1975, was a new plan for rural development that al-
lowed farmers to borrow money from banks without collateral.
This lending scheme enjoyed wide popularity among the
farmers. Borrowing for agricultural pursuits required only a
“character interview” and was designed to free farmers from
loan sharks and high interest rates. Although the plan was
not completely implemented and had only moderate success,
Kukrit and his party’s association with the fund became well
known among farmers, who represent the majority of voters
in the provinces. Moreover, Seni Pramoj’s Democrat Party suf-
fered from the usual complacency after the success of the 1976
election, as well as the misfortune of leading a seemingly pow-
erless government when the military took over by a coup in Oc-
tober 1976.
The net result of the Democrat losses to the Thai Citizens
Party in Bangkok and to the Social Action candidates in the
provinces was a decrease in party strength in Parliament from
115 seats in 1976 to just 35 seats in 1979. Other new parties
which benefited from the Democrats’ collapse, as well as from
their own organizational efforts in support of Kriangsak, were
the Freedom in Dharma Party which gained twenty-six seats
and the National Democrat Party which won ten seats. Several
“old” parties also gained in strength even though some of their
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leading members lost in their bid for reelection. Such was the
case with Dr. Krasae, leader of the New Force Party, who lost in
his bid for a seat in Khon Kaen even though his party increased
its strength to eight seats. The Thai Nation Party decreased its
seat total only slightly from fifty-six in 1976 to forty-seven in
1979. Other smaller parties such as the Social Agrarian Party
(Kaset Sangkhom) remained the same as in the last election
with eight seats.
Complete results of the 1979 elections in Bangkok and the
provinces as well as a comparison with results of the 1976
elections are shown in Table 4. In all, forty-one independents
won seats, many of whom eventually formed the basis for a
Kriangsak-supported coalition with the Freedom in Dharma
Party and other smaller parties in the House of Representatives.
As expected, Kriangsak became head of the new government
after he was nominated to that post in a special session of Par-
liament. Kriangsak received only 89 of a possible 301 votes from
the elected members of the House of Representatives. The bulk
of his votes came from members of the Senate (222 out of 225),
all of whom he had appointed only months before.
The call for a special session by Kriangsak resulted in a
boycott by the four major parties in the House: the Social Action
Party, the Thai Nation Party, the Democrats, and the Thai Cit-
izens Party. Therefore Kriangsak’s successful nomination was
marred by the absence of nearly 200 of the 301 elected M.P.’s.
The timing of the special session remained a much debated
issue among the opposition parties and was even referred to as
“a plot to create enemies and topple the government itself” by
Social Action leader Kukrit Pramoj.9 In a much calmer atmos-
phere, Social Action’s deputy leader, Boonthing Thongswat, was
unanimously elected speaker of the House. With Kukrit’s deputy
in control of the House and the Social Action Party forming the
basis for opposition to Kriangsak and his hand-picked Senate,
the lines for future conflict in the new government were already
drawn.
THE “NEW” GOVERNMENT
While the SAP-led opposition was able to exercise some
leverage regarding future policy matters, its influence in the
formation of a new government was almost nil. Its weakness
was due largely to the limitations placed on the elected M.P.’s
by the 1978 constitution. In the 1975 and 1976 elections, a
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Table 4
Comparison of Election Results: 1976 and 1979
1976 1979
Party B P T B P T
Isara (Independents) — — — — 41 41
Prachakonthai (Thai Citizens) — — — 29 3 32
Seri Tham (Freedom in Dharma) — — — — 26 26
Prachatipat (Democrat) 28 87 115 1 34 35
Chart Thai (Thai Nation) — 56 56 — 47 47
Kit Sangkhom (Social Action) — 45 45 2 86 88
Dharma Sangkhom (Social Justice) — 28 28 — 1 1
Sangkhom Chart Niyom (Social
Nationalist)
— 8 8 — — —
Kaset Sangkhom (Social Agrarian) — 8 8 — 8 8
Palang Mai (New Force) — 3 3 — 8 8
Palang Prachachom (Populist) — 3 3 — — —
Sangkhom Niyom (Socialist Party of
Thailand)
— 2 2 — — —
Patthana Changwad (People
Development)
— 2 2 — — —
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Prachatippatai (Democracy) — 1 1 — — —
Naewruam Sangkhom Niyom
(United Socialist Front)
— 1 1 — — —
Pithakthai (Protect Thai) — 1 1 — — —
Thai Sangkhom (Thai Social) — 1 1 — — —
Dharmathippatai (Merit Is Right) — 1 1 — — —
Sangkhom Kaona (Progressive
Social)
— 1 1 — — —
Siam Mai (New Siam) — 1 1 — — —
Naewruam Prachathippatai (United
Democracy Front)
— 1 1 — — —
Rang-ngarn (Labor Party) — 1 1 — — —
Chart Prachachon (National Peoples) — — — — 10 10
Ruan Thai (Thai Unification) — — — — 2 2
Kit Prachatipathai (Democrat Action
Group)
— — — — 2 2
— — — — — —
28 251 279 32 269 301
B: Bangkok; P: provinces; T: total.
coalition of various members in the House comprised a majority
and therefore had the right to form a new government. The
1978 constitution prevented a majority of the elected M.P.’s in
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the House from forming the government, however, and instead
required a majority of the entire Parliament including the ap-
pointed Senate. The new constitution also allowed the prime
minister to select members to the cabinet with only the approval
of the president of Parliament, who was also the speaker of the
Senate. According to the new constitution, cabinet members did
not have to be selected from elected M.P.’s as was required
in all previous constitutions. Thus the new constitution’s em-
phasis on the appointed Senate and the speaker of the Senate
in the formation of the new government not only paved the way
for Kriangsak as prime minister but also provided him with a
rubber-stamp approval process in the selection of his cabinet.
While there still existed hard bargaining for cabinet seats
among Kriangsak’s supporters (such as the Freedom in Dharma
Party), the disruption which characterized the haggling for po-
sitions in the three previous coalition governments was greatly
reduced. This change was due not only to the absence of a
coalition government but also to the fact that the constitution
enlarged the cabinet to forty-four posts and therefore provided
Kriangsak with more seats with which to reward his supporters.
In the months immediately following the 1979 elections and
the formation of the new government, a more liberal trend
evolved as labor and other groups began pressuring Kriangsak
for reforms. In the meantime Kukrit, relying on his widespread
popularity and wit, undermined Kriangsak’s efforts to increase
support for his military-dominated government among the
elected M.P.’s. In July, only three months after the election,
Kukrit managed to rally the House unanimously to censor Kri-
angsak for not replying to Parliament’s proposal for reforms.
Kriangsak, conscious of his dwindling popularity, made a series
of concessions to government and private labor organizations
on wage adjustments and bonuses and changed several aspects
of the Labor Law. He also signed into law several of Parliament’s
proposals which deleted the discriminatory “alien father”
clauses of the Election Bill and repealed the infamous “danger
to society” bill which had allowed the arrest and indefinite
detention of anyone regarded as “dangerous” without due
process.
The delicate balance of the Kriangsak government shifted
dramatically only ten months later when, in February 1980,
a series of controversial oil price policies resulted in a near
no-confidence vote in the House and Kriangsak’s resignation.
General Prem Tinsulamond, a friend and advocate of the royal
family, agreed to form a new government. Prem replaced the
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military-dominated cabinet, including the position of deputy
premier, with respected civilians such as Boonchu Ro-
janasathien and Thanat Khoman. By choosing talented civilians
and familiar military leaders, Prem hoped to increase the like-
lihood of solving Thailand’s crucial economic problems and to
win a broader base of support in the House of Representatives.
But Prem, the honest and capable military leader, was
unable to transfer his skills of leadership to the position of
prime minister. Expected to solve problems of inflation, cor-
ruption, rural underdevelopment, and the like, he instead dis-
played an ineptness for making decisions on any of these critical
issues. His attempt at “consensus” by distributing cabinet posts
among the major coalition parties—Social Action, Thai Nation,
and the Democrats—created bitter party rivalry. In March the
Social Action Party quit the coalition after sharp disagreement
with the secretary-general of Thai Nation, who was the agricul-
tural minister. Prem’s hesitance on critically needed social and
economic programs and his aloofness with regard to the open
rivalry among his cabinet members prompted impatience and fi-
nally a coup in April 1981 by the Young Turks of the Thai mil-
itary.
The coup of April 1981, which was led by Gen. Sant Chita-
patuma and masterminded by Col. Manoon Rupekachorn, both
of the prestigious First Army in Bangkok, lasted less than three
days. The traditional takeover by the First Army in Bangkok,
which was usually followed by the commanders of the Second
and Third Armies in the provinces, did not occur. Instead King
Bhumibhol, in an unusual move, gave support to his friend Prem
by flying to Korat where the Second Army was based. This move
prompted most of the military forces to remain loyal to the Prem
government. The Young Turk faction, not wanting to engage in
an actual battle in opposition to the king’s apparent choice, dis-
banded in favor of Prem’s countercoup after several tense hours
of a standoff between the two military factions.
Prem returned as prime minister in the midst of mixed loy-
alties among many military officers. He offered amnesty to the
coup leaders but stripped them of their military status, re-
placing them with officers who had remained loyal during the
coup. Prem also reshuffled his cabinet to reward loyal factions
of the military, including the right-wing extremist Maj. Gen.
Sudsai Hasdin. The aftermath of the abortive coup gave rise to
a staunchly military-dominated government with a volatile but
powerless parliamentary opposition led primarily by Samak and
his Thai Citizens Party.
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THE 1983 ELECTION AND COALITION
GOVERNMENT
Throughout 1982 the military continued to maneuver in order
to consolidate its position in the Prem government, while the di-
verse political parties campaigned in preparation for elections
scheduled for spring 1983. As was the case prior to the 1979
elections, there was again widespread speculation that the mil-
itary would stage a coup to stall or even prevent the elections.
Instead, the military-backed politicians made several vain
attempts to change various election rules which threatened to
reduce the role of the armed forces in future Thai governments.
Moreover, Army Commander-in-Chief Arthit and several other
officers among the military elite attempted unsuccessfully to
pressure Parliament to repeal several democratic reforms in the
new constitution that were scheduled to take place after the
1983 elections. These reforms were part of a “Twelve-Year Plan
for Democracy” that was to begin with the 1979 elections and
culminate with the 1987 elections when all democratic reforms
(such as an elected Senate) were to be in place.
From its inception few political observers believed that the
plan for increased democratic reforms and successive orderly
elections every four years would succeed without being inter-
rupted by a military coup. Prior to the 1983 election, however,
the reform-oriented politicians and parties prevailed and pre-
vented the various maneuvers on the constitution attempted by
Arthit and his followers and at least stalled what some Thai
politicians referred to as the military’s attempt at a silent coup.
The 1983 elections were held as scheduled in April with
more than 53 percent of the eligible voters going to the polls.10
The voter turnout was the second largest in Thai history and
was to some extent due to the widespread publicity of the mil-
itary’s various attempts to alter the election rules and repeal the
democratic reforms of the new constitution. The overall effect
of these political maneuvers apparently assisted many of the
reform-oriented politicians and parties in the election.
The Social Action Party under Kukrit’s leadership increased
its strength in Parliament by five seats and led all other parties
with ninety-three seats, while the Democrat Party led by Bhichai
increased its elected M.P.’s from thirty-five in the 1979 election
to fifty-six M.P.’s in 1983. The Thai Nation Party led by General
Pramarn won seventy-three seats in the new Parliament, an in-
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crease of twenty-six from the 1979 election. Opposition leader
Samak also increased the Thai Citizens Party’s strength from
thirty-two seats to thirty-six.
Because none of these parties enjoyed an absolute majority
among the 324 seats in the lower house, a coalition government
of two or more of these major parties seemed inevitable. At first
it seemed that the Democrat, Social Action, and Thai Nation
parties would form the new coalition. After several weeks of
negotiation and speculation, however, the Social Action, De-
mocrat, and Thai Citizens parties joined with the newly formed
National Democracy Party, which had won fifteen seats, to form
a coalition government with a solid majority of 261 seats. To the
surprise of most Thai political observers this left the military-
backed Thai Nation Party in the role of the opposition. It also
resulted in a 44-member cabinet dominated by elected civilian
representatives and led by Prem, who was invited to continue
as prime minister as well as defense minister.
The election results and the formation of the civilian-domi-
nated cabinet were seen by many Thais as a major step toward
the development of democracy in Thailand. The military
leaders, Arthit in particular, did not abandon their attempts to
repeal various constitutional reforms in order to safeguard the
role of the military in future Thai governments, however, and it
seems likely that if the military is not accommodated Arthit may
resort to a coup or some other means to gain greater control for
the military in the new government.
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The Meaning of Thailand’s
Transition
Theoretically the shift in Thailand’s foreign and domestic policy
might best be represented in terms of its economic and political
system. There is little doubt that the predominant economic
system, adopted primarily from the United States, was based
on a scheme of monopoly capitalism. This infusion of Western
capital—either directly from a foreign government to the Thai
government or indirectly through multinational corporations,
which in some cases maintained 100 percent ownership (Fire-
stone, Toyota, and others)—was readily accepted by many of the
Thai government’s leaders (Sarit, Phibun, Thanom) to be the
proper path to economic development. Moreover, achievement
of economic development along these lines presupposed an ad-
vance in political development as well. It was generally be-
lieved that the necessary ingredients of political development
(national integration, national consciousness, democratic insti-
tutions, political participation, and so forth) would somehow
evolve as a result of economic development.
While Thailand’s economy was in fact developing by com-
monly accepted criteria (such as GNP), particularly under the
authoritarian regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, political
development lagged far behind and, some scholars maintain,
even declined.1 There is also some question as to whether the
overall goals of economic development were achieved. Along
these lines the overall efficacy of the so-called dependency
model of development—which assumes that priming the needy
pumps of developing nations such as Thailand with various and
continued external resources will eventually create self-suffi-
ciency—needs to be reevaluated.
Typical of the incongruities created by external assistance
to overall national development is the case of the Bhumibhol
Dam in Tak province. This project is located in a remote area
of rural Thailand and began with elaborate designs that would
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provide not only irrigation for agricultural purposes but also
electricity for rural households in the area. The irrigation aspect
of the plan was never fully implemented, however, and huge
cables carried the dam’s energy output to provincial capitals
and Bangkok while most of the villagers in the immediate vicin-
ity of the dam remained without electricity or easy access to
water. Such examples of the inequitable distribution of national
resources are characteristic of the consequences of the depen-
dency model of development as it was applied to the author-
itarian regimes in Thailand and other countries in Southeast
Asia.
The student revolution of 1973 which overthrew the Thanom
military regime forced open the Thai political system and al-
lowed—if not by design then at least by consequence—the par-
ticipation of previously locked-out groups representing various
sectors of Thai society. By the spring of 1975, in fact, protests by
various groups of students, workers, and farmers had become
a common, if not legitimate, form of political participation. The
predominantly socialistic orientation of the leaders of many of
the protest groups gave rise to speculation that these move-
ments were being infiltrated by “foreign communist elements.”
My purpose here is neither to support military speculation of
communist infiltration in the social movements in Thailand nor
to lend credence to the socialist cause. Rather I wish to present
an overview, through historical analysis, of the transition in the
context of the unprecedented events reflected in the student,
worker, and communist movements and the reemergence of the
Thai Parliament. It is from this perspective that I want to clarify
the implications of Thailand’s transition.
The articulation of demands by these new interest groups
revolved around a variety of basic structural changes in the Thai
political arena. During this period (1973–1976), most of their
demands were at least temporarily met by the Thai government.
In meeting many of these demands (for wages, land, and po-
litical enfranchisement, for example) the government’s transac-
tions frequently represented only the allocation of certain re-
sources to groups who were previously denied access to them.
In other cases, however, the transactions represented a sig-
nificant transfer of power—the power to review, investigate,
and initiate policy—to groups (students, workers, farmers, and
others) who were rarely, if ever, involved in the policymaking
process. The overall impact of the politics of confrontation on
the Thai political economy had only begun to be felt by the Thai
elite during this transitional period.
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The drama, tension, and subsequent negotiated settlement
that characterized each direct confrontation with the Thai gov-
ernment elite were fast becoming the modus operandi for all
groups seeking remedial action for their grievances. Although a
parliamentary process had miraculously evolved from the chaos
of this transitional phase of Thai politics, the spokesmen for
the new interest groups rarely worked through their represen-
tatives and usually bypassed Parliament entirely in achieving
concessions directly from the Thai government. Moreover, as
soon as one group was accommodated by the government, an-
other group, as if by chain reaction, would initiate the cus-
tomary phase of mobilization, articulation of demands, and con-
frontation.
THE ESSENCE OF THE TRANSITION
At the height of the drama surrounding a series of demon-
strations involving workers, farmers, teachers, students, and
even some radical right-wing organizations, one Thai offical re-
marked, “It’s as if the ground has begun to swell up around us.”
That remark, though made lightheartedly at the time, may very
well epitomize the essence of Thailand’s transition during this
period.
This historically significant time in Thai history was char-
acterized by unprecedented movements generated from
below—that is, at the very foundation of the Thai political
system. It was not in any sense a full-blown batiwat chownaa
(peasant revolution), but it was characteristically different from
all previous shifts in the Thai political system, such as Chula-
longkorn’s “adjustment” to the colonial appetites of the British
and French from 1890 to 1910, the so-called 1932 revolution
involving the overthrow of the monarchy, and the events of
1940–1946, involving the much publicized “shifty Thai politics”
during and after the Japanese occupation of Thailand. These il-
lustrations are typical of the classic style of political change in
Thailand, which had always taken place from above.
The grass-roots movements in Bangkok and the provinces
involving the phuu noi (common people) provided some ev-
idence to those who proposed that Thailand had, in the af-
termath of the student revolution of 1973, given rise to a “new
democracy.” Moreover, the socialist orientation assumed by
many of the leaders of these movements further supported this
notion. This ideological orientation toward socialism, while not
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new to Thai politics, underlies another basic distinction be-
tween this transition and all previous periods of political change
in Thailand.
Pridi Panomyong adhered to socialist principles and actually
attempted to institute several socialist-oriented policies during
his brief tenure as prime minister in 1946. His ill-fated plan
for political change was activated in characteristic fashion from
above, however, and was neither well received nor even un-
derstood by those who were supposed to be its main bene-
factors. Moreover, Pridi’s socialistic plans for political change
were characteristic of “bourgeoisie socialism” involving a shift
of power from the military to the educated civilian elite in im-
plementing change for the masses. His plans while prime min-
ister did not call for grassroots movements initiated and carried
forward by the phuu noi themselves.
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
The role of the Thai military during this transitional period was
one of “watchful waiting” while indulging in behind the scenes
political maneuvers affecting the new Parliament and coalition
governments. Although various military cliques did create po-
litical parties and field candidates which they lavishly supported
in political campaigns, this transitional period was marked by
an unusual degree of fragmentation in the ranks of all three
branches of the armed services and among the various levels of
Thai police.
There had always been tension between the various
branches of the Thai armed services and the police, but tension
within each branch of the armed services was a new phe-
nomenon. Cleavages were particularly evident in the Royal Thai
Army and the Thai police—between the old entrenched officers,
on the one hand, and the younger officers (Young Turks) and
new cadets on the other. There was an increase in tension and,
in some cases, a complete breakdown of lines of authority be-
tween ranking officers from comfortable elite backgrounds and
new officers from modest origins.
One important factor which led to vertical cleavages was the
growing communist threat in the provinces during this period,
a threat which necessitated the relocation of many ranking
officers from their customary comfort in Bangkok to remote
areas. Customarily the new recruits and young officers from
nonelite backgrounds were sent to these areas to engage the
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communists in battle while the so-called crack army divisions
led by officers of elite backgrounds remained in Bangkok. The
Thai military elite’s preference for Bangkok was based on more
than a liking for safety and comfort; it was also the most ef-
fective path to upward mobility within the military system. A
Thai army officer achieved promotion by finding and serving a
high-ranking patron—and by being in Bangkok when the next
military coup took place—and not through heroic efforts in
battles against the communists. There is a well-known saying
about the Thai military’s pattern of succession since Field Mar-
shal Phibun became prime minister after a successful coup:
“Sarit maa jaak Phibun, Thanom maa jaak Sarit, le Kris maa
jaak Thanom.” That is, Prime Minister Sarit came from his
patron Phibun, Prime Minister Thanom from his patron Sarit,
and so on down to present Prime Minister Prem and his
commander-in-chief of the Thai army, Arthit Kamlang-ek.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANOTHER COUP
Although the preceding chapters have focused on Thailand’s
“new left” perhaps at the expense of more conventional aspects
of Thai politics, it should be noted that a persistent fear of
a military coup was evident throughout the initial transition
period (1973–1976). Constant rumors about the military’s plans
to return to power circulated throughout Thailand during this
period and were particularly pervasive in the months of June
and November 1974. A brief military alert after the resignation
of Prime Minister Sanya Thammasakdi in June 1974 gave rise
to speculation of a return to military rule, but Sanya was per-
suaded to resume office and, in doing so, rid the cabinet of
most of the military officers left over from the Thanom regime.
A three-day battle with the police in Bangkok’s Chinatown in
November precipitated another general military alert, but Field
Marshal Kris vowed that he “would not be the one to perform
a coup,” even though he admitted that some officers wanted
to make the move to “preserve order.” There was a rumor of
a coup following the collapse of Seni Pramoj’s coalition gov-
ernment in February 1975, but this event did not even precip-
itate a military alert.
The power vacuum left by the military in the wake of the
student revolt of 1973 was filled only briefly by the students,
and the military remained a powerful influence in Thai politics
during this period of transition. Communist offensives in the
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spring of 1975, which led to communist governments in neigh-
boring Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Laos, caused considerable
apprehension among many military leaders. This series of
events—combined with the growing domestic upheaval among
Thai workers, farmers, and students and increasing demands by
members of the new Socialist Party of Thailand—seemingly pro-
vided a deterrent to any plans for a military coup.
Why was there no coup after October 1973? The reasons
are not entirely clear. Several members of the Socialist Party
maintained that it was primarily factionalism within the military
ranks that had stalled a coup; it would come, they said, as
soon as the military leaders became properly unified. On the
surface the military seemed content to work through the Kukrit
coalition government in accommodating the domestic social
forces and in pursuing a policy of rapproachement with the
People’s Republic of China and the new communist govern-
ments of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos.
During this period Kukrit played an active role in estab-
lishing Thailand’s international priorities in accordance with the
realities of the politics of détente in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s
new priorities included an exchange of ambassadors with the
People’s Republic of China and diplomatic initiatives to the
newly formed communist governments of Laos, Kampuchea,
and Vietnam as well as a shift away from what many Thais con-
sidered to be a neocolonial relationship with the United States.
Events after the successful student uprising of October 1973
did stimulate the growth of several right-wing organizations.
These groups were, and still are, led primarily by the traditional
Thai elite. The most notable among these groups which openly
opposed the leaders of students and workers was the Right-
Wing Protest Group (Phitak Chart Thai). The Phitak Chart Thai
held several rallies in May and June 1975 in Bangkok to warn
the Thai people about the left-wing groups who were “ruining
the country.” Therdphun Chaidee, leader of the hotel workers
union, and student leaders Seksan Prasertjul and Thirayuth
Boonmee were the prime targets of the angry speakers, who re-
ferred to them as “communists” and “Reds.” One speaker for
the Phitak Chart Thai, Phan Visut, blamed Therdphun, Seksan,
and Thirayuth for the unrest in the country—and urged his au-
dience “to get rid of them.” Phan said in one of his speeches
that he was particularly upset with the un-Thai-like behavior of
these “barbarians” in a protest at the U.S. embassy, who had
torn the eagle out of the embassy’s plaque and replaced it with
a drawing of a vulture.
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The Phitak Chart Thai rallies were poorly attended. The
first rally at the Sanam Luang grounds was greeted with cat-
calls and even stones, forcing the speakers to flee from the
speaking platform (which happened to be the roof of a truck).
Other rallies were without incident as they were afforded the
protection of the Kitin Daeng (Red Gaurs or Red Bulls), a mil-
itant right-wing youth group which became a prominent factor
in subequent elections and the 1976 coup.
Other less militant right-wing organizations such as the
NAVAPON were somewhat more successful in obtaining public
support, particularly among the Thai upper class. This organi-
zation, named in honor of the Nine Chakri Kings, was estab-
lished to preserve and promote the institution of the monarchy
and maintain traditional patterns of respect for all Thai insti-
tutions. The spokesmen for these right-wing groups were basi-
cally pro-American and anticommunist—and were well funded
by wealthy Thai businessmen. These groups were rather inef-
fective in their purpose of swaying the workers, farmers, and
intellectuals away from the growing socialist trends, however.
The Kukrit government and the Thai bureaucracy continued to
avoid confrontation by appeasing the new forces on the left.
After October 1973, most of the demands of all major protest
movements by students, workers, and farmers were eventually
met by the government. In short, this period represented an un-
precedented proliferation of interest groups in Thai politics. The
prospects of some of the new groups improved at the expense
of old established groups. While violent confrontation between
these old and new forces was for the most part avoided, the
prospects for a stable government and a lasting parliamentary
democracy remained doubtful.
As expected, the coup did come. In October 1976, after a
series of violent clashes between militant forces of the right-
wing Red Gaurs and leftist students and workers that finally
culminated in a two-day battle involving police and special mil-
itary commando units on the grounds of Thammasat University,
the military took over the reins of government. On the surface,
the threat from the leftist-oriented social forces seemed at least
temporarily eliminated.
There was a certain irony about the coup which finally took
place on 6 October 1976: Both the military establishment and
the extreme left (the Thai Communist Party) seemed to have
achieved their ultimate goals. On the side of the military, many
of the younger cadets and the middle-level officers (Young
Turks) under the domination of the Thanom-Prapas clique had
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often voiced their distress that former Prime Minister Thanom
and his deputy Prapas were exceptionally corrupt during their
period of tenure and had remained too long. What these military
officials were suggesting in a sense was that the military estab-
lishment needed an overhaul. There needed to be new blood,
new life, and a new source of energy to run the country via
a military government. On the other hand, certain Marxist-ori-
ented groups wished to divide the country along rightist and
leftist ideologies.
In 1972, except for members of the National Student Center
of Thailand, very few Thai students possessed what one might
call a political consciousness at all. Certainly no potential
seemed to exist for an extreme Marxist perspective. But the
events of 1973 and the transition period that followed, 1973 to
1976, allowed several socialist-oriented groups, even extreme
Maoist factions, to enjoy considerable success among students,
workers, and farmers and also among intellectuals at the major
universities in Bangkok, particularly at Thammasat and Chula-
longkorn. The promotion of Marxist economics became quite
commonplace from 1974 to 1976 on these campuses. Even some
traditionally conservative parties in the elections of 1975 and
1976 expressed a desire to include a mild socialist platform
among their other promises.
The events leading up to the takeover by Defense Minister
Sangna showed how successfully the leftist tactics and polar-
ization really worked when former Deputy Prime Minister
Prapas attempted to return home from exile in Taiwan. The
most visceral of the left and right factions battled openly in
the streets with guns, grenades, and other weapons. The return
of Thanom from exile in Singapore saw these events not only
repeated but reaching more violent heights which eventually
precipitated the coup in October 1976. The leftists who had con-
tinually raised the specter of oppression and militarism were in
a sense proved correct, as civilians witnessed the bloody battles
of Thammasat University and swift repression by the new mil-
itary government which included the arrest of thousands of
students, hundreds of intellectuals, and even the prime min-
ister himself. In the meantime the Thai Communist Party, aware
of the Thai government’s vulnerability owing to the political
upheavals in Bangkok and new demands by Laotian-speaking
northeastern Thais and various other politically isolated groups
(Meos and others), increased supplies of arms, weapons, and
ideology to these groups. The new communist regimes in Laos,
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Vietnam, and Kampuchea also began to step up their support
for guerrilla movements in the north and northeastern regions
of Thailand.
The suppression of all forms of opposition by the Thanin
government from 1976 to 1979 merely increased the growth of
the communist movement. The proliferation of CPT front orga-
nizations included hundreds of former members of the student,
worker, and farmer movements and even several former
members of the disbanded Socialist Party of Thailand. The in-
vasion of Vietnam by China and the subsequent split between
Chinese and Vietnamese factions of the CPT caused a serious
dilemma for CPT leadership, however, resulting in a dramatic
loss of membership and effectiveness in 1980.
The military politics of the abortive coup of April 1981 re-
sulted in the weakening of several key military commands in
rural Thailand through the removal of capable Young Turk of-
ficers on the list of General Sant’s supporters and their re-
placement by Prem loyalists. Moreover, some of Prem’s most
capable officers (such as General Pichit) were shifted from the
battle front to the First Army in Bangkok. This temporary disor-
ganization in the Thai military ranks may give the CPT strate-
gists the reprieve they need in view of the dramatic losses they
have suffered on both the political and military fronts since
1980.
Ironically, the viability of the Thai Parliament may well
depend upon the continued success of military-backed parties
such as the Thai Nation in the House to protect the military
budget and other interests. The Thai labor movement as well
as the entire economy are affected by military politics, which
protects its corporate interests through membership on various
boards of directors and constrains labor disputes through con-
trol of key positions in the cabinet (the Ministry of Interior, for
example). As long as Thai politics remains military politics, le-
gitimate oppositional forces such as the Parliament and labor
union movements will only be as influential as the prevailing
military leadership will tolerate.
If significant splits in the military such as the Young Turk up-
heaval continue to occur, various oppositional forces may tem-
porarily benefit from the rivalry among the military leaders. Yet
none of these oppositional forces except Kukrit’s Social Action
Party, or to a lesser degree the Thai Nation or Democrat parties,
could possibly fill the vacuum through democratic processes
while only the CPT, with possible Vietnamese backing, stands
ready to fill the vacuum through force. The latter scenario
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seems unlikely so long as the CPT Central Committee remains
dominated by Chinese-trained leaders and the dispute between
China and Vietnam continues.
THE 1983 ELECTION AND BEYOND
The various political party leaders readied themselves for the
April 1983 elections amid rumors that a coup by General Arthit
was inevitable. One concern was the new election laws that pro-
vided for winner-take-all in each district by the political party
whose candidate received the most votes. It was widely be-
lieved, as the political campaigns began to unfold in 1982, that
Kukrit’s Social Action Party would be the main benefactor of the
law.
Another concern of the military-backed government was the
growing support for an elected rather than an appointed upper
house in Parliament, which was in accordance with the “Twelve-
Year Plan for Democracy” that was officially enunciated during
Thanin’s regime in 1976. Any move to limit this means for direct
military involvement in the Senate was seen as a threat to the
military itself.
A third concern was the reemergence of student activism
in the fall of 1982 as student activists from Thammasat and
Ramkamhaeng universities began to mobilize, protest, and
demonstrate in a manner reminiscent of the early 1970s. In
the fall of 1982, a student protest and hunger strike at Gov-
ernment House eventually led to various concessions by the
Prem government which included the reduction of the bus fare
in Bangkok.
Some observers believed that the events in late 1982 were a
genuine revival of the student movement and would eventually
precipitate a coup. In an interview with the author in December
1982, however, Kukrit revealed that the student movement
seemed to be more contrived than real; he suggested that
certain military leaders (such as Arthit) were the primary bene-
factors.
The results of the 1983 elections seemed to provide Kukrit
and his Social Action Party the opportunity to play a central
role in the civilian-dominated cabinet of the new coalition gov-
ernment. While Kukrit and other politicians maintain that the
Thai parliamentary process is genuinely evolving to the point of
becoming an integral and permanent institution in Thai politics,
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there always remains the possibility that the military may again
opt for a coup or some other tactic to safeguard its role in the
Thai political process.
International events in Southeast Asia as well as domestic
political developments in Thailand in spring 1984 seemed to
lend credibility to Thai fears regarding the threat of Vietnamese
forces along the Thai borders and the growing influence of the
Thai military in Parliament.
On the international front, Vietnamese forces took the of-
fensive against the various factions of the and-Vietnamese
coalition operating in Kampuchea and along the borders of
Thailand and The People’s Republic of China. The Vietnamese
offensive included an assault against the Chinese-backed com-
munist forces of the Khmer Rouge near Thailand’s Sisaket
Province in the northeast as well as attacks on the Thai backed
non-communist forces of the Khmer People’s National Libera-
tion Front (KPNLF) and the Armée Nationale Sihanoukiste
(ANS) of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.
The Vietnamese offensive spilled over into Thailand and
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces in southern China. Inevitably,
Thai and Chinese military units became involved in a number
of battles with the Vietnamese forces in March and April of
1984. The Thai military amassed over 10,000 of its best troops
to stop the Vietnamese incursions and claimed a major victory
at Phra Palai Pass where, according to Thai sources, over two
hundred Vietnamese troops were killed as opposed to only ten
Thai troops. Meanwhile, after a week of intense shelling of
each other’s positions along the Chinese-Vietnamese border, a
Chinese regiment reportedly crossed the border, overran and
briefly held several strategic hilltops in Vietnam’s Long Son
Province.
On the domestic political scene in Thailand, Arthit and his
followers continued their attempts to increase military influence
in the Parliament and undermine opposition to military-backed
proposals. Newspapers in March 1984 carried full coverage of
criticisms of members of Parliament by Arthit who maintained
that most M.P.’s are elected by a populace that does not have
a full understanding of democracy. In apparent agreement with
Kukrit on the subject, Arthit argued that an understanding of
democracy is a key to national security. Arthit followed his
verbal attacks on various M.P.’s with another concerted effort
to change the 1983 transitory clauses of the constitution which
had reduced the power of the appointed senate in the Thai Par-
liament.
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The necessity for civilian-dominated governments to accom-
modate the military in order to assure stability and longevity
was poignantly recognized by Kukrit himself in an interview in
which he sarcastically argued that the military was “unfortu-
nately misunderstood” and there was “no danger” from them.
“When I was prime minister,” he said, “I stood to attention every
time a general came in to see me and that worked very well.…”
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